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Abstract 
Tuberculosis (TB) in Papua New Guinea (PNG) is a major public health problem.  In 
2013 the World Health Organization (WHO) estimated a TB incidence of 347 cases per 
100,000 per year in PNG.  This is the third highest TB incidence in the WHO Western 
Pacific Region.  Recent TB incidence studies in Western Province of 500 cases per 
100,000 per year, and 1290 cases per 100,000 per year in Gulf Province indicate that 
PNG has one of the highest incidences of TB in the world.  As well there is evidence of 
increasing numbers of drug resistant TB cases.  PNG faces major challenges in TB 
control.  The rugged terrain, poor road access, and major law and order problems 
provide enormous challenges in health service provision, including TB control.  In 
addition PNG has a weak health system which has been impacted significantly by a 
clientelist political system which has entrenched nepotism and corruption in health 
system governance directly affecting capacity to provide even the most basic health 
services. 
 
The WHO Direct Observation of Treatment, Short Course (DOTS) has been the PNG 
National Department of Health (NDOH) approach to TB control since 1997.  However, 
it was later, in 2006 that TB moved onto the health policy agenda in PNG becoming a 
so called Tier 1 priority disease.  Soon after a successful Global Fund to Fight Aids, TB 
and Malaria (GFATM) Round 6 Stop TB in PNG Grant application provided $US20m for 
a national rollout of TB DOTS to all 20 provinces in PNG. 
 
This research undertakes a health policy analysis of the formulation and 
implementation of the 2006 PNG Stop TB Policy.  Using policy analysis methodology 
the research describes and critiques the first component of the WHO TB DOTS Policy 
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“political commitment”, in both the formulation and implementation of the policy.  It 
analyses what “political commitment” means in the PNG context and how the 
particular PNG construct of “political commitment” provided the context for the 2006 
Stop TB policy.  The research then undertakes a detailed analysis of the 2006 policy 
“agenda setting” process examining the role and influence of aid donors and policy 
entrepreneurs and how power relationships influence policy in an aid dependent 
setting such as PNG. 
 
The research finds that political commitment is driven by cultural constructs 
of ”wantokism”, the “big man” and clientelism which entrench nepotism, corruption 
and consequent significant dysfunction in the PNG Health System.  Rather than 
addressing these entrenched governance constraints the 2006 Global Fund Grant 
established parallel structures in order to implement the TB DOTS policy bypassing, 
and even further weakening, the government health system.  One result of not 
addressing the significant structural governance issues was the temporary suspension 
of the Round 6 grant, the resignation of the NDOH as the Round 6 Grant Principal 
Recipient, and the appointment of World Vision, an international NGO, to oversee the 
implementation of the national TB DOTS policy.  The 2006 PNG Stop TB policy did not 
achieve its principle stated objective of achieving 80% coverage of the population with 
DOTS, detecting 70% and curing 85% of TB cases; nor did it result in a strengthened 
health system.   
 
This research identifies and adds new evidence based knowledge on those key factors 
which must be addressed in future approaches to health policy formulation and 
implementation in resource poor settings such as PNG.  Firstly, health policy must start 
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with a consideration of and address the major policy contextual issues and constraints 
especially with regard to political commitment as the first component of all health 
policy.  Secondly, examples of leadership do exist in PNG which take into account the 
common good.  These models require further research on how they can be applied to 
health policy formulation and implementation.  Secondly, where successful models of 
health policy implementation do exist, such as the PNG Churches Health services 
capacity to overcome the constraints of “wantokism” by “performance management” 
of staff with effective “hire and fire” strategies, these models need to be further 
researched so they can be better understood in the PNG context and  incorporated 
into future health policy formulation.  Otherwise donor funded health policy which 
may meet the short term needs of aid donors will continue to not result in sustainable 
outcomes in disease burden nor stronger health systems.  
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Part 1 – Introduction, Literature Review 
and Methods 
 
 
 
 
 
Part 1 of this thesis introduces the research (Chapter 1), the literature review to 
identify current gaps in knowledge and to refine the methods used in this research 
(Chapter 2), and the methods used (Chapter 3) to achieve the aim and objectives of 
this research. 

3 
1 Introduction 
 
 “DOTS is an internationally recognized strategy for delivering the basics of TB 
case-finding and cure.  It is not simply a clinical approach to patients, but rather 
a management strategy for public health systems, including political 
commitment as well as case-detection through quality assured bacteriology, 
short-course chemotherapy, ensuring patient adherence to treatment, 
adequate drug supply, and sound reporting and recording systems.” 
Source: (Stop TB Partnership and World Health Organization 2006) 
 
This research analyses the 2006 Tuberculosis (TB) Direct Observation of Treatment 
(DOT), Short Course (DOTS) Policy1 in Papua New Guinea (PNG)2, a resource poor 
setting with a weak health system still reliant on international donor assistance for the 
funding of the majority of its disease control programmes.  The research specifically 
critiques the 2006 PNG TB DOTS Policy. 
 
TB is a major health problem in PNG.  With an official TB incidence of 347 new cases 
per 100,000 per year3(UNDP 2015), PNG is ranked second, after Cambodia, among 37 
countries in the World Health Organization (WHO) Western Pacific Region (WHO 
2011).  TB control is a major disease control and health service challenge in PNG 
(GovPNG 2010) in a setting of a HIV epidemic (UNAIDS 2012) and rapidly emerging 
drug resistant-TB (Phuanukoonnon, Suarkia et al. 2008, Ahmadova, Heldal et al. 2012, 
Ballif, Harino et al. 2012, Kirby 2013).   
                                                          
1 The “2006 TB DOTS Policy” is used interchangeably with “2006 Stop TB Policy” throughout this thesis 
as even though the title of the WHO Global Strategy for TB Control changed from “TB DOTS” to “Stop 
TB” in 2006, DOTS was still the first and central component of the 2006 Global Strategy approach to TB 
control. 
2 PNG is used as the abbreviation for Papua New Guinea throughout this research. 
3 A detailed critique of the burden of TB in PNG is undertaken in Chapter 4. 
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 Papua New Guinea 1.1
PNG is the largest Pacific Island country, located in the Western Pacific, just below the 
equator, with Indonesia’s West Papua Province to the west, and Australia to the south.  
With a population of over 7 million people in the 2011 census, 85% of whom live in 
rural areas, and 42% living in the highlands region (WHO 2011), the population density 
is small for the size of the country, with large areas not settled by humans.  This is 
partly due to the terrain but has also been attributed to the impact of diseases, 
particularly malaria, limiting where humans could live as well as the density of 
settlement(Riley 1983). 
 
There are over 800 language groups (Serjeantson, Kirk et al. 1983, Wurm 1983, Foley 
2000, Pawley 2006) with significant cultural diversity and strong loyalty to language 
group (Ploeg 1993, Schmid 1993) which is reinforced by PNGs mostly mountainous 
terrain.  With a very limited road network, as well as many small islands, transport 
between the major centres and provinces is by plane or coastal shipping.  The capital 
city, Port Moresby, has no road access, beyond a few kilometres, with the rest of the 
country.  With these major access problems due to the terrain, high levels of poverty 
(Cammack 2008, Rogers, Bleakley et al. 2010), inadequate government investment and 
strategic planning, corruption, significant law and order issues, and human resource 
problems, health service provision is a massive challenge in PNG (Gibson and Rozelle 
2003, Bolger, Mandie-Filer et al. 2005).  PNG is ranked 156 on the Human 
Development Index (UNDP 2015) and will not achieve any of its Millennium 
Development Goals (UNDP 2015) despite significant foreign aid inputs specifically 
directed to assisting PNG to do so. 
 
5 
PNG has some of the worst health indicators in the Asia Pacific region (Pincock 2006), 
with a Maternal Mortality Ratio over 500 deaths per 100,000 live births (GovPNG 2009, 
NDOH 2009, Mola and Kirby 2013), under-five child mortality of 78 per 1,000 live births 
(Bauze, Tran et al. 2012), and immunization coverage rates of 60% in many parts of 
PNG (Clements, Morgan et al. 2006, Toikilik, Tuges et al. 2010).  Along with continuing 
high rates of malaria (GovPNG 2009, UNDP 2015) previously unknown diseases such as 
cholera have emerged in PNG in recent years(Hall, Gillespie et al. 2013).   
 
These poor health outcomes are a direct result of a weak health system which has 
declined in capacity over the past thirty years.  There is a dysfunctional health 
governance structure with no real responsibility or accountability between the three 
levels of government – national, provincial and district.  The result is low and declining 
capacity to deliver basic health services throughout PNG with poor health service 
delivery and health outcome indicators.  This provided the setting and context for the 
2006 TB DOTS (Direct Observation of Treatment, Short Course) policy with a $US20m 
Global Fund to fight AIDS, TB and Malaria (GFATM) grant to fund the national roll out 
of TB DOTS.  Critically examining and understanding the process by which the 2006 TB 
policy came onto the policy agenda, how it was formulated and implemented is the 
goal of this thesis.  
 History of this research and origin of the research questions 1.2
The ideas for this research originated in November 2005, November 2006 and May 
2007 when the author was the Public Health (Community Health / Health Promotion) 
Expert on the Independent Monitoring and Review Group (IMRG) for the PNG Health 
Sector SWAp (Sector Wide Approach).  In this role, after extensive travel to observe 
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the PNG Health System, and consultations with health workers and health managers at 
the national, provincial and district levels throughout PNG, as well as aid donors to the 
PNG health sector the author contributed to IMRG Reports, in November 2005, 
November 2006 and May 2007, on matters relating to the provision of health services 
at the community level in PNG.   
 
When it was announced in late 2006 that the PNG TB DOTS Policy, as outlined and 
defined by the Country Status Report of National TB Program, PNG, 1997-2005 (Aia, 
Yadav et al. 2006), and the PNG Country Strategic Plan to Stop TB, 2006-2010 (Aia, 
Yadav et al. 2006), had moved TB from a low policy priority disease to become a high 
policy priority disease, and was to be funded by a Round 6 $US20mill Global Fund to 
Fight TB, Malaria and AIDS (GFATM) Grant (PNG CCM 2006), to implement TB DOTS 
throughout PNG from 2006-2010, questions about the formulation, adoption and 
funding of a national PNG TB DOTS Policy immediately came to mind. 
 
The author knew from his work on the PNG Health Sector IMRG that TB was not a 
designated priority disease for PNG in the PNG National Health Plan 2000-2010 
(GovPNG 2000), nor in the National Department of Health (NDOH) Strategic Plan for 
2006-2008 (Mann 2006).  The two priority diseases for funding and implementation of 
nationwide prevention and control Policies for the PNG Government, and therefore 
external donor assistance, up to 2006 were Malaria and HIV/AIDS (Mann 2006).   
 
The announcement in late 2006 that TB had become a priority disease in PNG (now 
equal with HIV and Malaria) and had quickly received a Global Fund $US20mill Grant to 
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fund the national roll out of the new 2006 PNG TB DOTS Policy, marked a dramatic 
change in PNG TB Control Policy, in a very short period of time.  
 
This announcement prompted many, initially random, questions given the authors’ 
recent experience of the PNG Health System.  Over time these questions developed 
into three sets of questions. 
 
The first question(s) was about the actual magnitude of TB as a health problem in PNG 
that justified a major Global Fund grant of this size, when TB had not been a Policy 
priority before 2006: 
• What is the actual burden of TB as a disease in PNG that it should become a 
Policy Priority disease in PNG? 
• Was the magnitude of the burden of TB in PNG a factor in this significant policy 
change? 
 
The second question(s) came from the observation, also made whilst the author was a 
member of the PNG health sector IMRG, that in the 10 years leading up to 2006 every 
indicator of health outcome, and health service provision and performance had 
significantly declined.  Underpinning this decline were major Governance reforms, with 
the decentralization of responsibility for all government services, including health, to 
the provincial and district level.  These reforms created a governance structure which 
resulted in little or no accountability between the three levels of government, 
including for the implementation of health policies and programs, essentially causing 
complete fragmentation of the Health System.  A central part of this observation 
during the 2005, 2006 and 2007 visits was the turbulent PNG political context, with 
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over 50% of members of Parliament losing their seats every five years, along with 
frequent changes in political alliances leading to regular changes in Governments and 
Ministerial portfolios in the life of one Parliament.   
• What was the impact of this political instability and constant change on how 
the policy process works in PNG?   
 
On deeper reflection it was apparent that these were questions  directly relating to  TB 
DOTS Component 1 - Political Commitment, which is seen as the first step in ensuring a 
TB DOTS Policy is delivered (WHO 2003, Stop TB Partnership and World Health 
Organization 2006).  This lead to a series of questions about political commitment and 
leadership in PNG, and the impact of political commitment and leadership on those 
governance structures which deliver Health Services in PNG:   
• What does political commitment and leadership mean in PNG? 
• What are the social, political, and economic factors (cultural institutions) which 
shape and construct Political Commitment and Leadership in PNG? 
• How are Political Commitment and Leadership exercised in PNG? 
• How has Political Commitment and Leadership shaped governance structures 
and the Health System in PNG? 
• How do the resulting Governance structures impact on the PNG Health Systems 
capacity to formulate and deliver a TB DOTS Policy? 
• What is the impact of the PNG construct of Political Commitment and 
Leadership on health system governance and capacity in PNG? 
 
The answers to these questions provided the health policy context in PNG which any 
new health policy needs to deal with if the policy is to achieve its goals and objectives. 
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A third series of questions arose from the manner in which TB DOTS moved from being 
a low policy priority disease to become as important as HIV and malaria on the PNG 
Health policy agenda, in such a short period of time from 2004-2006: 
• How did this dramatic and significant change in PNG TB Control Policy come 
about? 
• What were the events and who were the key actors in the Policy Process which 
brought this significant policy change about? 
 
In the absence of any previous published research on TB policy in PNG these questions 
informed and shape the research aims and objectives of this thesis. 
 
These questions were then refined down to four questions which are the basis for the 
aims and objectives of this research: 
• What is the true burden of TB in PNG requiring a national TB policy response? 
• What does TB DOTS Component 1 - Political commitment, actually mean in the 
PNG, and the impact of this on the PNG Health Systems capacity to formulate 
and deliver a TB DOTS Policy?  
• How did TB DOTS come onto the Health Policy Agenda in PNG in 2006; and 
how, and indeed if, the complex PNG Policy context was taken into 
consideration in the formulation of the 2006 PNG TB DOTS Policy? 
• How did the PNG construct of political commitment impact on the 
implementation of the 2006 TB DOTS policy?  
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 Research Aim: 1.2.1
The overarching aim is to describe and better understand how Health Policy is 
formulated in PNG by specifically examining the 2006 PNG TB DOTS Policy.  
 
 Research Objectives:  1.2.2
The four research objectives for this thesis are: 
1. To describe TB as a health problem in PNG i.e. what is the actual health burden 
of TB in PNG as policy problem? 
2. To describe and critique the PNG policy context with regard to TB DOTS 
Component 1 – Political commitment, the resultant governance structures, and 
the impact of these on the PNG health systems capacity to formulate  a TB 
DOTS Policy?  
3. To describe and critique the PNG TB DOTS policy agenda setting process from 
2004 – 2006.  What were the determinates of the key events, who were and 
what role did the key actors play, in TB DOTS coming onto the health policy 
agenda in PNG in 2006? 
4. To describe and critique the impact of the PNG construct of political 
commitment on the implementation of the 2006 TB DOTS policy. 
 
Central to this research is not to simply describe what happened to the TB Control 
Policy in PNG, but to critically articulate and understand why and how TB DOTS Policy 
came onto the PNG policy agenda in 2006, and if the complex PNG Health policy 
context was taken into consideration in both the formulation and implementation of 
the policy. 
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 Structure of the Thesis 1.3
The research is structured in six sections, or parts, so as to address and achieve each of 
the four Research Objectives. 
 
Part 1 – Introduction, Methods and Literature Review 
Part 1 of this thesis introduces the research (Chapter 1), the literature review to 
identify current gaps in knowledge and to refine the methods used in this research 
(Chapter 2), and the methods used (Chapter 3) to achieve the aim and objectives of 
this research. 
 
Part 2 – The Burden of TB in PNG 
Part 2 of this thesis addresses “Objective 1 – To describe TB as a health problem in 
PNG” i.e. what is the actual health burden of TB in PNG as policy Problem. 
• Chapter 4 – Tuberculosis in Papua New Guinea, examines in depth the burden 
of TB in PNG.  Starting with the official incidence and prevalence data for TB in 
PNG it finds that a weak health information system (HIS) means that the 
actual incidence and prevalence is not known for either drug sensitive or drug 
resistant strains of TB.  There is no reliable data on which to plan or evaluate a 
TB DOTS Policy in PNG.  
 
12 
Part 3 – Political Commitment and Leadership in PNG - the PNG Health Policy Context 
Part 3 of this thesis deals in detail with “Objective 2 - To describe and critique TB DOTS 
Component 1 – Political commitment, the resultant governance structures, and the 
impact of these on the PNG Health Systems capacity to deliver a TB DOTS Policy”: 
• Chapter 5 - Cultural institutions underpinning political commitment and 
leadership, undertakes an in-depth critique and analysis of the cultural 
institutions in PNG which determines and forms political commitment and 
leadership in PNG;  
• Chapter 6 – Political Commitment, Governance Reforms and PNG Health System 
Performance and Capacity, then critically examines how the unique PNG 
construct and style of political commitment and leadership influences and 
determines the PNG Health governance structures in PNG.   
• Chapter 7 – Political Commitment and TB DOTS in PNG – Standardized 
Treatment & Effective Drug Supply examines in detail how the health system 
governance has directly affected the PNG Health System’s capacity to 
implement a TB DOTS Policy.   
 
In summary, Part 3 undertakes a detailed analysis of the PNG TB DOTS policy context 
into which a TB DOTS Policy has to be delivered.  It is only when this complex PNG 
policy context is understood that we can truly understand what is required to be 
addressed in formulating and implementing a TB DOTS Policy in PNG, and also see if 
these factors were taken into consideration during the 2006 PNG TB DOTS policy 
agenda setting process.  Part 3 concentrates on the period from 1997 to 2006, in order 
to provide a clear picture of the PNG policy context leading up and at the time of TB 
DOTS moving onto the policy agenda in 2006.   
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Part 4 - Agenda Setting in the 2006 PNG TB DOTS 
Part 4 of this thesis deals with Objective 3 - To describe and critique the 2006 PNG TB 
DOTS Policy Agenda Setting Process from 2004 – 2006.  Part 4 examines in detail the 
power relationships and role of various policy actors – international (aid donors), 
domestic, and technical advisers (policy entrepreneurs), and the sequence of events in 
this period which moved TB DOTS onto the policy agenda in PNG in the period from 
2004-2006 resulting in the 2006 PNG TB DOTS Policy. 
• Chapter 8 - Agenda Setting and International Actors in the 2006 PNG TB DOTS 
Policy describes and critiques the policy actors at the regional and global level 
who exert significant power and influence in the 2006 PNG TB DOTS policy 
agenda setting process. 
• Chapter 9 - Agenda Setting within PNG 2004-2006 in the 2006 PNG TB DOTS 
Policy describes and critiques the agenda setting process in the 2006 PNG TB 
DOTS policy, the role of key policy actors and entrepreneurs in PNG in that 
process PNG during this period.   
 
Part 5 – Political Commitment and Policy Implementation 
Part 5 of the thesis deals with Objective 4 - To describe and critique the impact of the 
PNG construct of political commitment on the implementation of the 2006 TB DOTS 
policy. 
• Chapter 10 – Political Commitment in Implementation of 2006 TB DOTS policy, 
deals with how the PNG construct of political commitment affected the 
implementation of the 2006 Policy and the policy outcomes up to June 2013.  
Did the policy achieve its stated goal and targets and what determined these 
outcomes? 
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Part 6 - Discussion & Conclusion 
• Chapter 11- Discussion & Conclusion brings the key points of the thesis 
together and offers suggestions for future research, as well as offering 
suggestions arising from this research as to how to address the health policy 
process in low and middle income countries such as PNG. 
 PNG TB Policy Research Timeline 1.4
Below is a Timeline of TB Control Policy in PNG.  The grey area in this Timeline is the 
period of focus for this particular research and gives the key events which frame the 
research and which the research addresses in detail.  
Table 1 - PNG TB DOTS Policy Timeline 
(Shaded areas is the period of study for this research) 
Year PNG TB Policy Critical Junctures, Actors, Policy Windows & Policy Entrepreneurs 
1871-1971 Unknown whether TB was present in PNG when the Europeans started to 
arrive in the late 19th century.  However, with the arrival of Europeans 
circumstances changed and conditions developed that favoured the spread 
of TB.  Once established in the PNG population TB quickly spread.  Initial 
approach to TB case management was isolation of cases; with the 
introduction of antibiotics in 1950s & 1960s active case detection and 
treatment introduced. 
1975 PNG Independence 
 
Active case detection & 18 month treatment 
 
1993 WHO declares TB a global emergency 
 
1994/1995 TB DOTS adopted globally as official WHO TB Policy as the evidence based 
approach to TB Control. 
 
1997 TB DOTS Adopted as the policy for TB control in PNG. 
 
TB DOTS pilot programs in Lae District and National Capital District (urban 
settings, good communications & road access, populations able to access 
health services) 
 
Small amount of  PNG Govt recurrent budget, NO international donor 
funding for TB control in PNG 
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2000 PNG National Health Plan 2000-2010 
 
Tier 1 Diseases – HIV & Malaria (focus for recurrent PNG funding & donor 
funding) 
 
Tier 2 Diseases – TB, not a priority disease.  
 
2001-2005 AusAID – WHO/WPRO MOU for AusAID to fund WHO PNG Posts of a 
Medical Officer (TB) & Secretarial Assistant (TB) for PNG in Port Moresby. 
 
AusAID – WHO/WPRO MOU renewed for period 2007-2008 
 
2002-2007 Sir Peter Barter appointed as PNG Minister for Health & HIV.  Good 
manager, very efficient. 
 
2003 Round 3 GFATM Grant for Malaria Control in PNG Approved $US29.9mill 
(1st Aug 2004 to 31st July 2009) 
 
2004 Dr Paul Aia appointed Director PNG National TB Control Program 
 
2004 Round 4 GFATM Grant for HIV/AIDS in PNG Approved $US29.9mill (1st 
Sept 2005 to 31st August 2010) 
 
Sept 2004-2009 Dr Rajendra Yadav appointed WHO Country Medical Officer, Stop TB.  
Good manager, very efficient.  AusAID funded position. 
 
2005 Round 5 GFATM Grant for National PNG TB DOTS Policy application 
submitted. 
 
Rejected – National TB Control Program too weak. 
11th Feb. 2005 Meeting of major Program Partners’ to review the National TB Program 
and discuss the formulation of a TB Control Plan 
 
15th – 22nd March 
2005 
Intra- and inter-branch meetings of the NDOH and the National AIDS 
Council Secretariat to discuss the formulation of a TB Control Plan 
 
21st – 23rd March 
2005 
National TB Review Meeting and Workshop 
 
11th – 12th August 
2005 
National Workshop for “Country Policy on TB/HIV Collaborative 
Activities” 
 
2005 PNG NDOH Strategic Plan for the Papua New Guinea Health Sector 2006-
2008 
Four Priority Public Health Strategic Directions – Immunization, Malaria, 
Maternal Mortality, HIV 
 
TB NOT a priority disease control area 
Jan & Feb 2006 Dr Anastasios Konstantinos, Director, Queensland TB Control Centre, hired 
by AusAID as Consultant to advise on & write the PNG Country Status 
Report 1997-2005 & Country Strategic Pan 2006-2010 
 
April 2006 Sir Peter Barter, PNG Minister for Health & HIV declares TB a “National 
Emergency”. 
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• TB a Tier 1 Disease in PNG 
• TB onto the Policy Agenda in PNG 
 
July 2006 Round 6 GFATM Grant -“Expanding and implementing the Stop TB Strategy 
in Papua New Guinea” for $US20.8 mill.  Approved (1st Oct 2007 to 30th 
Sept. 2012) 
 
2007-2008 Roll out of TB DOTS to PNG commences with parallel systems in place 
bypassing NDOH & PNG Health System 
 
October 2009 Dr Rajendra Yadav leaves PNG to take up post with WHO Cambodia Stop 
TB Programme 
 
2009 External Review of GFATM inputs identifies needs for Health System 
Strengthening as focus for GFATM inputs rather than large Disease Control 
Grants & need for situational analysis to improve GFATM proposal 
contextualization. 
 
December 2010 GFATM adds PNG to list of recipient countries where “Additional Safeguard 
Policy” is required due to Grant implementation irregularities. 
OIG GFATM (5 July 2012). "Audit of Global Fund Grants to the Independent 
State of Papua New Guinea." 
Due to corrupt use of funds Round 6 Grant suspended 
 
Feb 2011 Australia & PNG announce a new separate  Stop TB in Western Province 
$Aus11m project; 2 months after Round 6 TB Grant suspended 
In Western Province only, includes MDR-TB component 
World Vision is implementing agency 
 
15th April 2011 PNG National Department of Health resigns as the Principal Recipient for 
Global Fund supported Programs in PNG for TB Round 6. 
 
5th July 2012 World Vision appointed a new Principal Recipient for Round 6 TB Grant. 
 
June 2013 Round 6 GFATM Grant ends, no immediate TB DOTS funding in PNG 
June 2013 -October 
2013 
No funding for TB control activities in PNG 
December 2013 – 
December 2014 
Interim Global Fund Grant of $US9.5m whilst further grant application 
prepared 
Feb 2015 Gates Foundation announces $Aus18m donations for TB control in PNG via 
Global Fund; World Vision also donates $Aus8m; all funds to be 
administered by World Vision 
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2  Review of the Literature 
 
 Introduction 2.1
There are two aims of the literature review for this research: 
The first is a critique of the literature in order to describe and critique current 
knowledge on TB as a global policy problem and then in PNG in particular.  We then 
examine the global context and significant trends affecting health policy with regard to 
TB control in developing countries – a major increase in funding, the growth of policy 
transfer, and the emphasis on health system strengthening.   
 
The second aim of this literature review is to describe and critique current 
understandings of health policy and the health policy process.  We also identify and 
undertake a critique of frameworks available in the literature for their ability to 
describe and critique health policy as it applies to political commitment (objectives 2 
and 4) and agenda setting (objective 3) in the development of the 2006 TB DOTS Policy 
in PNG.  This is particularly with regard to political commitment, agenda setting, the 
role of international actors, and governance in health systems so as to critique and 
describe the policy process which led to the adoption and funding of the 2006 TB DOTS 
Policy in PNG.   
 
 Review of Peer Reviewed Literature 2.2
In order to describe and critique the complex policy process and to identify, from the 
literature, the most applicable frameworks for analysis of the process in the 2006 PNG 
TB DOTS policy, the terms used for the review of the peer reviewed literature was 
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guided by the four research objectives.  Medline, PubMed and Google Scholar data 
bases were searched.  The first stage of the literature review used the search term(s) 
“Papua New Guinea” in combination with “Tuberculosis”, “Tuberculosis Control”, 
“DOTS”, “DOT”, “Short Course”, “Health System”, “Governance”, “Health 
Governance”, “Health Information”, and “HIS”.  As the literature review was being 
conducted it became apparent the further terms were significant and were included in 
the search - “Health Reform”, “Health Sector Reform”, “Organic Law”, “Donor 
Assistance”, “World Bank”, “Asian Development Bank”, “World Health Organization”, 
“AusAID”, and “Global Fund”.  This resulted in 254 papers.  Based on the abstracts of 
these papers the main themes that emerged were – health systems; health systems 
governance; political leadership and commitment; aid donors; donor assistance; policy 
transfer; agenda setting; policy implementation; TB DOTS; AusAID; WHO; Global Fund 
to fight AIDS, TB and Malaria.  As a result of the literature review the research 
objectives were further refined and the research methods developed as we set out in 
the remainder of this Chapter. 
 Grey (non-peer reviewed) Literature 2.3
The review of the grey literature review commenced with a search of the websites of 
those organisations identified in the review of the peer reviewed literature.  The grey 
literature review was extended to include those reports and documents identified in 
the key informant interviews as relevant to the health system, governance and TB 
control in PNG.  Reports were collected during the three field visits to PNG, as well as 
during the subsequent visit to AusAID in Canberra in June 2008.  The grey literature 
identified using these methods produced a significant number of reports – feasibility 
studies; base line, commencement of project, mid-term and end of project reports and 
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reviews, for and on donor funded health projects in PNG.  As well there were a number 
of consultant’s reviews of the PNG Health System prepared for United Nations 
agencies, bilateral agencies, non-government organizations and the development 
banks.  Reports identified as being relevant to the themes for this research, from the 
1960s up to 2014, were included in the analysis by themes, using the same terms as 
those for the peer reviewed literature.  The synthesis of the major themes arising from 
the literature review is presented next. 
 
 Tuberculosis as a Global Health Policy Problem 2.4
Firstly, TB remains a disease of global health significance, in the top twenty diseases in 
the most recent Global Burden of Disease study (GBD 2013).  WHO data states that 
there were 9.0 million cases of TB with 1.5 million deaths from TB globally in 2013 
(WHO 2014).  TB became a low global health priority disease in the 1970s and early 
1980s following the discovery of effective antibiotics in the 1950s and 1960s with the 
virtual elimination of TB in developed countries (Fox 1958, Fox 1979, Ogden, Walt et al. 
2003).  The emergence of Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) in the 1980s and 
1990s, the emergence of TB in HIV infected men in North America in the late 1980s 
(Cantwell, Snider et al. 1994), and the recognition of the strong association between 
TB and HIV (Odhiambo, Borgdorff et al. 1999), brought a renewed recognition of TB as 
a disease of global health significance.  This provided the “policy window” for TB to 
again come onto the global health agenda (Ogden, Walt et al. 2003).   
 
In April 1993 WHO declared TB a “global emergency”, and by 1994 was branding its 
new TB DOTS Policy as its official policy response to the re-emergence of TB and the 
20 
“required breakthrough in TB Control” (Kochi 1994, Ogden, Walt et al. 2003).  WHO 
employed staff with very strong advocacy skills to successfully market the TB DOTS 
Policy.  This was extremely successful to the point of declaring “we now have the cure 
for TB” (Kochi 1991, Ogden, Walt et al. 2003).  This implied that if the TB DOTS Policy 
was fully implemented there was now no need for further diagnostics or treatments 
for TB.  DOTS Policy advocates argued that TB Policy needed to be simple so that it 
could be easily adapted to the resource poor context.  The DOTS advocates believed 
that if you kept a policy to five easily understood components, with clear targets to 
achieve those components, then the Policy would be able to be implemented in a 
resource poor setting (Kochi 1991, Ogden, Walt et al. 2003).    
 
This approach was questioned and criticized by experienced TB control personnel and 
academics as both oversimplifying the complexity of the required response to TB 
control within individual countries, and also as most likely resulting in no further 
research funding for TB diagnostics or treatments, if the TB DOTS Policy was branded 
as “the solution” (Brown 1997, Ogden, Walt et al. 2003).  Their concern was the same 
as Fourier who points out that the absence of empirical evidence, based on reliable 
data, resulting in “evidence based policy making”, we end up with “policy-based 
evidence making” (Fourie 2014).  Fourier made these observations in researching HIV 
policy in weak states (Fourie 2014), such as PNG.  Indeed, further, research has 
questioned the validity of the Direct Observation of Treatment (DOT) component of 
the TB DOTS Policy (Zwarenstein, Schoeman et al. 1998, Volmink and Garner 2007).  
Alternative policy approaches to TB control have been proposed based on successful 
programs in Central and South America in the 1990s focused on MDR-TB(Farmer 
2001). 
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The TB DOTS Policy was based on the work of Dr Karol Styblo, an epidemiologist 
working in Africa on TB control in the 1970s and 1980s, when TB was no longer on the 
policy agenda in the developed world (Styblo 1978, Styblo 1985).  As a result when TB 
re-emerged as a major public health problem in HIV positive men in North America in 
the late 1980s Karol Styblo had a TB control Policy when the rest of the world had 
none (Cantwell, Snider et al. 1994, Ogden, Walt et al. 2003).  Karol Styblo’s work 
became the basis for the TB DOTS policy.    
 
The five components of the WHO TB DOTS Policy are (WHO 2012, WHO 2014):  
(1) Political commitment, with increased and sustained financing;  
(2) Case detection through quality-assured bacteriology;  
(3) Standardized treatment, with supervision and patient support;  
(4) An effective drug supply and management system; and  
(5) Monitoring and evaluation system, and impact measurement.   
 
The goal of TB DOTS at the country level is to detect 70% of cases, and cure 85% in 
order to reduce TB incidence cases (WHO 2002).  As the official WHO policy for TB 
control TB DOTS has been the only approach to TB control being implemented in low 
and middle income countries such as PNG (Stop TB Partnership and World Health 
Organization 2006, WHO 2014).  Officially the local context was and is meant to be 
taken into consideration as the policy was transferred and adapted to each country 
setting.   
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TB was made one of the three priority diseases (HIV, TB and malaria) to achieve MDG 
6, when the MDGs were declared in 2000, with the target of reducing prevalence of TB 
and deaths due to TB by 50% compared to the 1990 baseline, by 2015 (Stop TB 
Partnership and World Health Organization 2006, Lawn and Zumla 2011).  As a result 
TB was made one of the priority diseases for funding by the Global Fund to Fight Aids, 
TB and Malaria (GFATM) which was established in 2002 and which has been successful 
in mobilizing significant levels of funds to achieve MDG 6 (GFATM 2001, Feachem and 
Sabot 2007).  The emergence of multi-drug resistant (MDR-TB) (Kochi, Vareldzis et al. 
1993), extensively (XDR-TB) (Gandhi, Moll et al. 2006, Gandhi, Nunn et al. 2010) and 
totally drug resistant TB (TDR-TB) (Velayati, Masjedi et al. 2009) has maintained TB on 
the global health agenda.  Recent reviews of approaches to global TB control have 
raised concerns about the impact of this major increase in funding on health systems 
in developing countries(Atun, Weil et al. 2010, Marais, Raviglione et al. 2010).  The 
need to “assess potential for synergy; ensure optimal use of available resources, 
support best-practice models and reduce duplication/waste”(Marais, Raviglione et al. 
2010) is emphasized.  Further “although external funds help to provide essential 
services for tuberculosis in many poor countries, these funds might reduce local 
ownership, as well as the identification of sustainable local solutions”(Marais, 
Raviglione et al. 2010).  The reviews also note that the “unintended consequences” of 
donor driven health interventions are rarely studied or reported(Marais, Raviglione et 
al. 2010).   
 Tuberculosis in Papua New Guinea 2.5
It is unknown whether TB was present in PNG when the Europeans started to arrive in 
any number in the late 19th century, when missionaries and traders came to 
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settle(Wigley 1975, Ley, Riley et al. 2014).  However, with the arrival of Europeans 
circumstances changed and conditions developed that favoured the spread of 
previously unknown diseases and of diseases that had been contained in small 
populations because of their comparative isolation(Wigley 1975, Ley, Riley et al. 2014).  
Once established in the PNG population TB quickly spread.  As in the rest of the world, 
other than isolation of TB cases, an extremely difficult task in the PNG setting, there 
was little that could be done to control TB until the 1950s and 1960s when effective 
antibiotics became available to treat TB (Wigley 1975, Ley, Riley et al. 2014).   
 
Once antibiotics did become available in PNG treatment protocols using the new 
antibiotics were developed (Tao 1975, Wigley 1975).  The initial protocols required 
from 18 months to 2 years of treatment as an inpatient.  The side effects of the 
antibiotics made compliance a significant issue.  Regular colonial administration run 
health patrols in which  doctors and nurses were available down to the district level in 
PNG made ambulatory care possible after the intensive hospital period of treatment 
(Wigley 1975).  Despite this compliance was still a major issue (Wigley 1975).  In the 
post-colonial period, after Independence in 1975, these protocols continued combined 
with active case detection to detect and treat TB (Tao 1975, Endo 1979, Levy, Dakulala 
et al. 1998). 
 
This was the approach to TB control in PNG until 1997 when TB DOTS was introduced 
in PNG in two Provinces – the National Capital District and Lae (Aia, Yadav et al. 2006).  
The initial TB DOTS programs in PNG were limited to these two provinces with limited 
funds, and no foreign donor funds, as TB was not a priority policy disease in PNG until 
2006 (Aia, Yadav et al. 2006).  Whilst TB DOTS was adopted as the approach to TB 
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Control in these two provinces TB and TB DOTS did not actually come onto the PNG 
Policy Agenda and attract sufficient funding for it to become national policy until 2006.   
 
The formulation, agenda setting and implementation of the 2006 PNG TB DOTS (Stop 
TB) Policy is the focus for this research.  How TB moved from being a low policy priority 
to became a so called Tier 1 High Priority Disease, and how the TB DOTS policy became 
an attractive policy option at the political level, both within PNG and to aid donors, is 
central to this research.  A further point of interest is if the unique and complex PNG 
policy context was taken into consideration in that policy process.   
 
 Global Context for Health Policy 2.6
It is apparent from the literature that health policy in PNG, and the 2006 TB DOTS 
policy in particular, did not develop in isolation but was influenced by global 
developments or trends which had a major impact on how the 2006 policy came into 
existence.  From the literature review three global trends have emerged in the last two 
decades that have significantly influenced how health policy comes onto the policy 
agenda, and is formulated and implemented in developing countries – an increase in 
aid funding for health in developing countries, an increase in health policy transfer to 
developing countries, and recognition of the importance of strong health systems to 
deliver disease control policies, including TB control policy.  These are also why 
undertaking health policy analysis at the global and resource poor level, and of the 
policy interaction between these levels, has taken on greater importance.  
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 Increased Funding for TB DOTS 2.6.1
The first of these major trends is a significant increase in funding for health in 
developing countries.  In the early 2000s major health initiatives were established in 
order to mobilize funds to achieve the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) targets in 
developing countries.   Public private partnerships such as the Global Fund to Fight 
AIDS, TB and Malaria (GFATM), and the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation 
(GAVI) were established.  Along with new bilateral funding initiatives such as the U.S. 
Presidents Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), these organizations have been 
successful in mobilizing significant levels of funding specifically for MDG target 
diseases (Brugha 2008, McCoy, Chand et al. 2009, Lu, Schneider et al. 2010).  Founded 
in 2002, the Global Fund alone in its first five years mobilized $US9.6bill globally for 
HIV, TB and malaria programs in developing countries (Feachem and Sabot 2007).  This 
was a massive increase in the level of funding available to assistant developing 
countries achieve their MDG6 targets.  By 2013 aid donors provided $US31.3 bill in 
development assistance for health in low and middle income countries(Institute for 
Health Metrics and Evaluation 2014), a fivefold increase on 1990 levels.  The increased 
funds these global health and bilateral agency initiatives were able to provide, came 
significant influence on health policy formulation and implementation in a resource 
poor, which leads to the next important trend.   
 
 The Growth of Policy Transfer 2.6.2
The second important trend in health policy in developing countries is the growth of 
policy transfer “in which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, 
institutions and ideas in one political setting (past or present) is used in the 
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development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another 
political setting” (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000). 
 
The increase in aid funds for health is often linked with particular health policies.  TB 
DOTS is an excellent example.  For the past twenty years there has been an identified 
need to increase knowledge about, and the understanding of, the process of policy 
transfer, from the global to the national levels, and from the national to the sub-
national levels.  There was a need to develop systematic evidence and understanding 
of how policy transfer takes place(Dolowitz and Marsh 1996, Dolowitz and Marsh 
2000).   This has led to an increase in interest and research on the policy process in 
developing countries and the different stages of the policy process, including policy 
transfer.  To undertake this research existing frameworks from the political sciences in 
North America and Europe have been adapted and applied to health policy analysis in 
developing countries.  It has also led to the development of new methods and 
frameworks applicable to the particular needs of health policy analysis in developing 
countries.  Major reviews of the health policy literature undertaken in 2008(Gilson and 
Raphaely 2008, Walt, Shiffman et al. 2008) and in 2014 (Berlan, Buse et al. 2014, 
Erasmus, Orgill et al. 2014) have noted that whilst there have been major contributions 
to understanding how health policy takes place in, and is transferred to developing 
countries, there are still major gaps in knowledge.  Two areas in particular are 
identified: first, the analysis of power relationships involved in policy transfer between 
global health initiatives and developing countries; and second, the workings of local 
policy processes in developing countries, in very different policy contexts to North 
America and Europe.  A good example is provided by the lack of research into the 
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nature and forms of political commitment, a central component of global health 
initiative policies.   
 
 Health System Strengthening 2.6.3
The third important trend or development in global health policy was the focus on 
health system strengthening.  Despite the major increase in funding for HIV, TB and 
Malaria to achieve the Millennium Development Goal targets, these targets were not 
being achieved by the mid 2000s.  The lack of capacity within local health systems to 
deliver interventions to achieve population coverage was recognized as the major 
constraint.  As a result the Health Systems Strengthening initiative came about, also in 
the early 2000s.   
 
In the World Health Report of 2000 the World Health Organization was the first group 
to address health system performance.  This provided a catalyst for a debate and focus 
on the importance of health systems (WHO 2000, WHO 2007, de Savigny and Adam 
2009, Hafner and Shiffman 2013).  WHO defines a health system as “the collection of 
organizations and actors whose main intent is to promote, restore and maintain 
health”(WHO 2007).  WHO identifies six building blocks of a health system in its 
framework: “service delivery, a well-performing health workforce, good health 
information system, access to medical products and technologies, financing, and 
leadership and governance to ensure and monitor performance”.(WHO 2007).  
However, this framework has been criticised for over simplifying the local complexity 
of health systems.  Health systems are far more complex than six building blocks and 
this representation of health systems has not received full global support (Atun 2012, 
Hafner and Shiffman 2013).   
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Coker and Atun in researching the impact of TB DOTS programs found that health 
systems need to be understood within a much more complex local context which they 
compare to a Gordian knot(Coker, Atun et al. 2004).  In trying to understand why TB 
DOTS programs do or do not achieve targets they found the level of integration into 
the local health system was a key factor - “in many countries integration is not 
achieved and (TB DOTS) programmes are set up in parallel with existing health 
systems. At worst, the objectives of vertical programmes are not fully aligned with 
countries’ governmental health priorities and are ‘owned’ by international 
development agencies or local NGOs that have different lines of management and 
accountability, resulting in fragmentation and duplication of services.” (Atun, Lennox-
Chhugani et al. 2004) 
 
They identified the need to develop evaluation instruments or tools which took this 
complexity into consideration when evaluating TB control programs (Atun, Lennox-
Chhugani et al. 2004, Coker, Atun et al. 2004).  They found that traditional 
epidemiological methods missed the complexity, and often the more important health 
system and local contextual factors which influenced and determined outcomes were 
“controlled out” of analysis by epidemiological studies(Coker, Atun et al. 2004).  To 
capture the impact of the complexity of both local context and health systems they 
drew on the work of Pawson’s realistic evaluation approach (Pawson and Tilley 1997, 
Atun, Lennox-Chhugani et al. 2004, Coker, Atun et al. 2004) to firstly examine the 
elements of the health system within which the infectious diseases programme is 
embedded, and secondly to assess the infectious disease specific components of the 
programme.  Pawson and Tilley attempts to go beyond the usual question of did a 
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programme work or not work to ask why a programme works, for whom and in what 
circumstances does a program work(Coker, Balen et al. 2010).   
 
They provide five elements to this framework to evaluate a programme whilst 
acknowledging its complexity and the environment in which it sits by critically 
examining (Coker, Balen et al. 2010).  First, context denotes the political, legislative, 
social, economic and technological environments within which communicable disease 
control programmes sit.  Secondly, the epidemiological problem refers to infection 
levels and various disease characteristics.  For example, this might relate to upstream 
risk factors such as the emergence of drug-resistant strains of TB or HIV.  The third 
component is the intervention intended to serve public health. For example, in TB 
control this could be the DOTS strategy and its respective components.  The fourth 
element is the mechanism by which interventions are delivered.  The fifth element of 
the conceptual framework relates to outputs. Outputs are public health concepts that 
can be measured or determined.(Coker, Balen et al. 2010). 
 
This tool was used to evaluate the impact and integration of GFATM funded HIV, TB 
and Malaria projects in Vietnam (Conseil, Mounier-Jack et al. 2010), Indonesia (Desai, 
Rudge et al. 2010), Thailand (Hanvoravongchai, Warakamin et al. 2010), Laos 
(Mounier-Jack, Rudge et al. 2010) and Papua New Guinea (Rudge, Phuanakoonon et al. 
2010) have been undertaken.   
 
The evaluation of the impact and integration of GFATM grants in PNG was based on 30 
interviews along with a review of relevant documents and reports (Rudge, 
Phuanakoonon et al. 2010).  The evaluation found that the GFATM Grants had 
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developed positive synergies between the government health system and civil society 
partners. 
 
However, the performance based nature of the Global Fund projects within a weak 
PNG health system had led to parallel monitoring and evaluation, and drug 
procurement and supply chain systems.  The evaluation noted that the severely limited 
and overburdened pool of human resources in the PNG health system had been 
skewed towards the three Global Fund project diseases both at the management and 
service delivery levels.  All these factors, given the dependence on donors and a weak 
system, raised questions about the sustainability of the programmes (Rudge, 
Phuanakoonon et al. 2010).  Table 2 provides the summary of the results when 
applying the framework to PNG (Rudge, Phuanakoonon et al. 2010). 
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Table 2– Extent of integration of Global Fund portfolios for HIV and TB into the 
disease programmes, and the disease programmes into the general health system, 
for each health system element and function in Papua New Guinea 
 
Source: (Rudge, Phuanakoonon et al. 2010) 
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The Coker and Atun framework was developed with Global Fund support to provide a 
tool or instrument to rapidly assess the implementation, impact and integration of 
disease control programmes into health systems in developing countries (Coker, Balen 
et al. 2010, Rudge, Phuanakoonon et al. 2010).  However, this thesis is asking 
fundamentally different questions which are about the policy process leading up to the 
formulation and agenda setting for the 2006 TB DOTS policy.  From the literature it is 
apparent that it is the policy sciences which provide the methods that enable us to 
undertake an analysis of these policy processes. 
 
 The Policy Process 2.7
In 1951 Harold Lasswell first defined the “policy sciences” (Lasswell 1951, deLeon and 
Vogenbeck 2007) as the attempt “to resolve the problems pressing society and its 
government” (deLeon and Vogenbeck 2007).  Scientific methods could and should be 
brought to the analysis of how public policies came into existence, and how policy 
makers arrived at the set of policies or direction which governments put into place to 
govern society (deLeon and Vogenbeck 2007).  This marked the commencement of 
bringing academic rigor to the understanding and study of Public Policy.  It was also 
the start of a major academic discipline, now generally referred to as Public Policy 
Analysis, and has led to a major field of research in order to research and understand 
why policy decisions are made in the process a policy goes through to become a policy 
that is formulated, adopted and implemented (deLeon and Vogenbeck 2007).   
 
In the broader public policy literature the policy process was initially conceived of as 
following a simple linear process of problem recognition and issue selection, policy 
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formulation and decision-making, implementation, and finally evaluation –the so 
called stages heuristic or policy cycle model (Lasswell 1951, deLeon 1999).  In the 
1980s it was recognized that in the real world the policy process often does not follow 
a logical linear sequence.  “Policy formulation and decision-making” can and does take 
place before “problem recognition and issue selection” has taken place.  Policy is 
subject to external influences by a complex range of actors who can change over time.  
There can be periods of stagnation and then rapid development when political and 
social circumstances change.  The linear nature with clear differentiation into distinct 
stages of the stages heuristic is not able to take the complexity of the real world nature 
of the policy process into consideration and new frameworks for policy analysis 
needed to be developed (Sabatier 1999, deLeon and Vogenbeck 2007, Jann and 
Wegrich 2007). 
 
 The Multiple Streams Framework - Agenda Setting 2.8
John Kingdon in his in-depth study of the policy process in the USA in the 1970s 
developed a framework which takes into consideration the complexity of the real 
world nature of the policy process.  He was particularly interested in understanding 
and examining why and how one particular policy, from multiple alternative policy 
options, came onto the public policy agenda (Kingdon 2011).  This became known as 
agenda setting. 
 
Kingdon found that policy making does not proceed neatly in stages, steps or phases 
(Kingdon 2011).  He describes the policy process as “organized anarchy” (Kingdon 
2011).  His research was focused on the “organized” aspect, rather than the “anarchy”, 
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of the policy process i.e. a policy actually goes through a policy process which has 
definite characteristics, so whilst not linear, it is organized, and therefore is open to 
rigorous examination and understanding (Kingdon 2011). 
 
Kingdon identifies three independent policy making streams which flow through the 
policy system all at once, each with a life of its own (Kingdon 2011): 
1.  The problem stream refers to the manner in which, out of multiple policy 
problems confronting society and government, one particular policy problem 
becomes of sufficient importance to receive the attention of policy makers.  
This may be due to the size of a problem, or the perception of the size of the 
problem i.e. “the perception of problems as public matters requiring 
government action.”(Buse, Mays et al. 2006).  
2. The policy stream consists of “the ongoing analyses of problems and their 
solutions together with the debates surrounding their proposed 
solutions.”(Buse, Mays et al. 2006).  From multiple policy options the policy 
stream provides the policy or solution to the policy problem. 
3. The politics stream “operates quite separately of the other two streams and is 
comprised of events such as swings of national mood, changes of government 
and campaigns by interest groups.” (Buse, Mays et al. 2006).  The politics 
stream takes place at the political level, when a problem becomes sufficiently 
important to require a policy to respond to the problem.  The politics stream is 
however significantly influenced by policy actors outside the politics stream. 
 
Using the term “coupling” Kingdon found that a policy issue “is most likely to achieve 
public agenda status when public problems, policy alternatives, and political 
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opportunities intersect” (Kingdon 2011), at what is called a “policy window”, i.e. an 
event, or series of events, that brings the problem stream, the policy stream  (the 
policy solution to the policy problem) and the political stream (an openness or demand 
at the political level for a policy response), together so that the policy is adopted by 
the government i.e. the policy comes onto the policy agenda. 
 
There are patterns to the intersection of the three policy streams; they are not 
random.  Kingdon found that policy entrepreneurs know how to pull the three policy 
streams together, however this is difficult to accomplish (Kingdon 2011).  Policy 
entrepreneurs are continually looking for connections between the politics and policy 
making and creating “windows of opportunity” (Kingdon 2011).  Whilst politicians are 
central, other policy actors - “interest groups and lobbyists, academics and consultants 
are also influential” (Kingdon 2011), in agenda setting. 
 
However, the problem or constraint in applying the multiple streams framework to this 
research is that it was developed specifically for analysis of agenda setting and the 
policy process in the United States of America (USA).  We need to be aware of the 
significant differences in the policy context and process between the USA, where 
Kingdon undertook his research and developed the three streams framework, and 
PNG.  A major difference is how and where power in the policy process and agenda 
setting lies.  In the USA power lies within the United States politics stream, and much 
of the three streams policy analysis focuses on how power is exercised within this 
specific context. 
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As we have already seen there is a very different power dynamic and imbalance in the 
policy process in developing countries such as PNG due to the influence donors exert 
due to their  major levels of aid funding.  The three streams framework as applied in 
the USA does not allow us to take such an overwhelming power imbalance into 
consideration.  Given that aid donors contribute a significant proportion of funds to 
health services provision in PNG there is a very different set of elements operating in 
the policy process in PNG.  Aid donors exert much power and influence in the policy 
process and agenda setting in PNG with much of the policy process taking place 
outside of PNG at the regional and global levels.  So we need to adapt the three 
streams framework to our analysis of the 2006 PNG TB DOTS policy. 
 
In order to undertake analysis of policy agenda setting in a resource poor setting PNG 
to answer the research questions arising from Objective 3 - To describe and critique the 
PNG TB DOTS policy agenda setting process from 2004 – 2006. (i.e. what were the 
determinates of the key events, who were and what role did the key actors play, in TB 
DOTS coming onto the health policy agenda in PNG in 2006), we now examine the 
adaption of the three streams framework to the resource poor setting by Walt et al.  
This adaption enables an analysis of the regional and global policy process, including 
power relationships in agenda setting, and policy formulation, transfer and 
implementation which provides the most useful framework for the analysis 
undertaken in this thesis. 
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 Health Policy Analysis – Context, Process, Actors, Content 2.9
Drawing on the policy sciences and the three streams framework Walt et. al. (Walt and 
Gilson 1994) were amongst the first to apply the broader public policy methods to 
health policy.  They believed, and confirmed in their research, that health policy 
matters because policy determines resource allocation for health and as a result is a 
central determinant of people’s health and health outcomes.  “Who makes and 
implements policy decisions (those with power) and how decisions are made (process) 
largely determine the content of health policy and, thereby, ultimately people’s health” 
(Buse, Mays et al. 2006). 
 
It is the Walt et. al. definition of health policy which is used in this research - “Health 
Policy covers courses of action (and inaction) that affect the set of institutions, 
organizations, services and funding arrangements of the health care system (both 
public and private)” (Buse, Mays et al. 2006). 
 
They also started with the insight that health policy is not simply about the wording or 
the content of the policy but is the result of a policy process which they defined as 
“The way in which policies are initiated, developed and formulated, negotiated, 
communicated, implemented and evaluated” (Buse, Mays et al. 2006) which is a 
dynamic process with “the policy environment continuously shifting, transforming 
relations between groups and between institutions (Walt and Gilson 1994).   
 
Given the impact of health policy on people’s health and health outcomes undertaking 
health policy analysis is both legitimate and necessary because it helps and enables us 
to act effectively to improve the health of people(Walt and Gilson 1994).  They see 
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health policy analysis as being “concerned with the processes of policymaking, it is also 
centrally concerned with the behaviour of actors in formulating and implementing 
policy and the context within which policies are promulgated. … policy is not simply 
about prescription or description, and nor does it develop in a social vacuum; it is the 
outcome of complex social political and economic interactions” (Walt and Gilson 1994). 
 
Walt and Gilson (Walt and Gilson 1994) were also the first to identify the need to 
develop distinct frameworks for policy analysis in the health sector in low and middle 
income countries.  “Policy analysis is an established discipline in the industrialized 
world, yet its application to developing countries has been limited. The health sector in 
particular appears to have been neglected” (Walt and Gilson 1994). 
 
Walt et. al. developed the Context, Process, Actors and Content Framework for policy 
analysis which requires a detailed examination of not just the content of the policy but 
also of the actors involved in developing policy, the context within which the policy 
was developed and also the process the policy underwent as it was developed (Walt 
and Gilson 1994, Buse, Mays et al. 2006).  This framework is conceptualized in Figure 1 
the Policy Analysis Triangle. 
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Figure 1 – Policy Analysis Triangle 
Source:(Walt and Gilson 1994, Buse, Mays et al. 2006)  
 
An actor is anyone who has influence in the policy process.  This can be individuals, 
organizations, interest or pressure groups or networks, civil society organizations or 
multinational organizations. 
 
Context draws on the work of Leichter (Leichter 1979) , the complex mix of “political, 
economic and social, both national and international, which impacts on health 
policy”(Buse, Mays et al. 2006).  Using the approach of Leichter(Leichter 1979), and 
that of Walt et. al.(Walt and Gilson 1994) as articulated in Buse(Buse, Mays et al. 
2006), to critique and understand the complex PNG policy context is central to this 
research on TB DOTS Policy in PNG. 
 
Process refers to “the way in which polices are initiated, developed or formulated, 
negotiated, communicated, implemented and evaluated”(Buse, Mays et al. 2006). 
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Content of the policy can only be understood when it is examined as part of the policy 
process which involves and considers actors, context and process.  
 
A central tenet of the Walt et. al. framework is the need to understand power 
structures and relationships in the policy process.  Power within relationships in policy 
decisions, and the process by which decisions are made, determines the content of 
health policy.  They make the point that the policy process is often about “political 
compromise and not a rational debate” (Walt and Gilson 1994), so that the power of 
the actors and organizations to influence the policy process is central to the direction 
the policy process takes.  They point out that “important and professional networks of 
managers and professionals”(Walt and Gilson 1994), bring influence to the policy 
process.  Critically examining and understanding the role of power in relationships in 
the policy process is even more important in the case of low and middle income 
countries, with complex external power relationships such as aid donors, technical 
advisers etc., influencing the policy process.  “In many low income countries there are 
large gaps between top and lower level bureaucrats, between nurses and doctors, 
between policy elites and managers. In such countries power is further complicated 
because it rests not only on internal relationships, but significantly, on external 
relationships with advisers, experts, aid donors and financial institutions.  Policy 
analysis cannot continue to ignore the influence of values and group interests – the 
“who” of ….. policy choice and implementation practices”(Walt and Gilson 1994). 
 
This framework provides the ability to critically examine and understand the dynamic 
and complex PNG TB DOTS policy process – the actors (internal and external) including 
the power relationships between those actors, the complex PNG policy context 
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(cultural institutions, governance and health system), and the capacity to formulate 
and implement health policy in PNG, which means this framework provides the 
relevant method to undertake analysis of the TB DOTS Policy in PNG. 
 
Applying these methods Walt et al undertook one of the first studies examining the 
role of international organizations in the transfer of policy ideas, and the promotion of 
particular macro-level policies (Walt, Lush et al. 2004).  This study examined the 
development and transfer of TB DOTS policy and syndromic management of sexually 
transmitted infections (STIs) policy to developing countries.  It found that policy 
transfer took place in three separate but interrelated iterative loops.  Each loop had its 
own network of actors with links to organizations and varying degrees of authority and 
funding.  The first loop (field level, context specific genesis of policy) was the 
development of the policy at the local level, before agenda setting and policy transfer 
(Walt, Lush et al. 2004).  This occurred at the local level through a “bottoms up”, field 
oriented, context specific process with local groups of public health doctors and 
epidemiologists.  In the case of TB DOTS this stage took place over many years starting 
in the 1960s in India with ambulatory care of TB patients instead of hospital care.  In 
the 1980s in Africa the length of TB treatment was shortened to 6 months and to 
ensure compliance, an initial two month intensive phase of treatment as an inpatient 
in hospital was introduced.  The second loop (global policy networks) took place at the 
global level in international organizations in the late 1980s and early 1990s when there 
was the need for a TB policy to respond to the rapid re-emergence of TB in North 
America in HIV positive patients (Walt, Lush et al. 2004).  The second loop involved a 
related, but separate, group of policy actors in international organizations who took up 
the work done in the first loop and consolidated the knowledge generated in the very 
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context specific first loop.  They turned that knowedge into a global health policy 
called TB Direct Observation of Treatment, Short Course (DOTS).  The third loop 
(marketing and dissemination) involved distilling this policy down into a standardized, 
global, generic “one-size-fits all” TB DOTS policy which has five components:  political 
commitment; case detection using sputum microscopy; standardized short course 
chemotherapy; regular drug supply; a standardized recording and reporting system 
(Walt, Lush et al. 2004).  A very professional advocacy and marketing campaign 
branding TB DOTS as the policy solution to the increasing burden of TB was mounted 
(Ogden, Walt et al. 2003).  In this loop there is a clear shift away from science and 
research, to advocacy and marketing.  This was not without debate and dissent (Brown 
1997, Ogden, Walt et al. 2003, Coker, Atun et al. 2004).  In contrast with the first loop 
this third loop was “top down” and authoritarian.  With the backing of powerful global 
organizations such as the World Health Organization and the World Bank, TB DOTS 
programs were being imposed on countries, service providers and patients, and were 
seen by opponents of the policy as being out of touch with the needs of TB patients 
and health services realities on the ground (Walt, Lush et al. 2004). 
 
The Walt et. al. adaption of the three streams framework has been used by Klugman to 
study non-government organizations as agents for change in South Africa (Klugman 
2000); by Ogden to analyse the adoption of TB DOTS as a global health policy driven by 
WHO in the 1990s (Ogden, Walt et al. 2003); and by Shiffman to undertake a detailed 
analysis of agenda setting of Safe Motherhood Initiatives in India (Shiffman and Ved 
2007). These studies establish the relevance of this methodology in this research of 
how TB DOTS became the national TB Control Policy in PNG in 2006. 
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The Walt et. al. (Walt and Gilson 1994, Walt, Lush et al. 2004, Buse, Mays et al. 2006) 
Context, Process, Actors and Content Framework adapts the three streams framework 
to the resource poor setting.  It takes into consideration the fact that much of the 
policy process takes place at the global level, as well as at the country level, and the 
manner in which international policy actors exert considerable, and often unequal, 
power in the policy process.  This is the great contribution of the Walt et. al. adaption 
of the three streams framework.  It is the use of this method which enables us to 
address Objective 3 - To describe and critique the PNG TB DOTS policy agenda setting 
process from 2004 – 2006, and answer the research question what were the 
determinates of the key events, who were and what role did the key actors play, in TB 
DOTS coming onto the health policy agenda in PNG in 2006?  It also provides an 
overarching framework for this thesis which is to describe and critique health policy 
and the health policy process in a resource poor setting. 
 
 Framework on Determinants of Political Priority for Global Initiatives 2.10
Before we move on we need to briefly look at another framework which has recently 
received attention in the peer reviewed literature.  In 2007 Shiffman and Smith, 
drawing on Walt and Gilson (Walt and Gilson 1994, Buse, Mays et al. 2006), proposed a 
new Framework on determinants of political priority for global health initiatives 
(Shiffman and Smith 2007) in order to research and understand what determines 
“political priority” for global health initiatives in low and middle income countries.  
 
The underlying goal of Shiffman’s framework is to understand why global health 
initiative policies do or do not come onto the policy agenda in low and middle income 
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countries.  Since being proposed the framework has been used to research and 
understand why global health initiatives do or do not come onto the policy agenda in 
low and middle income countries (Shiffman and Smith 2007, Schmidt, Joosen et al. 
2010, Benzian, Hobdell et al. 2011, Keeling 2012, Pelletier, Frongillo et al. 2012, Walt 
and Gilson 2014). 
 
The Shiffman framework has four categories or elements (see Table 3): 
1. The power of the actors involved. 
2. The ideas they use to portray the issue 
3. The nature of the political contexts in which they operate 
4. The characteristics of the issue itself. 
Table 3– The Four Categories for the Framework on Determinants of Political Priority 
for Global initiatives 
 
Source: (Shiffman and Smith 2007) 
 
However, the Shiffman framework (see Table 3, Category 3 “Political Contexts”), only 
undertakes analysis or research on two factors of the political context which influence 
whether a global health initiative does, or does not, make it onto the policy agenda in 
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a low or middle income country.  These two factors are policy windows and  global 
governance structure with regard to the global health initiative (Shiffman and Smith 
2007).  It does not include or undertake analysis of the recipient countries own complex 
policy context, which is central to this research on the 2006 PNG TB DOTS Policy.  It is 
the complexity of the cultural institutions, the governance structures, and the resulting 
health service delivery challenges within PNG which we need to examine in detail, and 
which the framework on determinants of political priority for global initiatives is not 
yet sufficiently developed to enable.  The logical conclusion, if Shiffman’s framework 
were applied to this research on TB DOTS policy in PNG, is that the priority setting (or 
agenda setting) was successful as the TB DOTS Policy did come onto the PNG policy 
agenda.  This research is asking fundamentally different questions.  Finally, the starting 
point for the Shiffman framework is that the global health initiative policy e.g. TB 
DOTS, is the right policy for the particular policy context in all countries.  It does not 
allow for a critical examination of the global health initiative policy taking into account 
an analysis of the local context into which the policy has to be implemented so as to 
consider if the policy is actually implementable. 
 
We next examine the literature to provide us with methods to enable us to critically 
examine TB DOTS Component 1 – Political commitment in the 2006 TB policy process 
and the impact of the particular PNG construct of political commitment on the 
implementation of the 2006 TB policy. 
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 Political Commitment - how to frame and measure 2.11
Objective 2 of this thesis is to describe and critique the PNG policy context with regard 
to TB DOTS Component 1 – Political commitment, the resultant governance structures, 
and the impact of these on the PNG health systems capacity to formulate and 
implement a TB DOTS Policy?  Objective 4 is to describe and critique the impact of the 
PNG construct of political commitment on the implementation of the 2006 TB DOTS 
policy.  These two objectives are about political commitment in the formulation and 
implementation of the 2006 policy.  We now look to the literature to understand what 
political commitment means and to examine frameworks which enable us to 
undertake an analysis of political commitment in the 2006 policy process. 
 
The first thing to note from the WHO literature is that the meaning and how the term 
“political commitment” is used in TB DOTS policy has changed and evolved, as the TB 
DOTS policy evolved since its announcement in 1994.  In 1994 TB DOTS Component 1 
was stated as  “Government commitment to sustained TB control activities” (WHO 
1999).  By 2006 in the Stop TB Partnership Strategic Plan for TB Control 2006-2015 
(Stop TB Partnership and World Health Organization 2006) “political commitment” had 
evolved to more specifically include a commitment to long term planning, along with 
human and financial resources.  “Political commitment, with long-term planning, 
adequate human resources, expanded and sustainable financing, to reach the targets 
set by the World Health Assembly and the Stop TB Partnership” (Stop TB Partnership 
and World Health Organization 2006) 
 
The second thing to note from the peer reviewed  literature is that there is little or no 
research on just what political commitment means in TB DOTS policy even though 
47 
“Political commitment with increased and sustained funding” (WHO 2014) is the first 
component of the TB DOTS policy.  With regard to TB DOTS there are only two studies 
in the peer reviewed literature which have investigated political commitment.  In a 
study of political commitment to TB DOTS Policy in Peru political commitment was 
measured in terms of ensuring sufficient funding and human resources to implement a 
TB DOTS policy (Bonilla and Bayonab 2007).  In a more recent study investigating the 
existing and expected dimensions of political commitment to TB control in Ghana, 
Amo-Adjei (Amo-Adjei 2014) found four dimensions of political commitment emerged 
from a series of in-depth interviews which were combined with a documentary review: 
1. Provision of adequate resources (financial, human and infrastructure), 
2. Political authorities’ participation in advocacy for TB, 
3. Laws and policies promulgated, and  
4. Social protection interventions (Amo-Adjei 2014). 
 
Frameworks by which to investigate the level and meaning of political commitment are 
also not extensive in other health policy research.  Te Lintole, in a study to analyse the 
government of India’s political commitment to reducing hunger and malnutrition, 
defined and analysed political commitment as having three dimensions:  
1) policies and programs,  
2) public expenditure, and  
3) legal frameworks (te Lintelo 2012). 
 
  However, there has been a small but growing literature in the past decade which 
attempts to define and measure the key characteristics of political commitment in HIV 
research, and also to analyse the link between political commitment and HIV health 
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policy outcomes (Fox, Goldberg et al. 2011).  Fox has made the observation that 
“because political science research is primarily interested in explaining political 
phenomena rather than health outcomes, this body of research has tended to focus on 
explaining political commitment rather than the effects of political commitment on 
policy outcomes”(Fox, Goldberg et al. 2011). 
 
 
Much of the research on political commitment concerns the response to the HIV 
epidemic.  Fox et. al.(Fox, Goldberg et al. 2011) attempted to conceptualize and 
measure political commitment to the HIV epidemic, and to examine links with HIV 
outcomes.  While expressed commitment and budgetary commitment are important 
components of political commitment they identify institutional commitment as a 
crucial underlying component (Fox, Goldberg et al. 2011).  Commitment means little if 
it is not based on establishing enduring governance structures and bureaucracies that 
facilitate and enable policy formulation and implementation. 
 
Based on this work they developed a framework to assess a government’s level of 
political commitment to respond to the HIV outbreak, and link political commitment to 
HIV outcomes (Fox, Goldberg et al. 2011).  They found three components of political 
commitment:  
1) Expressed commitment 
• public pronouncements in line with scientific evidence and internationally 
recognized standards  
2) Institutional commitment 
• established AIDS bureaucracies,  
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• adoption of laws and regulations,  
• HIV surveillance and monitoring and evaluation mechanisms  
3) Budgetary commitment 
• disbursement and allocation of funds towards HIV  
 
Fox’s review identified a set of variables defined as determinants, effect modifiers and 
mediators of political commitment.  These relate to domestic political processes 
including  state capacity, regime type and governance, responses to earlier health 
epidemics, ethnic and social fragmentation, magnitude of the epidemic, response of 
non-state actors (e.g. civil society), and international actors (pressure and donor 
funding) (Fox, Goldberg et al. 2011).   
 
Further, Fox has more recently applied this framework to analyse political 
commitment in food and nutrition security, establishing the validity of the framework 
as well as its application beyond HIV as an approach to analyse political commitment 
(Fox, Balarajan et al. 2014).   
 
A further contribution to the current understanding of political commitment comes 
from the health systems research done by Atun.  In a review article on health systems 
strengthening and TB control Atun (Atun, Weil et al. 2010) speaks of political 
commitment using the term governance and stewardship.  Drawing on the WHO 
definition, he defines governance and stewardship as creating a “Policy environment, 
regulatory environment, stewardship function, and structural arrangements for 
purchasers, providers, and market regulators. WHO judges that good governance 
means that strategic policy frameworks exist and are combined with effective 
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oversight, coalition building, the provision of appropriate regulations and incentives, 
attention to system design, and accountability.” (Atun, Weil et al. 2010) 
 
This is similar to the institutional commitment component of Fox et. al. framework.  So 
the framework developed by Fox et al provided a good starting point for this research 
on political commitment in PNG in the period from 1997 to 2006.  Political 
commitment is about the institutions and structures which governments establish in 
order to deliver services in order to implement policy.  It involves ensuring governance 
structures which enable and facilitate the delivery of the policy, along with robust 
health information systems to enable the monitoring and evaluation of the policy.  
Further it examines and takes into consideration the domestic political context and 
processes such as the capacity to govern, the type of political structures, and the role 
of both non state and international actors in the policy process.  This framework does 
not examine political commitment simply in terms of political statements, and/or 
financial and human resource commitment with regard to the policy. 
 Gaps in knowledge on Health Policy, Political Commitment and Agenda Setting 2.12
in PNG 
The final part of the literature review was undertaken to identify previous research 
and studies on health policy, political commitment, the health policy process and 
agenda setting in PNG.  From the literature there has been little or no research on 
health policy and the health policy process in PNG.  There has been no use or 
application of the health policy analysis frameworks adapted to resource poor settings 
to research political commitment, agenda setting, policy formulation or policy 
implementation in PNG.  One Masters of Philosophy thesis critically examines the 
formulation of HIV Policy in PNG (Topp 2006) using discourse analysis but only in 
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relation to HIV policy.  This is the only previous research which brings methodological 
rigor to health policy analysis in PNG.  There is no previously published research on 
health policy process with regard to agenda setting, political commitment, policy 
formulation and implementation of TB Control policy in PNG. 
 
The application of the Coker and Atun framework (Coker, Balen et al. 2010) to evaluate 
the impact and integration of the Global Fund programs into the PNG health system 
(Rudge, Phuanakoonon et al. 2010) quite specifically evaluated the impact and 
integration of the Global Fund HIV, TB and Malaria funded projects into the PNG health 
system with some level of methodological rigour with methods used and validated in 
TB DOTS programs in other parts of the world.  However, this evaluation does not 
attempt to undertake a policy analysis of the PNG TB DOTS policy.   
 
There is an absence of research on the health policy process in PNG and the complex 
PNG policy context, particularly with regard to political commitment and agenda 
setting therefore this research is addressing a genuine gap in knowedge and is an 
original contribution to knowedge. 
 Conclusion 2.13
 
In conclusion the existing literature does provide us with methodologies to adequately 
answer the research questions and achieve the research objectives of this research.  
The literature also identifies gaps in the literature both in relation to political 
commitment and agenda setting generally, but especially in relation to PNG which 
make this research an original contribution to knowledge. 
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Based on what we have found in this Chapter the overarching approach to answering 
the research questions will be framed within the Walt and Gilson - Context, Process, 
Actors and Content Framework (Walt and Gilson 1994, Buse, Mays et al. 2006).  With 
regard to political commitment in PNG the framework of Fox et. al. (Fox, Goldberg et 
al. 2011) will be used to undertake the analysis of political commitment to achieve the 
research objectives. 
 
Compared to Shiffman’s framework, the three streams approach with its neutral 
starting point, as adapted by Walt et. al. in the Context, Process, Actors and Content 
Framework will enable an in-depth description and critique of the policy context, 
process and actors in PNG, will frame the analysis of agenda setting for the 2006 PNG 
TB policy. 
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3 Methods - Doing Health Policy Research 
 
 Introduction 3.1
This chapter outlines the research methodology, methods undertaken and data 
sources used to achieve these research objectives.   
 
 Methods for this research  3.2
This research aims to uncover and understand the complex contextual factors that 
drive and influence policy, decisions and outcomes.  Standard epidemiological 
approaches aiming to establish associations and causality are of little assistance in 
answering these research questions.  The literature review has identified three 
frameworks which enable us to answering the research questions and so achieve the 
research objectives.  These frameworks bring a high level of rigour, have an 
established record in the policy sciences literature, and are capable of being applied in 
resource poor contexts. 
 
The context, actors, process, content framework (Walt and Gilson 1994, Buse, Mays et 
al. 2006) allows an analysis of the interactions and relationships of actors in the policy 
process, especially its ability to describe and critique power structures and 
relationships in the policy process.  Critically examining and understanding the role of 
power in relationships in the policy process is crucial in low and middle income 
countries, where complex external power relationships with aid donors, technical 
adviser’s etc. influence the policy process.  This framework enables the researcher to 
critically examine and understand the dynamic and complex PNG TB DOTS policy 
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process – the actors (internal and external), including the power relationships between 
those actors, the complex PNG policy context (cultural institutions, governance and 
health system), and the capacity to formulate and implement health policy in PNG, 
which means this framework provides a relevant method to undertake analysis of the 
TB DOTS Policy in PNG. 
 
The political commitment analysis framework (Fox, Balarajan et al. 2014) identifies 
three components to political commitment – expressed commitment, institutional 
commitment, and budgetary commitment.  This framework allows for a detailed 
analysis of the institutional commitment component of political commitment in PNG 
which other frameworks do not allow.  Institutional commitment is about the 
institutions and structures which governments establish to deliver services in order to 
implement policy.  It involves ensuring governance structures which enable and 
facilitate the delivery of the policy, along with robust health information systems to 
enable the monitoring and evaluation of the policy.  Further it examines and takes into 
consideration the domestic political context and processes such as the capacity to 
govern, the type of political structures, and the role of both non state and 
international actors in the policy process.  This framework does not examine political 
commitment simply in terms of political statements, and/or financial and human 
resource commitment with regard to the policy.  So the framework developed by Fox 
et al provided a legitimate starting point for this research on political commitment in 
PNG in the period from 1997 to 2006.  The political commitment framework provides 
the method for analysis of political commitment in Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 10 of this 
thesis. 
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The third frameworks relevant to this research is the multiple streams framework 
which finds that policy making does not proceed neatly in stages, steps or phases 
(Kingdon 2011).  The multiple streams framework identifies three independent policy 
making streams which flow through the policy system all at once, each with a life of its 
own (Kingdon 2011):  1) The problem stream refers to the process by which, out of 
multiple policy problems confronting society and government, one particular policy 
problem becomes of sufficient importance as to come to the attention of policy 
makers (Buse, Mays et al. 2006).  2) The policy stream consists of “the ongoing 
analyses of problems and their solutions together with the debates surrounding their 
proposed solutions.” (Buse, Mays et al. 2006).  3) The politics stream “operates quite 
separately of the other two streams and is comprised of events such as swings of 
national mood, changes of government and campaigns by interest groups.” (Buse, 
Mays et al. 2006).  The politics stream takes place at the political level, when a problem 
becomes sufficiently important to require a policy to respond to the problem.  It is only 
when these three streams come together in what is a policy window that the policy 
moves onto the government’s policy agenda.   
 
This framework enables us to describe and critique in detail each of the components of 
the policy agenda setting process in the 2006 PNG TB DOTS policy.  We present this 
analysis in Chapters 8 and 9 of this thesis.  However, as we need to adapt the multiple 
stream framework to analyse the agenda setting process in the PNG context in the 
light of the significant differences in the policy context and process between the 
United States of America, where Kingdon undertook his research and developed the 
multiple streams framework, and Papua New Guinea.  The major difference is how and 
where power in the policy process and agenda setting lies.  In the USA power lies 
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within the United States politics stream, and much of the research applying the three 
streams policy analysis focuses on how power is exercised within the United States 
context.  PNG is a very different policy context.  Given that aid donors contribute a 
significant proportion of funds to health services provision in PNG there is a very 
different set of elements operating in the policy process in the PNG.  Aid donors exert 
more power and influence in the policy process and the agenda setting process in PNG.  
As a result much of the policy process takes place outside of PNG at the regional and 
global levels.  So we need to adapt the multiple streams framework to our analysis of 
the 2006 PNG TB DOTS policy.  We do this by dedicating Chapter 8 to an analysis of 
these global and regional relationships which exert influence and power on agenda 
setting in the 2006 PNG TB DOTS policy.  In Chapter 9 we analyse the events within 
PNG itself which brought TB DOTS onto the policy agenda in 2006. 
 
A further advantage of the multiple streams framework over other policy analysis 
frameworks is that it starts the policy analysis from a neutral stance with regard to 
global health initiative polices e.g. TB DOTS.  It does not presume, or use as its starting 
point, the stance that the global health initiative policy is the best or only policy for the 
particular context.  This neutrality in the starting point allows for a more objective 
analysis of the agenda setting process making the multiple streams framework the 
appropriate framework for the analysis of agenda setting in the 2006 PNG TB DOTS 
Policy. 
 
All three of these frameworks use in-depth interviews with key actors in the policy 
process; the observation of events, context, interactions, and relative positions of 
power and influence; and an extensive analysis of published and unpublished literature 
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to achieve triangulation of the data.  This is a well-established method in undertaking 
health policy analysis (Gilson 2014) in order to research and articulate the policy 
process, the context and role and interactions of key actors in that process. 
 
In order to understand as fully as possible the process that enabled TB DOTS to come 
onto the policy agenda in PNG in 2006, and the PNG construct of political 
commitment,  this the research uses the following data sources:   
1 In-depth interviews with key relevant personnel involved in the 2006 PNG TB 
DOTS policy process;  
2 Observations made on field trips;  
3 Review of published research on PNG, health policy analysis and TB and TB 
DOTS policy; and  
4 Analysis of government reports and documents (both PNG and Australian), and 
bilateral agency reports.   
It is the combination of the data from these sources for analysis which allows 
triangulation of the data.  
 
By taking the 2006 PNG TB DOTS Policy we have a defined policy within a defined time 
period which frames this research.  See Table 1.  Key Government of PNG documents 
which help provide the time frame for, but do not define or limit, this research are: 
1. Papua New Guinea National Health Plan 2000-2010(GovPNG 2000) 
2. Aia, P., et al. (2006). Country Status Report of National TB Program, Papua New 
Guinea, 1997-2005. Port Moresby, National TB Program Unit, Disease Control 
Branch, National Department of Health, Papua New Guinea(Aia, Yadav et al. 
2006). 
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3. Aia, P., et al. (2006). PNG Country Strategic Plan to Stop TB, 2006-2010. Port 
Moresby, National TB Program Unit, Disease Control Branch, National 
Department of Health, Papua New Guinea.(Aia, Yadav et al. 2006) 
4. Papua New Guinea Country Coordinating Committee (2006). Proposal Form - 
Sixth Call for Proposals - Expanding and Implementing the Stop TB Strategy in 
Papua New Guinea. The Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
(GFATM).  Port Moresby.  July 2006.(PNG CCM 2006) 
These sources, along with other sources, were used to construct a detailed historical 
time line of the events surrounding the development of the 2006 PNG TB DOTS Policy.  
The purpose of the timeline is to enable an understanding of the context and process 
of policy development as well as to identify and understand key events and factors 
influencing the policy process in the development of the 2006 PNG TB DOTS Policy.  
This detailed timeline is provided at the end of Chapter 1 - Introduction. 
 
 Key Informant Interviews 3.3
The starting point for the key informant interviews was those people listed as having 
participated in the meetings and workshops leading up to the development of the 
2006 Country Status Report of National TB Program(Aia, Yadav et al. 2006), and the 
Papua New Guinea, 1997-2005 2006 Country Strategic Plan to Stop TB, 2006-2010(Aia 
2012).  As a result the initial key informant interviewees were people in government, 
bilateral and multi-lateral aid and UN agencies, and not-for-profit organizations 
working in health in PNG.  Each interviewee was asked to identify other individuals 
who held relevant positions who would be willing to participate (a technique known as 
snowballing).  During the initial interviews it became apparent that the interviews 
59 
needed to extend beyond PNG to include technical experts from outside of PNG who 
had played roles in the development of the 2006 PNG TB DOTS policy.  As a result 
further interviews were conducted in Australia.  See Field Visit 4 and 5, page 63.  
Where interviewees consented to be identified they are identified throughout this 
thesis in the following manner (interviewee surname, date).  See Appendix 1 for a 
Profile of the Interviewees. Where the interviewee volunteered the reason for not 
consenting to being identified the usual reason was that their employment could have 
been affected by having their views expressed publically.  There is a genuine concern 
that if further detail is provided it will actually identify those interviewees who 
requested they not be identified.  PNG is a comparatively small country and the people 
involved in TB control are even smaller in number.  This is acknowledged as a limitation 
of this research.     
 
A total of 18 key informant interviews were conducted for this research.  16 of these 
interviews were conducted between April and November 2008.  A field visit was 
undertaken to PNG in April 2008 to conduct the majority of the interviews.  Six 
interviews were conducted in Australia.  Two of these were with interviewees who had 
left PNG, having worked as researchers in political science and the policy process in 
PNG, and were now based at the Australian National University.  One was with a 
retired academic who had initially worked as a district medical officer in PNG before 
taking up the position of Professor of Community Health at UPNG.  The fourth was 
with a senior AusAID official working on the AusAID PNG Health sector aid program.  
The fifth was a telephone interview with the Director of the Queensland TB control 
program.  A follow-up telephone interview was conducted in 2010 when clarification 
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of points from the initial interview was required.  This also allowed for collection of 
further data on progress with the implementation of the 2006 policy. 
 
Interviews were semi-structured and conducted in English.  The interviews ranged in 
length from a half hour up to one hour and a half hours.  All interviews were 
conducted face to face, except two interviews, including the 2010 follow-up interview, 
which was conducted via phone.  The interviews were then transcribed by this 
researcher and coded according to the themes identified by the literature review. 
 
 Ethics 3.4
This research was approved by the University of Sydney Human Research Ethics 
Committee (Reference No: 10740).  Each interviewee was provided with the 
Participant information sheet and, if they agreed to proceed, signed the Participant 
consent form.  Further clarification of the research, how data would be managed etc. 
was provided as requested by the interviewee before the interview proceeded.  See 
Appendix 2 and 3. 
 
Of the 18 interviewees 6 gave consent for their names to be identified.  3 interviewees, 
when signing the consent form, requested that they remain anonymous.  When there 
was no indication of agreement to have their identity revealed when the Participant 
consent form was signed then it was assumed consent has not been given to reveal the 
participants identity.  This was the case with 9 participants.  The group who did not 
give consent, or who did not indicate consent on the Participant consent form, were 
either government employees or working for Non-Government Organisation (NGO) 
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where their employment was in TB DOTS implementation in PNG, and identifying them 
could place their work in jeopardy.  Any data from these interviews is referenced so as 
to ensure the identity of the interviewee is not revealed. 
 Field Trip Observations 3.5
The findings arising from the literature review and the key informant interviews are 
then triangulated with field trips observations made by this researcher on three field 
trips to PNG.  I was the Community Heath / Public Health member of three PNG Health 
Sector SWAp Independent Monitoring and Review Group (IMRG) Teams which 
undertook reviews of the PNG Health Sector SWAP in November 2005, November 
2006 and April / May 2007.  My field visit notes are incorporated into the final reports 
produced by the IMRG.  These IMRG reports have been approved by the National 
Department of Health (NDOH), the Government of PNG, for general release.  So the 
field data used in this PhD research is from IMRG reports in the public domain i.e. 
approved by the PNG NDOH, the Government of PNG. 
 
These field trips took place in: 
Field Visit 1 – November 2005 
In November 2005 (Research Field Notes November 2005) visits were made to: 
• The National Department of Health (NDOH), Port Moresby; PNG National AIDS 
Council; World Health Organization; UNICEF; AusAID, the Australian High 
Commission, Port Moresby 
• Milne Bay Province:  The Provincial Health Office, Alotau, Provincial Capital of 
Milne Bay Province; Provincial Hospital Alotau. 
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Field Visit 2 – November 2006 
In November 2006 (Research Field Notes November 2006) visits were made to: 
• The National Department of Health (NDOH) in Port Moresby; PNG National 
AIDS Council;  World Health Organization; AusAID, The Australian High 
Commission, Port Moresby; and Churches Medical Council, Port Moresby.  
• Sandaun (West Sepik) Province: The Provincial Health Office (PHO) in Vanimo, 
Provincial Capital of Sandaun; Vanimo Town Health Centre; and Bewani Health 
Centre inland from Vanimo. 
 
Field Visit 3 – April / May 2007 
May 2007 field visits (Research Field Visit Notes May 2007) were made to: 
• The National Department of Health (NDOH) in Port Moresby; PNG National 
AIDS Council;  World Health Organization; AusAID, The Australian High 
Commission, Port Moresby; and Department of Public Health, School of 
Medicine and Health Sciences, The University of Papua New Guinea. 
• Madang Province:  The Faculty of Health Sciences, Divine Word University, 
Madang; The Provincial Health Office (PHO) in Madang, Provincial Capital of 
Madang; visit to Bogia District Hospital / Health Centre, on the west coast of 
Madang Province; and 
• Western Province:  The Provincial Health Office (PHO) and District Health Office 
(DHO) in the Provincial Centre of Daru; Daru Provincial Hospital, Daru; visit to 
Mabudawan Health Centre on the Torres Strait coast of Western Province. 
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Field Visit 4 – April 2008 
In April 2008 a further visit was undertaken to Port Moresby and Madang in Papua 
New Guinea during which interviews were conducted for this research.  Additional 
PNG government, bilateral and multilateral agency reports identified during the 
interviews as being relevant to this research were also collected. 
 
Field Visit 5 – June 2008 
A further field visit was undertaken to Canberra, Australia in June 2008 where further 
interviews were conducted, and further reports relevant to this research were also 
collected. 
 
 Application of Research Methods to Data analysis to achieve the Research 3.6
Objectives 
Data from the peer reviewed and grey literature, the key informant interviews and 
field visit notes were coded by this author according to the research themes identified 
from the literature review, and analysis was undertaken.  Information provided 
through the interviews has been corroborated with information from the field visit 
notes and also the peer reviewed and grey literature to ensure triangulation has been 
achieved.  The results of the analysis are presented in Sections 2, 3 and 4 of this thesis.   
 
Objective 1 – To describe TB as a health problem in PNG 
In Part 2 - Chapter 4 – Tuberculosis in Papua New Guinea, peer reviewed literature, 
grey literature, key –informant interviews and field observations are used to describe 
and critique the burden of TB in PNG.  It examines the official incidence and prevalence 
data for TB in PNG, the PNG health information system (HIS) with regard to TB 
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incidence and prevalence and the presence of multi-drug resistant TB in PNG in order 
establish reliable data on which to plan and evaluate a TB DOTS Policy in PNG.  
Objective 2 - To describe and critique TB DOTS Component 1 – Political commitment, 
the resultant governance structures, and the impact of these the PNG Health Systems 
capacity to deliver a TB DOTS Policy 
 
Part 3 of this thesis presents the data analysis to achieve Objective 2  - To describe and 
critique TB DOTS Component 1 – Political commitment, the resultant governance 
structures, and the impact of these the PNG Health Systems capacity to deliver a TB 
DOTS Policy.  The political commitment analysis framework (Fox, Balarajan et al. 2014) 
is applied to the peer reviewed literature, grey literature, key –informant interviews 
and field observations in order to analyse, describe and critique the particular PNG 
construct of political commitment.  All three elements of political commitment – 
expressed commitment, institutional commitment and budgetary commitment are 
analysed throughout Part 3.  However particular attention is paid to institutional 
commitment in the analysis of governance structures and the consequent impact on 
the health systems capacity to deliver a national TB DOTS policy.  This analysis is 
structured in the following way: 
• Chapter 5 - Cultural institutions underpinning political commitment and 
leadership, undertakes an in-depth analysis and critique of the cultural 
institutions in PNG which determines and forms political commitment and 
leadership;  
• Chapter 6 – Political Commitment, Governance Reforms and PNG Health system 
Performance  deals with the impact of PNG health system governance 
(institutional commitment) on the capacity and performance, and health 
outcomes. 
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• Chapter 7 – Political Commitment and TB DOTS in PNG to examine in detail how 
the health system governance directly affected the health system’s capacity to 
implement a TB DOTS Policy.   
 
In summary, Part 3 undertakes a detailed analysis of the PNG TB DOTS policy context 
into which a TB DOTS Policy has to be delivered.  It is only when this complex PNG 
Health policy context is understood that we can truly understand what is required to 
be addressed in formulating and implementing a TB DOTS Policy in PNG, and also see if 
these factors were taken into consideration during the 2006 PNG TB DOTS policy 
agenda setting process.  Part 3 concentrates on the period from 1997 to 2006, in order 
to provide a clear picture of the PNG policy context leading up and at the time of TB 
DOTS moving onto the PNG policy agenda in 2006. 
 
Objective 3 - To describe and critique the 2006 PNG TB DOTS Policy Agenda Setting 
Process from 2004 – 2006 
Part 4 of this thesis deals with Objective 3 - To describe and critique the 2006 PNG TB 
DOTS Policy Agenda Setting Process from 2004 – 2006.  The multiple streams 
framework (Kingdon 2011) as refined and adapted to the resource poor setting by 
Walt et. al. (Buse, Mays et al. 2006, Walt, Shiffman et al. 2008) is used to analyse the 
peer reviewed literature, grey literature, key –informant interviews and field 
observations in order to analyse, describe and critique the role of various policy actors 
- domestic, international, and technical advisers, and the power relationships between 
PNG and international actors, and the sequence of events in this period which moved 
TB DOTS onto the policy agenda in PNG in 2006.  Each of the three streams – problem 
stream, policy stream and politics stream are dealt with in detail and adapted to the 
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particular PNG policy context.  To deal with the power imbalance which results in 
much of the policy process in the 2006 PNG TB DOTS policy taking place outside of 
PNG, this analysis adapts the multiple streams framework to deal with the PNG 
context by starting this analysis with those international actors and organizations and 
the policy process which takes place outside of PNG (Chapter 8).  This then sets the 
context for the analysis of the agenda setting process within PNG itself from 2004-
2006 (Chapter 9).  This analysis is structured in the following way: 
• Chapter 8 - Agenda Setting and International Actors in the 2006 PNG TB DOTS 
Policy describes and critiques the policy actors who exert significant influence 
and power, their relationships and interactions, and the key events at the 
regional and global level in the 2006 PNG TB DOTS policy agenda setting 
process. 
• Chapter 9 - Agenda Setting within PNG in the 2006 PNG TB DOTS Policy 
describes and critiques the agenda setting process in the 2006 PNG TB DOTS 
policy, the role of, and relationships between the key policy actors and 
entrepreneurs in that process in PNG during this period.   
 
Objective 4 - To describe and critique the impact of the PNG construct of political 
commitment on the implementation of the 2006 TB DOTS policy. 
Part 5 of this thesis then describes and critiques the implementation of the 2006 TB 
policy. 
• Chapter 10 - Political Commitment in Implementation of the 2006 TB DOTS 
Policy again uses the political commitment framework of Fox et al (expressed 
commitment, bureaucratic commitment and financial commitment) to describe 
and critique the implementation of the 2006 policy. 
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Part 6 - Discussion and Conclusion (Chapter 10) then brings the results together in a 
detailed discussion and conclusion and an outline of the implications of this research 
for policy making in resource limited settings. 
 
 Limitations of the Research 3.7
There are limitations to some of the data used in this research.  The data from PNG 
government, bilateral and multilateral agency literature had undergone a peer review 
process only in some cases.  When this peer review process was not outlined in the 
report or document, these data were used only when the data was verified by one of 
the other primary data sources i.e. key informant interviews or field notes.   
 
The other potential limitation of this research is one noted by Walt and Gilson when 
they identified the need for, and encouraged further health policy research, which is - 
“We emphasize the critical importance of sensitivity and caution in this approach to 
policy analysis, recognizing the potential influence of the analyst's own values and 
perspectives over the analysis and even the decisions made. (Walt and Gilson 1994)”.  
The importance of triangulation of data to address this potential limitation is 
addressed by ensuring triangulation with a high level of rigor is applied at all stages of 
the research. 
 Conclusion 3.8
In conclusion this chapter has outlined the methods and frameworks for this research.  
As well it has detailed the data sources and how data collection took place to meet 
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ethical requirements.  Finally it has outlined how data analysis has been carried out to 
achieve the research objectives. 
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Part 2 – Burden of TB in PNG 
Part 2 of this thesis addresses Objective 1 – To describe TB as a health problem in PNG 
i.e. what is the actual health burden of TB in PNG as policy Problem.  Chapter 4 – 
Tuberculosis in Papua New Guinea, examines in depth the burden of TB in PNG.  
Starting with the official incidence and prevalence data for TB in PNG it finds that a 
weak HIS means that the actual incidence and prevalence is not known for either drug 
sensitive or drug resistant strains of TB.  There is no reliable data on which to plan or 
evaluate a TB DOTS Policy in PNG. 
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4 Tuberculosis Incidence in Papua New Guinea – Impact of Governance 
Structures and Donor Needs 
 
“One of the ground-breaking elements of the DOTS strategy has been its clear methods 
for routine case notification, reporting, treatment cohort analysis, supervision for 
validation, and related performance indicators.  These approaches are urgently needed 
to measure progress towards the MDG and Partnership impact targets.” 
Source: (Stop TB Partnership and World Health Organization 2006) 
 
 Introduction 4.1
The aim of this chapter is to evaluate the extent of TB as a health problem in PNG, 
what is the actual TB incidence and what are other indicators of burden of TB in PNG?  
WHO and the Stop TB Partnership emphasise the importance of TB DOTS Component 5 
- Monitoring and Evaluation System, and Impact Measurement, placing major 
emphasis on the central role reliable data have in a national TB DOTS Program in order 
to plan, as well as evaluate the impact or otherwise of TB control programmes.   
 
Reliable evaluation of TB control interventions requires good quality data.  This 
chapter critically examines TB data and health information in general in PNG in order 
to understand the quality of data, and to assist us with examining how and if data are 
used to inform policy in the subsequent chapters of this thesis.  To understand why 
there was no reliable TB incidence or TB burden of disease data leading up to the 2006 
PNG TB DOTS policy coming onto the policy agenda in 2006, it is necessary to examine 
in some detail the HIS in general, as well as TB data in particular – how these data are 
collected, reported and collated.  It is necessary to understand who has responsibility 
for health data at the different levels of the Health System and the lines of 
responsibility for health data reporting and quality. This research finds that data on TB 
are extremely poor with insufficient reliable data to enable an accurate estimate of TB 
72 
incidence and prevalence.  Nor are there sufficient reliable data to enable accurate 
monitoring and evaluation of TB disease outcomes or the National TB Control Program. 
 
There are four key findings in this chapter: 
1.  There is a poorly functioning HIS, despite past attempts to address data 
collection, collation and analysis.   
2. The underlying issues with the quality of TB data are beyond the control of the 
NDOH and date back to governance structures that came about as a result of 
the Organic Laws of 1977 and 1995.  Health districts and provinces, at the lower 
level of the Health System, do not actually have responsibility to the NDOH for 
collecting or reporting health information.   
3. Aid donor reporting requirements drive and demand different data to routine 
HIS data.  These donor requirements have added to the complexity of TB HIS by 
demanding data on TB indictors which the HIS is not capable of providing.  In 
response donors have either unsuccessfully attempted to strengthen the 
existing HIS, or created parallel HIS systems, adding to an already dysfunctional 
HIS, and confusing what is already a very imprecise calculation of the true TB 
incidence and burden of TB. 
4. PNG has an emerging problem with drug resistant TB, both multi-drug resistant 
(MDR-TB) and extensively drug resistant (XDR-TB), but the current HIS and PNG 
National TB Control Program (NTP) do not have HIS reporting capacity or 
instruments to measure the extent of this significant problem. 
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 TB Incidence and Burden in Papua New Guinea 4.2
There is significant inconsistency in the official measurements of TB incidence in PNG.  
A review of Western Province HC TB case records in 2012 found a TB incidence of 500 
cases per 100,000 people per year, similar to that in Mozambique and Cambodia 
(McBryde 2012).  These data were collected as part of an independent review of the 
AusAID inputs into TB control in the Western Province.  This review used data taken 
directly from HCs and did not rely on data from the NDOH HIS.  The TB incidence in 
Western Province reported in the review is significantly higher than the official 
National TB incidence, and also the WHO reported TB incidence for the whole of 
PNG.WHO Geneva gives a TB incidence of 303 (197-430) in its World TB Report 2011 
(WHO 2011).  The Western Pacific TB Report 2010 states that the TB incidence is 250 
(210-300) with wide provincial level variation(WHO 2011).  The PNG NDOH reports an 
incidence of TB of 250, which is actually based on 2007 data (NDOH 2011).  The official 
WHO Reports quote the NDOH as the source of data.  At the same time the NDOH 
quotes the WHO as the source of their data.  When the two data are compared, there 
is inconsistency in the official reported incidence.  Neither source outlines the 
methodology used to calculate the TB incidence and burden of TB.  Whilst within a 
similar range, these variations in incidence, along with the absence of an explained 
methodology, raise the important question as to just how accurately these official TB 
incidence data actually reflect the true incidence of TB.   
 
 TB Data and Health Information in Papua New Guinea 4.3
The current PNG National Health Information System (NHIS) dates back to 1995, when 
an updated HIS form with a standardized set of indicators was developed and 
74 
introduced following consultation with provinces and districts and field testing in 
Chimbu Province, to address the need for reliable, standard, country-wide health 
indicators (NDOH 2005).  The HIS form was rolled out along with  a manual providing 
the necessary protocols and guidelines in a form that is ‘simple, flexible, acceptable, 
affordable and provides information that is sensitive, timely, representative and useful 
for public health action’ (Cibulskis and Hiawalyer 2002, Hiawalyer 2005).   
 
These standardized hard-copy NHIS forms, which are still in use, are what each Aid 
Post and HC is meant to complete and return to the PHO each month (Hiawalyer 2005, 
Kitur 2012), where the data is collated for use at the provincial level.  Forms are then 
forwarded to the Monitoring and Review Branch (M&RB) at the NDOH in Port Moresby 
where the data is entered a second time (Kitur 2012).  Morbidity and mortality data on 
hospitalized patients are collected separately by health facilities and sent directly to 
M&RB.  These hospital data are regarded as the most accurate reflection of TB cases 
presenting to hospitals in PNG(GovPNG 2014).  However, they do not provide data on 
those TB cases who do not present to hospitals which may account for a major burden 
of cases in PNG.  These combined data sets form the basis of the health data 
(Hiawalyer 2005, Kitur 2012), and are meant to be used for planning, implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation of health status and programs (Hiawalyer 2005, Kitur 2012), 
as well as for reporting to international agencies and donors. 
 
There are several constraints that impact on and limit the quality of data in the HIS.  
Firstly, returns of the monthly NHIS forms to the M&RB are often delayed for six 
months or longer (Kitur 2012, Research Field Notes November 2005).  “Trying to get 
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basic reports back from aid posts and clinics (Health Centres), is very difficult. The road 
would be cut off during certain times of the year, then you have to remember also PNG 
is partly an archipelago so also when the seas aren’t right, and technology is poor.  
Even people who do fill it out do get frustrated when they don’t get any feedback and 
say oh well you know we’ve done all these forms and now we don’t get even an 
acknowledgement so why do we do it the next month” (Anonymous 2 - Interview 11th 
April 2008), and “People often had difficulty submitting the forms in a timely manner, 
the fax machine was probably not working, or they didn’t have a fax machine, or the 
ferry that was meant to take the report to the mainland decided to skip that island that 
quarter, the electricity was down for 3 months, so these are the realities in 
PNG.”(Adepoybi - Interview 12th April 2008)  Also, there is large variation among 
provinces in the number of paper-based forms returned to M&RB, with less than 50% 
of NHIS returns reaching M&RB from some provinces (Kitur 2012, Research Field Notes 
November 2005).  Further, there are delays of up to two years in NHIS data being 
entered into the M&RB data base (Research Field Notes November 2005).  Finally, 
there had not been an epidemiologist in the M&RB for ten years, limiting the quality of 
analysis of the NHIS data (Kitur 2012, Research Field Notes November 2005).   
 
Questions about HIS data quality were raised in a comprehensive evaluation of the 
data in 2006 by Ashwell and Barclay (Ashwell and Barclay 2010), who examined HIS 
data collected over seven years from 1998-2004 as part of an evaluation of a national 
development project The study examined how reliable the HIS was in measuring 
community health status at the local level.  Using in-depth quantitative and qualitative 
data from 10 Provinces (50% of the provinces), 19 districts (21% of the districts), 175 
health personnel, and 77 community focus group discussions, the study  found 
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significant problems in the quality of health data collected by the HIS at the AP and HC 
level with ‘under-reporting, over-reporting, and errors with calculation and 
transcription’ along with ‘discrepancies when provincial and national level records were 
compared with health centre records’ (Ashwell and Barclay 2010).  The study also 
found that in some of the 10 provinces, data from APs was included in the local HC 
monthly HIS forms, whilst in others, AP data was not included as AP Community Health 
Workers (CHW) were not considered to be sufficiently competent to make accurate 
diagnoses to include the data from APs in the routine HIS (Ashwell and Barclay 2010).  
The study concluded that the quality of HIS data from the HC level is highly 
questionable (Ashwell and Barclay 2010).  Recent reviews of the HIS find that these 
fundamental problems with the HIS and data quality continue up to the present (Kitur 
2012). 
 
One interviewee for this research observed that “the wrong people are trained to 
complete the NIH reports.  Clinicians, (doctors, HEOs and nursing officers) are receiving 
the HIS training.  But I can guarantee you in over 95% of TB sections in Health Centres 
it’s a CHW in there.  Nurses don’t want to work in the TB section, they don’t want to 
catch TB, it’s highly stigmatised.  The poor CHW gets stuck there, and the CHW has 
limited education and capacity and that’s why the WHO refuses to train them.  So the 
CHW still has no idea how to fill in the forms properly because of their limited capacity 
sometimes they just spend all day dispensing drugs and they don’t even record 
anything.  This was problematic as CHWs form a significant part of the PNG TB control 
workforce”(Adepoybi - Interview 12th April 2008).  It is these very AP and HC TB data 
that are used to calculate the TB incidence, contributing to questions about the quality 
of these calculations. 
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Beside these NHIS data bases there are disease-specific data bases in the NDOH, which 
are required to report to international TB program donors (NDOH NTP 2011).  The TB 
control program data, from which the TB DOTS quarterly cohort reports are prepared, 
are collected by the TB Control Program, separate from the routine NHIS returns.  
Table 4 Variations in Global Fund and PNG National Department of Health (NDOH) TB 
Monitoring and Evaluation reporting indicators in Papua New Guinea, sets out the TB 
indicators these forms collect for NTP.  However, the TB Control Program reports also 
are not  timely with delays of many months or years, and many  forms not completed, 
leaving gaps in TB data (Research Field Notes November 2005).   
 
Further, major communication problems exist between the M&RB and the TB Control 
Program in the NDOH with very poor or non-existent communication or information 
sharing due to internal conflict (Research Field Notes November 2005).  As a result, the 
available TB data are not freely shared within the PNG Health System for TB control 
planning, or monitoring and evaluation.  Finally, there has been no trained 
epidemiologist or a standard method provided by the TB Control Program in the NDOH 
as to how the TB incidence is actually calculated(Research Field Notes November 
2005). 
 
In summary, the reported TB incidence does not have a strong basis for reflecting the 
true TB incidence and does not provide a good foundation for assessing the needs on 
the ground or progress made, with respect to donor funding.  Nor does the HIS provide 
a basis for the monitoring and evaluation of TB inputs or outcomes.  
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Figure 2 – The Papua New Guinea Health System 
Source: (Ashwell and Barclay 2010) 
 
 TB Under Reporting – Health System Factors 4.4
The problems with routine and TB specific health information stem from the 
overwhelming health system issues in PNG, (Please see Figure 2 The Papua New 
Guinea Health System for the organizational structure of the PNG Health services).  
With 85% of the population living in rural areas, APs have been the main providers of 
health services to the majority of the population since Independence and should be 
the main source of data for basic disease surveillance. (Frankel 1984, GovPNG 2010).  
The 2,400 Aid Posts (Aps) are the first line of contact with the health system in rural 
PNG (Asian Development Bank 2003).  Staffed by an Aid Post Orderly (APO) and CHW, 
AP are situated in or near most villages, and provide the majority of primary care 
services.  Under the 1995 New Organic Law (see the following section and Chapter 5 
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for details of the impact of the Organic Laws in PNG), it became the responsibility of 
Local Level Government (LLG) (Districts) to maintain APs and pay the staff wages.  
However, due to a lack of funds for staff wages, medications shortages and lack of 
maintenance of buildings, over 50% of APs had closed in the preceding  20 years (Asian 
Development Bank 2003, Cammack 2008).  This means that up to fifty percent of the 
population now do not have access to health services of any type, nor is health data 
collected about their state of health or health outcomes (Bolger, Mandie-Filer et al. 
2005, NDOH 2009, GovPNG 2010).  As a result of the AP closures, more people must 
travel long distances to access services at HCs, the next level of care in the health 
system.  It is well documented that the further people have to travel to access health 
services, the less likely they are to attend for treatment (Müller, Smith et al. 1998, 
Gibson and Rozelle 2003, Toikilik, Tuges et al. 2010). Time away from home involves 
the economic cost of leaving gardens necessary for survival in a subsistence culture; in 
addition, the trip can be hazardous due to difficult terrain and/or breakdown in law 
and order(Bolger, Mandie-Filer et al. 2005). 
 
 Impact of the Organic Laws on the PNG Health Information System 4.5
The impact of the Governance structure reforms in PNG of the Organic Laws of 1977 
and 1995, on TB Control in particular, and Health service delivery in general, will be 
dealt with in more detail in Part 3.  However, as this research has been undertaken it 
has become apparent that these Laws are, in fact, a fundamental factor underpinning 
the poor quality of TB data and health data in general.  So we briefly need to deal with 
the implications of the Organic Laws at this point in this thesis. 
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A short time after Independence in 1975, PNG was confronted with secessionist 
movements in several provinces with the real possibility of the country splitting up 
along linguistic and regional lines (Standish 1983).  In an attempt to prevent this from 
happening, by engaging these secessionist groups in the direct decision making of 
government, the Organic Law of 1977 devolved responsibility for all service provision 
down to the Provincial level (Standish 1983).  This did not placate the secessionist 
groups.  A bloody civil war broke out and was fought in the Province of Bougainville in 
the 1980s and 1990s.  The New Organic Law (NOL) of 1995 devolved government 
service provision, even further, down to the lowest level of government, the LLG, also 
called the District.  Under the 1995 New Organic Law reforms, Districts and Provinces 
were responsible for the provision of all services, including health services along with 
TB control, as well as health information collection and reporting.  The National Level 
of Government was then only responsible for policy setting and reporting to donors.   
 
With regard to Health Information, the result of these governance reforms in the 
1970s, 1980s and 1990s, was a variety of fragmented sets of health data in different 
health districts with no central coordination or analysis (Cibulskis and Hiawalyer 2002, 
Hiawalyer 2005).  There was, and still is, no obligation on districts to collect, collate or 
analyse health data in a standard format.  As a result, national level disease control 
and health information managers no longer had control over HIS.  There was no 
statutory obligation on the Health Districts, i.e. at the HC and AP level, to report health 
data to a higher level.  From an early stage in the history of post-independence PNG 
health service provision, a lack of accountability or responsibility to the levels above 
the district became entrenched. This fragmentation continues to impact on data 
collection, quality and analysis and underpins the current low level of HIS HC Reporting 
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Form returned to the provincial and national levels as well as incomplete forms 
returned.    
 
The NDOH is aware of these problems in health data collection and quality, and has 
attempted to address some of the underlying issues (Cibulskis and Hiawalyer 2002, 
Kitur 2012).  The new 1995 HIS Forms and more recent attempts to improve the rates 
of HIS Form returns are an example of this (Cibulskis and Hiawalyer 2002, Kitur 2012).  
However, these attempts to reform the HIS have no statutory authority to force 
provinces or districts to accept or implement them. 
 
 Donors Reporting needs and parallel TB data in PNG 4.6
Donors to the health sector in PNG have attempted to deal with these major 
constraints regarding HIS in one of two ways.  One way has been to attempt to reform 
and improve the existing HIS.  The second has been to create parallel HISs in order to 
meet the donors’ own reporting needs. 
 
An example of an attempt to reform the HIS in PNG is the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) Third Rural Health Services Project in the 1980s, which had the goal to build 
capacity in the Provincial Management (Newbrander, Thomason et al. 1988).  One 
component of this project was an attempt to establish a standardized set of health 
indicators (Campos-Outcalt 1991).  Micro-computers were introduced in seven of the 
then nineteen provinces with the goal of standardizing and improving health data 
quality (Campos-Outcalt 1991).  Pilot projects developed with input from short-term 
consultants showed initial favourable findings (Campos-Outcalt 1991).  However, these 
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programs were not rolled out nationally and did not continue beyond the life of the 
project.  
 
A further example of donors creating parallel systems to the PNG HIS is the assistance 
PNG received from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria (GFATM).  In 2007, as 
part of Global Fund PNG TB DOTS Round 6 Grants, PNG was awarded $US20mill over 
five years, to enable PNG to implement a national TB DOTS program (PNG CCM 2006).  
However a significant issue was that routine NHIS  does not collect data for all the 
Global Fund program indicators, the latter requiring a broader range of indicators.  
Table 4 sets out in detail the TB indictors required by GFATM compared to the 
indicators of the PNG TB Control Program.  The stringent Global Fund reporting 
indicators are set in Geneva and written into the grant agreement.  If these data are 
not provided as required, further tranches of funds are not released.  To address this, 
one major component of the Round 6 GFATM Grant was to improve TB data collection 
(PNGCCM 2006).  Under this component of the grant, the GFATM Grant sub-recipient 
actually employed GFATM project contractor monitoring and evaluation officers down 
to the provincial level, in those provinces where the Global Fund programs are being 
rolled out (Adepoybi - Interview 12th April 2008).  This has resulted in a parallel set of 
data being collected, one using the NHIS routine data form, and one collecting the 
extra data required for reporting against the GFATM indicators (Table 4).  As one 
senior official working with one of the Round 6 Global Fund TB Grant sub-recipients 
observed “looking at the reporting, it was all really output driven, numbers of posters 
printed, numbers of meetings held, number of world TB days events done, number of 
vehicles purchased, just trying to spend money.  There was not really any attempt to 
look at what we were doing in terms of real impact (on TB outcomes).  Talk about 
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setting up parallel and unsustainable systems, setting up parallel structures - district, 
provincial, national (Adepoybi - Interview 12th April 2008).  
 
The requirement of two sets of data has resulted in confusion at the HC level as to 
what TB data are required.  In mid-2012, the Global Fund announced that it would not 
be approving further funding for disease control programs (OIG GFATM 5 July 2012), 
inadequate reporting by PNG against the required Global Fund indicators being one of 
the reasons given.  These problems with reporting occurred despite the additional 
GFATM Round 6 Grant support given to improved data collection.  
 
Table 4 - Variations in Global Fund and PNG National Department of Health TB 
Monitoring and Evaluation reporting Indicators 
 
Global Fund 
 
PNG NDOH  
       T B  C a s e   D e t e c t i o n 
 
Monitoring at national level  
Number of all TB cases registered and 
reported to the national health authority 
in the past year (prevalence) 
Proportion of new smear-positive and 
all TB cases detected among estimated 
total population 
 
Number of new smear-positive 
pulmonary TB cases registered and 
reported to the national health authority 
in the past year (incidence) 
Proportion of TB cases detected who 
were sputum- smear positive 
(indicator of quality of diagnosis) 
 
 Monitoring at health facility level  
 
Proportion of TB suspects tested who 
were 13 years and over among all adult 
outpatients 
 
 Proportion of TB suspects tested who were sputum smear positive  
      T r e a t m e n t   O u t c o m e s 
Number of new smear-positive 
pulmonary TB cases in a specified period 
who subsequently were successfully 
treated (i.e. “cured” plus “treatment 
completed”) 
Proportion of new sputum-smear 
positive cases converted at 2 or 3 
months; 
Proportion of new smear-positive, 
smear positive, all other TB cases 
(including respective TB cases) 
with the following treatment 
outcomes: 
cure, treatment completed, treatment 
failure, died, default, transfer out, 
treatment success rate (proportion 
cured plus completed) 
 
Number of laboratories showing 
adequate performance (specify: smear 
microscopy, culture or drug 
  
84 
susceptibility) 
Number of reporting unites who did not 
report stock-out of the first-line or 
second-line anti TB drugs used in the 
national TB program over a defined 
period 
  
Number of reporting units at all levels of 
data flow that submitted timely case-
finding and treatment outcome reports 
to the national TB program in the 
previous quarter. 
  
       T B   /   H I V 
TB/HIV indicators: Number of TB patients 
tested for HIV; HIV positive TB patients 
receiving CPT therapy; … receiving ARV) 
  
        M D R -  T B   I n d i c a t o r s 
Number of TB cases (new and re-
treatment) who received diagnostic drug 
susceptibility testing for at least isoniazid 
and rifampicin during the period of 
assessment 
TB patients with results for isoniazid 
and rifampicin  
- 
Confirmed MDR-TB detected among TB 
patients tested for isoniazid and 
rifampicin drug sensitivity testing (DST) 
 
Number of laboratory-confirmed MDR-
TB cases registered and started on a 
prescribed second-line anti-TB treatment 
regimen during the specified period of 
assessment 
-  
- 
Confirmed MDR-TB tested for 
susceptibility to fluoroquinolone and 
second line injectable 
 
- Delay in diagnosis of MDR-TB  suspected and date for DST  
E n r o l m e n t   o n   M D R – T B   t r e a t m e n t   i n d i c a t o r s 
Delay between the date of MDR-TB 
confirmation and date patient started a 
prescribed second-line drug regimen 
Duration of time between confirmation 
of MDR-TB and start of MDR-TB 
treatment 
 
 
All MDR-TB cases (suspected or 
confirmed) enrolled on MDR-TB 
treatment, aggregated by (i) all cases; 
(ii) cases aged <15 yrs; and (iii) females 
 
 
Confirmed MDR-TB cases enrolled on 
MDR-TB treatment regimen, 
aggregated by (i) all cases; (ii) cases 
with HIV on ART; and (iii) cases with 
HIV but not known to be HIV 
 
 Confirmed XDR-TB cases enrolled on XDR-TB treatment  
 
  I n t e r i m    r e s u l t s   a t   6th   
m o n t h 
(early indicators of treatment success) 
 
 
MDR-TB cases on MDR-TB treatment 
regimen with negative culture by 6 
months 
 
 MDR-TB cases on MDR-TB treatment regimen who died by 6 months  
 Patients on MDR-TB treatment regimen found not to have MDR-TB  
 Patients on XDR-TB regimen found not to have XDR-TB  
 
Defaulting, change of regimens to XDR 
TB or susceptible TB treatment are also 
evaluated. The period of assessment is 
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3 calendar months where all patients 
registered and treatment during the 
assessment period is included. 
Indicators are measured 9 months after 
end of quarter of assessment. 
 F i n a l  t r e a t m e n t    o u t c o m e  
 
All confirmed MDR-TB cases on MDR-
TB treatment regimen will have the 
one of the following outcomes: 
Cured; completed; died; failed; 
defaulted; no outcome assigned. 
 The period of assessment 
 is 12 calendar months (annual cohort) 
and the indicators are measured 24 
months after the end of the year of 
assessment. All data can be extracted 
from the MDR TB treatment register. 
 
Source: (GFATM 2011, NDOH NTP 2011) 
 
Separate from the 2006 GFATM Round 6 Grant, in February 2012 AusAID announced 
$Aus11mill for a four-year project on TB control in the Western Province of PNG 
(AusAID 2012).  The main aim of this project is to stop travel by Papua New Guinean TB 
patients across the Torres Strait to seek treatment in Australian health facilities, an 
issue that has received considerable attention in Australia (Gilpin, Simpson et al. 2008, 
Brolan, Upham et al. 2011, Simpson, Coulter et al. 2011).  Based on the Global Fund 
grant approach in other parts of PNG, the project is aimed at scaling up TB DOTS in 
Western Province, with an added component to address MDR-TB, so Papua New 
Guinean TB patients can access quality TB services in their own community (AusAID 
2012).  However, the monitoring and evaluation of the project does not rely on the 
PNG HIS.  Due to the weak HIS in Western Province, external consultants have been 
recruited to undertake the monitoring and evaluation of the project, in parallel with 
the PNG HIS (McBryde 2012). This is a further case study in parallel systems being 
established by donors in order to meet their data needs. 
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 Data on Emerging Drug Resistant Tuberculosis in PNG 4.7
To add a further level of complexity to the problem of TB data, PNG now has a 
significant problem with the emergence of multi-drug resistant TB (MDR-TB) 
(Ahmadova, Heldal et al. 2012, Ballif, Harino et al. 2012, Lokuge, Salee et al. 2012, 
WHO 2012).  There are no actual national drug-resistant TB data as there is no 
routinely conducted Drug Resistance Surveillance (DRS), and no national drug 
resistance survey has yet been conducted in PNG although these are planned (WHO 
2011, Ahmadova, Heldal et al. 2012). 
 
As one TB doctor commented “The emergence of MDR-TB and XDR-TB is in part due to 
the inappropriate and unreliable diagnosis and inadequate dosing of drug-sensitive TB, 
with resistance developing as a consequence.” (Ongugo - Interview 22nd November 
2010)  Another important factor in the emergence of MDR-TB is “a huge default 
problem in PNG so treatment failures and what not would not have been picked up. 
Because they were all just lost to follow up. So the system is broken, so patients were 
not brought back and sent for MDR testing”(Adepoybi - Interview 12th April 2008). 
 
One long standing researcher on TB in PNG found “in terms of the health information, I 
can’t find any good data on multi-drug resistant TB patterns, there just doesn’t seem to 
be any and it just isn’t being done and again like how do you do TB DOTS without that 
sort of data?” (Riley - Interview 10th February 2010) 
 
Data on MDR-TB is only available from several small, local TB drug-resistance surveys 
in different parts of PNG.  In a TB drug sensitivity study carried out on the isolates of TB 
patients presenting between January 2006 and January 2007 at Modilon Hospital, 
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Madang, the Provincial Hospital for Madang, on the north coast of PNG, 17.2% (11/64) 
of TB patients whose isolates were tested for drug resistance showed resistance to 
first-line TB drugs, and 7.8% (5/64) had confirmed MDR-TB (Phuanukoonnon, Suarkia 
et al. 2008).  Drug-susceptibility testing (DST) done on TB patients, also at Modilon 
Hospital isolates from 2005 to 2007 (60 isolates), and from 2009 to 2010 (201 isolates) 
found that 15.7% had resistance to at least one first-line TB drug, and that 5.2% were 
MDR-TB (Ballif, Harino et al. 2012).  Further, molecular cluster analysis of these isolates 
provided evidence for transmission of resistant strains (Ballif, Harino et al. 2012).  A 
review of the 161 TB patients who, between 2000 and 2010, crossed the Torres Strait 
from the Western Province of PNG to access health services in northern Australia, 
MDR-TB was found in 24% (40/161) cases (Simpson, Coulter et al. 2011), confirming 
earlier similar studies (Gilpin, Simpson et al. 2008).  Data on 69 samples sent by the 
Central Public Health Laboratory in Port Moresby to the Queensland Mycobacterium 
Laboratory (QMRL) showed an MDR-TB rate of 57% (Ahmadova, Heldal et al. 2012).  
Further, analysis of sputum isolates from TB patients from National Capital District 
using the GeneXpert machine at Port Moresby Hospital showed that around 25% were 
multi-drug resistant (McBryde 2012).  In May 2012, a GeneXpert machine was also 
installed in Daru Hospital, Western Province, with 50% of sputum isolates tested in the 
first 6 months being positive for MDR-TB (McBryde 2012).   
 
Of major concern is the appearance of Extensively Drug Resistant TB (XDR-TB), i.e. TB 
resistant to two second line injectable TB drugs, plus fluoroquinolone.  XDR-TB has 
been found in six of the TB sputum isolates tested at Daru Hospital in 2012 (McBryde 
2012).  These limited MDR and XDR-TB cases place greater importance and urgency on 
accurate TB data.  It is crucial that accurate and reliable data on those patients who 
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default from treatment, who are still sputum smear positive (SSP) after completing 6 
months of DOTS treatment, who are presenting for re-treatment, and who are HIV 
positive are collected, as these people are at greater risk of MDR-TB.   
 
The ability to test for MDR-TB and XDR-TB in PNG remains very limited, and HIS and TB 
data reporting is not reliable enough for a representative measure of MDR-TB and 
XDR-TB in PNG.  A further point is that the PNG health system does not have the 
capacity in terms of expensive second line drugs or community outreach to establish 
and maintain a TB DOTS-Plus program required to manage MDR-TB.  
 HIV and Malaria in PNG 4.8
Of central consideration when addressing TB as a public health policy problem in PNG 
was the rapidly emerging burden of HIV in PNG.  “PNG has a generalized HIV epidemic 
with steadily increasing HIV prevalence.  In 2005, the HIV prevalence was 2% (range: 
0.8%-3.2%) among adults aged 15-49 years, the Highlands region being the most 
affected.  Based on the prevalence rate, it was estimated that 57,000 adults were living 
with HIV at the end of 2005.  There is currently no estimate of HIV incidence.” 
(Research Field Notes November 2006)  As with TB HIV incidence was not based on 
reliable population wide HIV data from HIS data, but rather on sentinel surveillance in 
the ante-natal clinics at Port Moresby General and Lae Provincial Hospitals (Research 
Field Notes November 2005, Research Field Notes November 2006).  HIV was the 
major cause of adult hospital admission and death in Port Moresby General Hospital.  
However, in those HIV deaths the main HIV co-infection, which was the actual cause of 
death, was TB. (Research Field Notes November 2006). 
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In December 1997 the PNG National Aids Council (NAC) was established, with direct 
reporting to the Prime Minister, to enable a multi-sectoral response to the HIV 
epidemic.  This effectively removed responsibility for HIV from the National 
Department of Health.  “The role of NDOH has been unclear after the transfer of 
surveillance activities to NAC even though the surveillance is carried out through the 
health facilities.  Other than clinical services, input by the NDOH into the national 
programme has been limited.  This is largely because the role of the NDOH was unclear 
in the initial conceptualization of a multi-sectoral response.  However, several 
evaluations and reviews have recommended that NDOH becomes more involved in 
HIV/AIDS control and in surveillance in particular.”(Research Field Notes November 
2005).   
 
The other major health policy problem confronting PNG was malaria.  “Malaria is the 
leading cause of outpatient attendances and the second leading cause of hospital 
admission and death (after HIV).” (GovPNG 2000, Asian Development Bank 2003, 
Research Field Notes November 2005) 
 
It is the high burden of both HIV and malaria which made them so called tier 1 health 
policy priority diseases in the period from 2000 to 2006 (GovPNG 2000, Mann 2006).  
In the health policy problem stream it is these two diseases which received priority and 
competed with TB to come onto the policy agenda, up until 2006. 
 Conclusion 4.9
Data on TB in PNG are extremely poor and unreliable and insufficient to enable an 
accurate estimate of TB incidence and prevalence.  Nor are there sufficient reliable 
90 
data to enable accurate monitoring and evaluation of TB disease outcomes or the 
control program.  A fundamental structural governance problem underpins the poor 
data collection, analysis and reporting.  These structural problems are beyond the 
control of the health system itself, and have come about because of a need to keep the 
new country intact by placating the demands of secessionist groups in a rugged, 
inaccessible, and culturally and linguistically diverse country.  If health information, the 
health system, and health outcomes for all Papua New Guineans are to improve, these 
fundamental structural governance problems need to be addressed, especially now 
that MDR-TB and XDR-TB are emerging.  Attempts to do so have, thus far, not been 
successful. 
 
Despite these overwhelming constraints, donors such as the Global Fund and AusAID 
have expended large sums on TB control in PNG and continue to do so.  Donors to 
disease control programmes such as TB, come to PNG with a particular paradigm of 
how a health system functions, e.g. how health data are collected, analysed and 
reported, as well as how TB control must be carried out, i.e. TB DOTS.  These 
paradigms assume the existence of a centralized HIS with adequate communication 
between peripheral HCs and the central health information unit, and then the capacity 
to undertake analysis and reporting against a range of programme indicators.  
However, the current PNG HIS is not capable of achieving data outputs based on such 
assumptions, given the embedded structural governance constraints.  This illustrates a 
divide between donors’ own need for data and the limited capacity to provide these 
data.  Donors’ own governance structures, including those regarding data 
requirements, are not flexible, and not able to be adapted to the major structural 
limitations of HISs in low income countries such as PNG.  There is an inherent 
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assumption that a recipient government should restructure itself in order to meet the 
data needs of donors, which is unrealistic and unachievable.  Attempts to reform or set 
up parallel HISs have been unsustainable.  Donors need to look at how the institutions 
of government work, especially with regard to information gathering.  Donors are not 
going to fix the HIS on their own.  A broader PNG-driven reform of the health sector 
governance structures must be the starting point.   
 
The Organic Laws have undermined the structural institutional capacities of the state 
to collect accurate data.  In PNG there are good models of data collection that do not 
work given the structure of government.  Even if there were a political commitment to 
DOTS at all levels of government, inclusive of increased and sustained financing, this 
will have very limited success without prior or concomitant changes in institutional and 
governmental structures that allow appropriate allocation of resources and 
accountability of those involved. 
 
Having now identified Governance as the underlying cause of a lack of reliable data (TB 
DOTS Component 5) it is essential that in Part 3, the next section, we move to closely 
examine the governance, leadership and political commitment, (TB DOTS Component 
1), that are crucial to understanding the policy context for TB control decisions in PNG. 
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Part 3 – Political Commitment and 
Leadership in PNG - the PNG Health 
Policy Context 
 
Part 3 of this thesis deals in detail with Objective 2 - To describe and critique TB DOTS 
Component 1 – Political commitment, the resultant governance structures, and the 
impact of these on the PNG Health Systems capacity to deliver a TB DOTS Policy: 
 
• Chapter 5 - Cultural institutions underpinning political commitment and 
leadership, undertakes an in-depth critique and analysis of the cultural 
institutions in PNG which determine and form political commitment and 
leadership in PNG;  
• Chapter 6 – Political Commitment, Governance Reforms and PNG Health System 
Performance then critically examines how the unique PNG style of political 
commitment and leadership influences and determines the health governance.  
It critically examines the impact of the resulting fragmented health system 
governance on capacity and performance, and health outcomes. 
• Chapter 7 - Political Commitment and TB DOTS in PNG – Standardized 
Treatment and Effective Drug Supply examines in detail how health system 
governance has directly affected the health system’s capacity to implement a 
TB DOTS Policy.   
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In summary, Part 3 undertakes a detailed analysis of the PNG TB DOTS policy context 
into which a TB DOTS Policy has to be delivered.  It is only when this complex PNG 
Health policy context is understood that we can truly understand what is required to 
be addressed in formulating and implementing a TB DOTS Policy in PNG, and also see if 
these factors were taken into consideration during the 2006 PNG TB DOTS policy 
agenda setting process.  Part 3 concentrates on the period from 1997 to 2006, in order 
to provide a clear picture of the PNG policy context leading up and at the time of TB 
DOTS moving onto the PNG policy agenda in 2006.  
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5 Cultural Institutions underpinning Political Commitment & 
Leadership in PNG 
“Sustained political commitment and leadership are the foundation for any sound 
programme to control TB. The legal and regulatory context defines the potential as well 
as the structure and policies of the national TB and DR-TB control programmes. 
Political commitment is expressed through adequate financial support and appropriate 
infrastructure, including facilities and trained human resources. Coordination among 
the different components of public and private health programmes and organizations is 
essential for successful programme implementation. Sufficient training and retention of 
medical and public health personnel depend on long-term government planning and 
support.” (WHO 2006) 
 
 Introduction 5.1
Political Leadership and Commitment is the first component of the WHO TB DOTS 
policy (WHO 2006).  A clear statement of how the WHO TB DOTS Policy envisages 
Political Commitment and Leadership is clearly set out in the WHO "Guidelines for the 
programmatic management of drug-resistant TB" (WHO 2006) and is quoted at the top 
of this page.  Political Commitment and Leadership is not simply agreeing in principal 
with the contents of TB DOTS as a Policy, but involves establishing and ensuring 
governance structures to deliver the TB DOTS policy, and is quite specific in what these 
involve: 
1. A “legal and regulatory context” that defines the potential as well as “the 
structures and policies of the national TB and DR-TB control programme”. 
2. “Adequate financial support and appropriate infrastructure, including facilities 
and trained human resources” (WHO 2006). 
3. Coordination among the different components of public and private 
programmes and organizations for successful programme implementation. 
4. Sufficient training and retention of medical and public health personnel 
depends on long-term government planning and support. 
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In this chapter we deal with TB DOTS Component 1 – Political commitment.  Policies 
require political commitment and leadership to be adopted and implemented (Buse, 
Mays et al. 2006).  In the health policy literature, political commitment signals a 
commitment to not just an ‘in principal’ agreement to the content of a policy, but a 
commitment to ensuring the necessary financial and human resources are put in place 
to enable implementation of the policy (Walt and Gilson 1994, Buse, Mays et al. 2006).  
Political commitment entails establishment of appropriate governance structures both 
in terms of health services and systems to implement the policy, and also to measure 
the impact of, and be accountable for, the implementation of the policy (Buse, Mays et 
al. 2006).  Political commitment is also linked to leadership at the political level, to 
ensure a policy is adopted and implemented (Buse, Dickinson et al. 2007).  It is this 
combination of political commitment and leadership that underpins policy 
development and implementation (Walt, Lush et al. 2004). 
 
As the first component of the 2006 PNG TB DOTS Policy PNG Country Strategic Plan to 
Stop TB 2006-2010 (Aia, Yadav et al. 2006) it is crucial to examine and understand what 
political commitment and leadership means and how it is exercised in the PNG policy 
context.  Were the PNG contextual realities, with regard to political commitment and 
leadership, taken into consideration in the formulation of the PNG TB control policy?  
Who made the policy decisions and who formulated the Policy?  Were the existing 
governance structures in place taken into consideration?  If not, did the political 
commitment and leadership exist to change the governance structures?  This chapter 
describes and critiques the three cultural institutions that form and shape political 
commitment and leadership in PNG.  For the purposes of this research “a cultural 
institution or cultural organization is an organization within a culture/sub-culture that 
97 
works for the preservation or promotion of the culture”(Wikipedia 2015).  Firstly, we 
examine the effect of the unique and normative cultural institutions called 
“wantokism” and the “big man” on political commitment and leadership.  Secondly, we 
examine the resulting concept of “clientelism”, which shapes the local electoral 
process in PNG, as well as impacting significantly on the National Parliamentary policy 
process in PNG.  Thirdly, we will deal with the concept of “corruption” in the PNG 
policy process, which itself is a product of “wantokism”, the “big man” and 
“clientelism”.  Given this complexity, is it reasonable to expect political commitment 
and leadership, as envisaged by international agencies such as WHO and GFATM, to be 
actually exercised in PNG, particularly with regard to the formulation and 
implementation of health policy? 
 
 The “Big Man” and “Wantok” in PNG culture – Impact on Leadership and 5.2
Political Commitment 
PNG is made up of over 800 distinct and unique language groups with associated 
cultural differences.  Until European colonisation and settlement, clans had largely 
lived in geographical isolation from other language or clan groups, thus becoming 
closely knit, self-reliant societies.   The distinct cultural beliefs and practices that 
developed as a result of this separation further entrenched a lack of understanding 
and distrust of other clans, resulting in frequent fights amongst the geographically 
closer ones (Reilly 2008).  As a consequence, language or clan groups have developed 
an intense loyalty to members of the group, and are commonly referred to as 
“wantok”, which is the PNG Pidgin English word for “language group”.   
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However, the term “wantok” has taken a far deeper meaning than simply referring to 
those who speak the same language.  “Wantok” means those who are bound together, 
not simply by speaking the same language, but by a deep social and cultural imperative 
to support each other, whatever the circumstances (Okole 2002a, Okole 2005).  
Wantok have the cultural permission to call on other wantok for support when food, 
shelter, funds, other material support or protection are needed.  Wantok cannot be 
denied.  Loyalty to wantok transcends any sense of belonging to a wider provincial or 
national grouping, or responsibility to the national interest (Okole 2002b, Dix and Pok 
2009).   
 
Even as wantok move from their traditional village group to seek employment, 
education, etc., this loyalty to wantok persists.  In larger urban centres, wantok tend to 
settle together in order to maintain cultural ties, bringing with them a continuing 
strong sense of loyalty to wantok.  In the urban setting this manifests itself in not only 
the provision of shelter, food, money and protection, but also favourable 
consideration in appointments to government positions over others from different 
clan groups, irrespective of qualifications (Kurer 2007, Dix and Pok 2009).  As a result, 
wantokism has infiltrated every stratum of society and government in PNG (Dix and 
Pok 2009). 
 
Izard and Dugue in a 2003 report for the ADB found that “in the public service, the 
wantok system leads to much conflict of interest and nepotism. The obligations to the 
clan frequently supersede the responsibilities of a specific administrative function and 
the obligations to larger geographic (district/province) or national interests.” (Asian 
Development Bank 2003).   
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Wantokism also has a major impact at the political level in PNG where the “wantok 
system undermines the democratic process as many candidates run not on the basis of 
a political platform but rather on the promise of future wealth shared.” (Asian 
Development Bank 2003).  “The wantok system provides for an egalitarian sharing of 
wealth and responsibilities. It provides a safety net not unlike social security but with 
strong community obligations. While the wantok system procures advantages for the 
clan, it often does so at the expense of modern social and professional obligations, 
which go beyond the boundaries of one’s extended family or clan. In particular, the 
concept of “common good” does not seem to have taken root in the culture.”(Asian 
Development Bank 2003) 
 
The other important feature of PNG cultural leadership, which has a major impact on 
the PNG policy process, is the concept of the “big man” in PNG traditional village life 
(Lederman 1990), some key features of whom have been assumed by the modern PNG 
politician (Dix and Pok 2009).  Within PNG culture the “big man” assumed a leadership 
role and exerted significant influence within the clan.  Lederman, in ethnographic 
studies on clan structures in the PNG Highlands, finds that the term “big man” refers to 
male leaders whose political influence is “achieved by means of public oratory, 
informal persuasion, and the skilful conduct of both private and public wealth 
exchange” and that “leadership is a personal achievement associated with organizing 
events held in the names of clans and tribal alliances.  Leaders neither inherit their 
status by virtue of seniority, lineage membership, or ritual sanction, nor are they 
formally elected or installed.” (Lederman 2001). 
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So rather than being inherited, traditional leadership in PNG is based on several 
personal qualities, one of which is “the skilful conduct of both private and public wealth 
exchange”(Lederman 2001).  This conduct of “wealth exchange” has become a key 
feature of the “clientelism” that PNG politicians must practice, and be a part of, to 
survive in the PNG political process.  It is a desirable characteristic of leaders and 
leadership in today’s political process (Kurer 2007) as we shall now see.   
 The Papua New Guinea Political Process – “Clientelism” in PNG 5.3
At independence in 1975 PNG adopted a Westminster Parliamentary system of 
Government (May 2004).  In most stable, long-term Westminster Parliamentary 
democracies, in the lead-up to a general election, political parties articulate a policy 
platform that spells out the policies the party proposes for the upcoming 
Parliamentary term in order to achieve party goals and objectives, and that usually sets 
out a vision for a direction for the country.  Following a general election, the party with 
the majority of members forms the “government” headed by the Prime Minister who 
is elected by a majority vote of the “government” members of Parliament (Lijphart 
1999).  In some instances a coalition of parties is required to form a government.  The 
government proceeds to implement, through the Parliamentary process, the policy 
platform for which it has received a “mandate” having gained the majority of the votes 
by the electors.  Members of Parliament who do not join the “government” form the 
“opposition” in the Parliament, and generally oppose the government’s policy 
initiatives or propose alternative policy responses (Lijphart 1999).   
 
In PNG, the Westminster Parliamentary system of government has developed a 
uniquely PNG character in both the electoral process, at the local level, and the 
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Parliamentary policy process at the national level (Lijphart 1999, May 2004).  One 
positive point to make about the PNG electoral process is that since independence a 
general election has actually been held every five years, (Lijphart 1999, Okole 2002a) 
despite the enormous logistical and economic cost of doing so, due to the rugged 
terrain, and law and order constraints (Strathern 1993) faced by electoral officials.  
 
However, the PNG parliamentary process is marked by instability and volatility 
(Strathern 1993, May 2004, Standish 2007).  Continuity is minimal due to the high 
turnover of members of Parliament at each election (Okole 2002a).  There is no strong 
party system, with rapidly changing loyalties, allegations of corruption and regular 
votes of “no confidence” in Prime Ministers(May - Interview 17th June 2008, May 
2004) .  Underpinning this instability, is “clientelism”.  Clientelism is essentially an 
agreement between a “client”, in the PNG case the voter or block of votes (wantok or 
clan), and a “patron”, in the PNG case the elected Member of Parliament, to share the 
material benefits of office that come with being a member of Parliament in PNG (Kurer 
2007). 
 
This is achieved by “overriding due process in the pursuit of these aims” (Kurer 2007).  
Clientelism in the PNG political process links directly to the normative loyalty of 
“wantokism” to other wantok (Okole 2002a, Okole 2005), and “wealth exchange”, 
which, as already discussed, is a core characteristic of the “big man” in PNG society 
(Lederman 2001, Kurer 2007). 
 
Kurer finds that the distinguishing feature of clientelism in PNG “is the desire for 
particularistic gains that in the PNG context include benefits for clans, such as 
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government contracts, as well as for individuals, such as money for feasts, bride prices, 
tickets for people to travel, jobs in the public service, or credit for personal use or 
business ventures.  The conflict with ‘governance’ that arises from providing these 
particularistic benefits is self-evident; by definition they have to be made available 
outside regular channels.” (Kurer 2007) 
 
In PNG politics, the checks and balances of government, whereby Members of 
Parliament are held accountable for the use of government funds, the awarding of 
government contracts etc., are either ignored or bypassed (Dix and Pok 2009).  It is 
therefore important to deal with the concept of “corruption” in PNG later in this 
chapter.  
In the PNG electoral process, in any electorate there are a large number of candidates 
with no particular party affiliation, as each clan often nominates their own candidate in 
an attempt to have their clan represented in the Parliament.  This results in a high 
number of Independent members of parliament.  As one clan does not usually have 
sufficient votes to alone secure the election of their candidate, alliances are formed 
between clan groups within an electorate.  The “successful” clan groups, the clients, 
expect material gain and benefits to flow from their Member of Parliament in order to 
maximize the advantage of having direct access to government resources, especially as 
there is a significant chance that their Parliamentarian will not be elected again at the 
next election.  The reason is that the Parliamentarians usually are not able to meet the 
demands of all the electors and clans who have formed the alliance to elect them to 
Parliament.  As soon as the material goods do not flow to the clans, the alliance breaks 
down and new alliances form for the next election. The remainder of the electorate 
remains largely unrepresented for the five year Parliamentary term (Reilly 2002).  In 
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many cases the Parliamentarian will not even visit other parts of the electorate out of 
fear of physical harm (Strathern 1993, May 2004).   
 
Violence, often extreme, is also a feature of the PNG political process (Strathern 1993, 
Reilly 1999, Rumsey 1999, Reilly 2008).  The level of violence between clans increases 
as an election approaches, and reaches its highest level at the time of election and 
immediately after as votes are finalized.  Violence is often associated with taking 
measures to ensure the clans’ candidate is elected to Parliament.  It is important to 
note that the violence is not associated with disagreement or disputes over different 
policy stances or debates (Strathern 1993, Reilly 2008).  The value for the clan is in 
getting their candidate into Parliament, rather than the policies that candidates do or 
do not espouse.  Reilly finds that the traditional violence of PNG, often associated with 
land disputes, bride price etc., has taken on a new character and become part of the 
modern political process, where the value of the material benefits of winning a seat in 
Parliament causes high levels of violence (Rumsey 1999, Reilly 2008).  The political 
process has become a modern expression of a traditional way of settling disputes in 
PNG.   
 
Clientelism also pervades the National Parliamentary process, which is largely taken up 
with “survival” in government. This necessitates maintaining or changing alliances to 
ensure that the outcomes inherent in clientelism can be delivered to the client electors 
and clans so they continue their support.  With a large number of independent 
Members of Parliament and a large number of small parties, Parliamentary alliances 
are formed largely on the basis of clientelism, i.e. the alliances that enable the 
Parliamentarian to deliver to clan group(s) the expected material benefits of having 
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their “patron” in Parliament.  As soon as an alliance that has been brought together to 
form “government” is no longer capable of delivering the required and expected 
material benefits, the Parliamentarian changes allegiances to another grouping of 
Parliamentarians, who are seen to have a greater likelihood of delivering the material 
benefits to their electors.  The results are regular changes of groups or coalitions, both 
within and between “government” and “opposition”.  In each PNG Parliament since 
independence the Prime Minister has been removed during the life of the Parliament 
by a “no confidence” motion as a result of the regular changes of allegiances resulting 
from clientelism (Kurer 2007). 
 
Key features of the impact of clientelism on the PNG political process include wantok 
voting as a block to maximize the chances of electing their member of Parliament 
(Okole 2002a, Okole 2005, Kurer 2007); large numbers of candidates standing for 
election resulting in a high number of “independent” members of Parliament, as the 
various clans within an electorate want their representative to be elected (Okole 
2002a, Kurer 2007); a high turnover of politicians at each election when 
Parliamentarians do not deliver sufficient of the expected material goods of office to 
their electors and when alliances break down for the same reason(May 2004, Okole 
2005, Kurer 2007) ; a small margin of votes between successful candidates and other 
candidates, due to the large number of candidates in each election, meaning the 
legitimacy of elected Parliamentarians is not established by a clear cut majority vote 
(Reilly 1999, May 2004); an electoral process marred by extreme violence (Strathern 
1993, Rumsey 1999, Reilly 2000, May 2004, Reilly 2008); a weak Parliamentary party 
system as clans do not commit to a broader party policy agenda (Reilly 1999, Reilly 
2002, Okole 2005), but focus solely on their own clientelist material needs.   
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Despite attempts to reform the PNG electoral system to address the impact of 
clientelism on the PNG political process(Peabody, Edwards et al. 1995, Reilly 2002, 
Reilly 2006)  in the 2002 election 75% of members of Parliament lost their 
Parliamentary seats (Kurer 2007).  In the same 2002 election, an average of 27 
candidates per constituency stood for Parliament and only one candidate in the whole 
of PNG secured more than 50% of the votes in their electorate(May 2004) .  The 2002 
election was again marked by high levels of violence(May 2004).  Reilly found that “the 
2002 elections, widely criticised as the worst ever held in Papua New Guinea, featured 
numerous instances of bribery, intimidation and other electoral offences, including 
multiple voting, hijacking of ballot boxes and, in the Southern Highlands particularly, 
large-scale electoral violence.” (Reilly 2008) 
 
It was the Parliament elected at the 2002 election, with this unique PNG construct of 
political commitment, which oversaw the adoption of the PNG Country Strategic Plan 
to Stop TB, 2006-2010 (Aia, Yadav et al. 2006) and the successful application for the 
Round 6 GFATM Grant - Expanding and Implementing the Stop TB Strategy in Papua 
New Guinea (PNGCCM 2006) to fund the implementation of the PNG TB DOTS Policy.   
Political volatility and instability has been present in and up to the most recent 2012 
PNG Parliamentary election (Reilly 1997, Okole 2002b, May 2004, Okole 2005, Reilly 
2008, Natapei 2012), when 63% of members of Parliament lost their seats (Natapei 
2012).  At the Parliamentary elections in 2007 and 2012, large numbers of candidates 
have stood for individual electorates where members of Parliament are elected with 
only small margins of votes, throwing doubt on the legitimacy of the winner (May 
2004). 
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It is important to note that in the political process, and more generally in PNG, there is 
acceptance and value placed on the need for broader development to benefit the 
general population and country, with emphasis on improved access to health, 
education and infrastructure such as roads for all Papua New Guineans.  However,  this 
sense of the “common good”, beyond the particular clan group, is not valued to the 
same extent as the benefits to be gained from clientelism (Kurer 2007).  This is 
especially so when those material goods are potentially available for only one term of 
Parliament. 
 
An important final point to make is that in PNG, 85% of the population live in rural 
areas below the poverty line, surviving by subsistence agriculture, with only minimal 
participation in the cash economy (Bolger, Mandie-Filer et al. 2005, Cammack 2008, 
Rogers, Bleakley et al. 2010).  Engaging in clientelism is one of a very limited number of 
ways to improve one’s standard of living when there are few other options.  Further, 
clientelism is not unique to PNG; it is a feature of the political process in many low 
income countries including other Pacific Island states (Huffer 2005) . 
 
 Difference between “traditional” and “modern” political leaders 5.4
In their critique of the role of the “big man” in PNG, Dix and Pok (Dix and Pok 2009) 
find that whilst the “big man” lived in and was a part of the traditional village setting, 
traditional sanctions such as loss of respect and being ostracized from the clan meant 
that accumulation of excessive personal wealth did not take place.  Material goods 
acquired through “big man” status were shared through “wealth exchange” within the 
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village and clan.  Modern day politicians live mostly in large urban centres, removed 
from the village, so the traditional sanctions the clan could impose at the village level 
can no longer be applied in the case of excessive individual wealth accumulation (Dix 
and Pok 2009).  
 
 Desired characteristics of Political Leadership in PNG resulting from Clientelism 5.5
There are particular characteristics of “political leadership” in PNG that voters value 
when they are electing their members of Parliament - “voters will tend to support 
candidates who are likely to be elected, to be in powerful position in government and 
thus be able to channel resources their way, if elected, and who, if elected, actually do 
so… PNG voters opt for candidates who are socially close and ….. corruption and self-
enrichment is not something that disqualifies politicians in the eyes of voters; relevant 
for their decision is solely the amount of benefits delivered.”(Kurer 2007) 
 
The ability to articulate policies in health, education, or other services with the goal of 
achieving a “common good”, or advancement of the electorate as a whole take a back 
seat to the clientelist political  relationship (Kurer 2007).   
 
However, it is also important to note that in PNG there are well documented cases of 
exceptional politicians who have displayed a different model of leadership to that 
outlined so far.  Christopher Sambre was re-elected for the Nuku electorate of West 
Sepik province from 1977 to 1992 (Okole 2002a).  Okole notes “how good leadership, 
character and religion…and his moral standing” were key to his re-election over many 
years (Okole 2002a).  Okole quotes other examples of ethical political leadership in 
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PNG since independence, but emphasises that these are exceptions in the PNG 
political process (Okole 2002a). 
 “Corruption” in PNG 5.6
Corruption in PNG was the central reason the Global Fund (OIG GFATM 2014) 
suspended the initial Round 6 Grant for TB DOTS in PNG (PNGCCM 2006).  As a result 
of fraudulent use of Round 6 funds, NDOH was forced to resign as Principal Recipient 
(PR) and was replaced as PR by World Vision International.  Given this we need to 
examine wantokism and clientelism and their connection with corruption in PNG and 
its impact on the political process as being central to the understanding of political 
commitment in PNG. 
 
Corruption is still seen as a major issue at all levels of government and in the private 
sector in PNG (Anonymous 3 - Interview 2nd June 2008, Anonymous 1 - Interview 10th 
April 2008, Wickberg 2013), as Dix and Pok reported in 2009: 
“Corruption is rampant and largely unchecked in the Pacific island nation of Papua 
New Guinea (PNG).  Grand corruption has many faces in PNG: nepotism, 
administrative corruption, and state capture.  Systemic nepotism, including ghost 
workers on a payroll and political favour-based hiring, has cost the state millions of 
dollars in just one province.  Administrative corruption reportedly takes place in a 
formalized system of commissions on real or rigged procurement contracts, out of 
court settlements, and other payments made by the state to private actors.  State 
capture is evident to most observers in the forestry and petroleum extraction 
industries, which are dominated by select foreign interests licenced by the state.” 
(Dix and Pok 2009) page 239 
 
However, it is important to understand just what is meant by corruption and whose 
particular understanding of the term “corruption” is being applied to the situation.  It 
is a term that in PNG must be understood within the contexts of “wantokism” and “big 
man”. 
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Drawing on research in four rural PNG districts Walton attempts to understand rural 
Papua New Guinean’s perception of corruption and argues that the debates about 
corruption in PNG should be reframed (Walton 2013b).  Walton finds two very 
different views or perceptions of what constitutes corruption (Walton 2013b).  These 
views are very significant in the PNG context. 
 
The first “mainstream” view frames corruption “in reference to state laws, rules and 
institutions, in turn, those who reflect this view focus on the corruptibility of state 
officials” (Walton 2013b).  This mainstream view of corruption places emphasis on 
“breaches of obligations set out in legal codes”(Walton 2013b); “the abuse of public 
office for private gain” (Walton 2013b); and “rent-seeking”(Walton 2013b).  This view 
of corruption is the view of economists and external agencies such as the GFATM, 
World Bank (World Bank 1997) and the former AusAID (AusAID 2004).  The focus of the 
support from these agencies was to undertake Public Sector Reform by establishing 
and strengthening governance in institutions such as the Ombudsman’s Commission, 
the Justice System and the economic structural reforms in the PNG Treasury (AusAID 
2004, Dix and Pok 2009).  This view of corruption comes from a western liberal 
democratic or neo-liberal philosophy of how economies should be structured and how 
development ideally takes place (Walton 2013a). 
 
In the second or “alternative” view of corruption, drawing on the work of 
Huffer(Huffer 2005), Walton frames the “understanding of corruption as depending on 
community norms and relationships of power” (Walton 2013b). Corruption “is a term 
of condemnation towards acts that are denounced by a particular community.  The 
110 
types of acts that are covered by this definition are culturally determined depending ‘on 
the context and on the position of the actors involved’(de Sardan 1999). From this 
perspective, corruption comes into being when immoral acts benefit individuals or 
communities outside the group (de Sardan 1999), or when individuals within the 
community transgress communal norms for individual benefit (Williams 1999).” 
(Walton 2013b). 
 
In this “alternative” view “corruption occurs when shame, a cultural mechanism for 
keeping corruption in check…..is undermined (de Sardan 1999)…corruption is caused by 
the clash of traditional/communal and modern norms and expectations.”(Walton 
2013b) 
 
The “alternative” view of corruption is markedly different to the “mainstream” view.  It 
is a view presented mainly in the writings of anthropologists (de Sardan 1999, Williams 
1999, Huffer 2005).  In this view, corruption is framed by a social or cultural 
perspective, rather than an economic or neo-liberal perspective (Walton 2013a).  The 
“alternative” view of corruption is consistent with the findings with regard to the 
wantok system and the “big man” culture in PNG, both of which we have closely 
examined in this Chapter.  This view of corruption would consider the excessive wealth 
accumulation of politicians (i.e. taking without sharing) as being corrupt.  It is also 
consistent with the finding that excessive wealth accumulation is only possible once 
the “big man” moves away from the traditional village social structure to a larger 
urban centre, where sanctions in terms of shame or ostracization can no longer be 
imposed.   
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Walton finds that “in weak states such as PNG, some types of corruption can offer 
social protection mechanisms for those excluded from state benefits. At the same time, 
most citizens in the survey saw corruption—particularly grand corruption—as 
detrimental to their communities and the state… it appears that both citizens and anti-
corruption organisations have similar views about the impacts of grand corruption but 
differ significantly when it comes to petty corruption.”(Walton 2013c) 
 
With regard to grand corruption a long time researcher on PNG politics made the 
observation about the wantok system and corruption in PNG that “some people say 
the wantok system means you can explain corruption because people have got 
obligations out of the kinship system that they can’t deny, so people are obliged to 
make contributions to marriages, to mortuary fees, to births and other things and these 
are obligatory and must make them.  But when you’re getting ten million being stolen I 
don’t believe that’s got very much to do with the wantoks and rarely do any of the 
wantoks benefit from that level of corruption, that’s entirely different, and indeed you 
might find that two or three people that have got no kinship relation at all have 
combined to do that.  These big scams I don’t really think are related to wantoks at 
all.”(Nelson - Interview 17th June 2008) 
 
Further, the solutions to address corruption come from within PNG society and the 
wantok system, which is seen to underlie corruption in the “mainstream”.  Potential 
solutions to corruption in PNG are to extend those sanctions the clan or wantok are 
able to impose within the traditional village setting, so they are able to be imposed 
once the clan members move beyond the village, rather than impose punishment by 
structures from outside PNG (Huffer 2005, Walton 2013b). 
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 Implications for Policy Formulation and Implementation 5.7
What are the implications of these findings on political commitment and Leadership in 
PNG on the parliament’s and the parliamentarians’ ability to engage in the Policy 
process?  Examining the function of government with regard to policy development 
and implementation Reilly found that “political instability has long been cited as a key 
factor undermining policy stability, continuity and planning in Papua New 
Guinea.”(Reilly 2002) 
 
At the political level one interviewee observed of the PNG political process that “one of 
the important roles of members of parliament in democratic systems is to hold the 
government of the day to account.  And when you have got such a rapid turnover of 
MP’s, many of them whom are not particularly well educated, where you don’t really 
have a system of political parties that align behind particular sets of policies, and where 
you have a political system which almost since independence has been renowned for 
being pretty corrupt, it’s not really the kind of context in which you can expect to see 
well thought through policies being executed in any kind of effective sort of 
way.”(Anonymous 3 - Interview 2nd June 2008)  
 
This extends down to the government department level capacity to engage in the 
policy formulation and implementation process.  One long term political researcher 
and observer of PNG policy process Professor Ron May found in his research “one of 
the conclusions we drew from the study of policy making (in PNG), is the capacity of 
departments to give serious debate and analysis to potential policy alternatives is 
diminished, and bills often get drafted that are really not very well thought out, and get 
pushed through parliament by a strong governing majority, without much debate and 
113 
may or may not have much commitment behind them.  I think there is a little 
undermining of the policy process going on as a result of this” (May - Interview 17th 
June 2008) 
Professor May found that this extended down to and had real implications for policy 
implementation at the local level in PNG - “a lot of what goes on in Moresby doesn’t 
take adequate account of what situations are like out at district level.  It sounds easy to 
say that public servants in Port Moresby don’t know what it’s like out there, but most 
Papua New Guineans are fairly well entrenched in their own village backgrounds so one 
thinks they do know a bit.  But I think often there is a bit of reluctance to fully take on 
board how difficult it is at the local level.  So you may have a policy formulated in 
Moresby that looks quite good, but the ability to follow through and make it work at a 
local level just isn’t there.  I think often the planning of projects is made on assumptions 
on the ability to carry it through down to a village level that are unrealistic.” (May - 
Interview 17th June 2008) 
 
The then Prime Minister Mekere Morauta, in a 2000 speech to Parliament, 
summarized the PNG political and policy context as “Parliament has not worked as well 
as it should. In recent years, instability within the system has brought about a paralysis 
in decision-making, and consequently a failure in policy-making, in the implementation 
of policy, and in the delivery of basic services to the people. Many observers have 
commented that a basic reason for this is that politicians have demonstrated a lack of 
commitment to the people who voted them into parliament” (Reilly 2002). 
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 Conclusion 5.8
This was the policy context with regard to Component 1 - Political commitment of a TB 
DOTS policy in the period leading up to the 2006 PNG TB DOTS policy.  In reality 
“sustained political commitment and leadership” was dominated by wantokism, the 
“big man” and clientelism, which resulted in a unique construct of political 
commitment which was at odds to the WHO and GFATM construct of political 
commitment.  The next component of political commitment are those governance 
structures which flow from and result from this PNG construct of political 
commitment.  We need to now describe and critique those governance structures in 
order to understand how and if the resultant governance structures were dealt with in 
the 2006 PNG TB DOTS policy so as to understand the “legal and regulatory context” in 
PNG into which a national TB DOTS policy would be delivered, in order to understand if 
these were taken into consideration in the formulation of the 2006 PNG TB DOTS 
policy.   
115 
6 Political Commitment, Governance Reforms and PNG Health System 
Performance 
 
“Sustained political commitment and leadership are the foundation for any sound 
programme to control TB. The legal and regulatory context defines the potential as well 
as the structure and policies of the national TB and DR-TB control programmes. 
Political commitment is expressed through adequate financial support and appropriate 
infrastructure, including facilities and trained human resources. Coordination among 
the different components of public and private health programmes and organizations is 
essential for successful programme implementation. Sufficient training and retention of 
medical and public health personnel depend on long-term government planning and 
support.” (WHO 2006) 
 
 Introduction 6.1
The aim of this chapter is to describe and critique the impact of the particular PNG 
construct of political commitment on governance structures in PNG; and the health 
system governance and poor health outcomes which are a consequence of the 
governance structures.  PNG governance and health system governance are a central 
component of and shape the policy context into which a national TB DOTS policy will 
be delivered. 
 
We use the Fox et. al. framework to analyse political commitment.  For true political 
commitment Fox et al requires three components of political commitment to be 
demonstrated in policy – expressed commitment, institutional commitment and 
financial commitment.  It is only when all three components are present that there is 
actual political commitment to a policy (Fox, Goldberg et al. 2011).   
 
Governance is a key component of political commitment.  Institutional commitment is 
demonstrated by ensuring, and if needed establishing, governance structures to 
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enable the delivery of a health policy(Fox, Goldberg et al. 2011).  A similar 
understanding of governance as a central component of political commitment is also 
part of the WHO definition of political commitment which is to provide the legal and 
regulatory context for the delivery of a TB DOTS policy(WHO 2006) .   
 
This chapter describes and critiques the PNG governance structures, how they evolved 
and functioned, and the impact of these on health service delivery in the period 
leading up to the 2006 TB DOTS policy thus providing a central part of the policy 
context for the 2006 PNG TB DOTS policy. 
 
 The Rationale, History & Evolution of Governance in PNG 6.2
In order to fully understand the PNG Governance structures in the period leading up to 
2006, when the PNG TB DOTS Policy came onto the policy agenda in PNG, we need to 
briefly examine how and why those structures developed in the preceding 30 years.  At 
the time leading up to independence from Australia in 1975, PNG was governed by a 
centralized, colonial-imposed governance structure, with districts directly responsible 
to the Australian colonial administration in Port Moresby (Bonney 1982, Standish 
1983, May 2004).   
 
In the two years leading up to Independence, there was pressure from secessionist 
groups in Bougainville and the Highlands of PNG to cede from the new nation.  The 
breakup of the new country was a real possibility (Bonney 1982, Standish 1983, May 
2004). 
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In response to this threat the new PNG Parliament enacted the 1977 Organic Law on 
Provincial Government which established 19 elected Provincial Governments in PNG 
(Standish 1983, Axline 1984, Axline 1988, May 2004, PNGNDOH 2011).  The 1977 
Organic Law legislated the decentralization of full responsibility for provision of all 
government services, including health, to the Provincial level (Bonney 1982, Standish 
1983, Axline 1984, Axline 1988, Campos-Outcalt and Newbrander 1989).  This was not 
just for service delivery but also full responsibility for policy formulation and 
implementation.  This left national departments in the government responsible for 
policy advice, monitoring of service delivery, as well as liaison with international 
donors. 
 
It should also be noted that immediately after Independence there was a process of 
rapid localisation of PNG Public Service positions with Papua New Guineans, many of 
whom did not have the required training or experience, taking over positions in the 
new PNG government formerly held by colonial expatriates (May 2004).  The effect of 
wantokism and nepotism in the appointment of these Papua New Guineans 
entrenched a low level of skills and capacity in the PNG Public Service (Standish 1983, 
Hengene Payani 2000).  This resulted in a large number of people at the National and 
Provincial levels of government who were not qualified or competent to administer 
and deliver programs and services.  There were wide-spread allegations of fraud, 
corruption and nepotism with “critics of provincial government….having no difficulty in 
finding instances to cite of financial excesses and mismanagement, inefficiency, 
nepotism and corruption”(May 2004).  As a result service provision to rural populations 
in particular declined significantly (May 2004). 
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However, the devolution of power to the provincial level did not placate the 
secessionist movements and in the late 1980s and into the 1990s a bloody civil war 
broke out in Bougainville province(May 2003, May 2004).  As a result, in a further 
attempt to placate these secessionist groups the 1995 New Organic Law on Provincial 
Government and Local Level Government took the decentralisation reforms, with 
regard to service provision, to the lowest level of government, by legislating that the 
provision of all government services in all sectors – education, agriculture, health etc., 
become the responsibility of the LLG, also known as the District(May 2004).   
 
However, there was insufficient planning and preparation for the implementation of 
the 1995 New Organic Law.  The roles and lines of responsibility at all levels of 
government – national, provincial and district (LLG), was not spelt out resulting in 
unclear lines of responsibility and accountability - “the implementation of the New 
Organic Law was not adequately prepared and lacked guidance from the central level.  
From the onset of implementation in 1995, different interpretations emerged among 
the provinces, which could not be reconciled by the central government”(Asian 
Development Bank 2003).  At the same time the level of funding initially promised did 
not find its way down to the Provincial level - “the funding levels to provincial, district, 
and local level governments initially envisioned under the New Organic Law were 
unrealistic and unattainable”(Asian Development Bank 2003). 
 
The 1995 New Organic Law decentralization reforms were also driven by major donors 
such as the ADB, as part of the neo-liberal Health Sector Reform policy in favour during 
the 1980s and 1990s (Campos-Outcalt and Newbrander 1989).  The devolution of 
services to the lowest level of a health service was expected to achieve greater 
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efficiencies in cost compared with a centralized government controlled and managed 
health service, which was deemed inefficient (Smith 1997). 
 
These reforms changed the governance structure in PNG completely.  At Independence 
in 1975 government was fully centralized.  In the next twenty year period 1975-1995 
governance was devolved to the lowest political level, the Local Level Government at 
the District Level.  This was enacted by Parliament through a two stage shift of 
authority downwards, initially in the 1977 Organic Law on Provincial Government, and 
then further in the 1995 New Organic Law on Provincial Government and Local Level 
Government.  These politically expedient, pragmatic governance policy responses were 
adaptations to the specific contextual geo-political needs of the new country of PNG.  
The aim was to keep the country intact, by attempting to involve the country’s diverse 
language and cultural groups directly in government.  However, the administrative and 
technical capacity at the Provincial and Local Level Government (LLG) levels was not 
sufficiently developed to provide a workable structure or capacity for the 
administration and delivery of vital government services, such as health.  Governance 
became more fragile and fragmented with each stage of the devolution of power. 
 
120 
Table 5 - Governance Reforms in PNG & Impact on Health Service Governance 
Year Legislation Enacted by PNG Parliament 
Impact on Health Service 
Governance 
 
1975 New PNG Constitution - Independence 
Highly centralized Health Service 
– all health policy & service 
provision run from National 
Department of Health (NDOH), 
Port Moresby, directly to 
districts.  Provincial government 
does not exist. 
 
1977 Organic Law on Provincial Government 
Provincial Governments 
established and all health service 
policy, financing & service 
delivery functions devolved to 
Provinces.  NDOH role is one of 
policy formulation and advice. 
 
1995 
New Organic Law on Provincial 
Government and Local Level 
Government 
Local Level Government (District 
level) becomes responsible for 
health service provision.  NDOH 
still only policy formulation & 
advice. 
 
 National Department of Health (NDOH) - Performance & Capacity 6.3
In the period leading up to 2006 the NDOH had already suffered the consequences of 
wantokism, nepotism and clientelism in appointments of people without the required 
technical or managerial skills for the positions they had taken up; and of 
misappropriation of funds intended for the provision of health services.  The 
organizational culture within NDOH was similar to that which had developed in other 
PNG government departments.  Within NDOH there were low standards of work 
performance and an inability or unwillingness by senior management to address 
significant lack of performance or misconduct.  “The weak areas (within NDOH) are of 
a structural and organisational nature, i.e. the structure does not support the delivery 
of priority programmes and the organisational culture, similar to that of many other 
PNG government organizations, is characterised by a lack of cohesive management, 
absenteeism at all levels, poor work ethic, poor morale etc.  Communication processes 
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within NDOH, with provinces, and with other stakeholders, are also poor.”(Research 
Field Notes November 2005).  This is the result of “decades of mismanagement and the 
recruitment of people without the right skills and the right motivation”(Anonymous 3 - 
Interview 2nd June 2008).  As another  interviewee observed “there are some good 
people in the PNG health system, and in general there is money available but not being 
spent improving child health or whatever, you have got a huge management problem 
at all sorts of levels in the system, staff motivation problem, supervision, discipline, you 
name it” (Anonymous 4 - Interview 18th June 2008) 
 
 NDOH Senior Executive Management (SEM) - Performance & Capacity  6.3.1
At the SEM level within NDOH there was poor leadership and little strategic direction.  
“Teamwork in the SEM is poor.  There is little evidence of a relationship that supports 
frank and open dialogue on key issues, challenge or debate.  The effectiveness of SEM 
meetings is limited.  Under its Terms of Reference it is to convene on a monthly basis. 
This year it has met only three to four times, primarily because the Secretary, who is 
the Chairperson, has conflicting commitments. This irregularity has contributed 
strongly to a loss of direction and momentum within SEM, with little follow-up and 
accountability for actions completed or not completed.” (Research Field Notes 
November 2005).   
 
Poor leadership and management at all levels, “which translates into lack of control, 
accountability, teamwork, commitment and focus” were recognized in the NDOH 
Strategic Plan 2006-2008 as a priority, stipulating that all senior technical people 
within NDOH undertake training in leadership and management(Research Field Notes 
November 2005).  However, it was also noted that “some NDOH program directors and 
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provincial health advisers are considered to lack the base educational and personal 
competencies to be able to be effectively trained.  They are simply the wrong people for 
the job and no amount of training will make a difference” (Research Field Notes 
November 2005).  One interviewee observed “there are 10 senior managers within the 
department, and of those there would be no more than 3 whom you could describe as 
being reasonably competent, the rest were not.  And that was certainly true of the 
public health branch.  This was in a branch that was responsible for dealing with a 
whole range of communicable diseases including TB, HIV and Malaria.  The major 
business of the health sector, and it had no leadership.” (Anonymous 3 - Interview 2nd 
June 2008).  For those competent managers there was a definite disincentive to take 
any action to address the situation - “they knew everything that was going on but they 
didn’t do anything about it because they were scared.…the possibility always existed 
that something extremely unpleasant would happen to them and sometimes it 
did”(Anonymous 3 - Interview 2nd June 2008). 
The result was a lack of co-ordination and communication between the technical 
branches within the NDOH(Anonymous 3 - Interview 2nd June 2008, Research Field 
Notes November 2005).  One interviewee observed “there’s not a lot of consultation 
between different areas so you can sit in one office and the next office they’ll have the 
door closed and there will be no flow and collaboration between the areas” 
(Anonymous 2 - Interview 11th April 2008). 
 
It was at this senior executive and national health program branch level in the NDOH 
that high level technical advice was meant to be found to inform health policy 
formulation and to drive implementation, in the best interests of the government and 
people of PNG.  
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 NDOH Human Resources Management – Performance & Capacity 6.3.2
Underlying the major human resource constraints in the PNG health system was the 
“cultural institutions” of wantokism, nepotism and clientelism - “the department 
operated in a series of vertical silos.  And there usually would be a big man or women 
from a particular tribal group (wantok).  Throughout the health system these vertical 
silos developed which didn’t talk to each other.” (Anonymous 3 - Interview 2nd June 
2008).  As a result within NDOH, and extending to the wider PNG Health System, there 
was no reward for good performance and no management of those who were not 
performing(Asian Development Bank 2003)  The result was that “cultural 
considerations (i.e. wantok) appear to compromise the capacity to provide effective 
feedback, or manage poor performance, and whilst disciplinary systems exist they are 
not often implemented.”(Research Field Notes November 2006).   
In 2003 the ADB identified that “perhaps one of the greatest constraints to progress is 
the inability or unwillingness of senior management to exercise personnel management 
options in relation to non-performance.  NDOH’s ineffectiveness in this area of 
management responsibility is entrenched, supported by non-responsive central 
government agencies, in particular Department of Personnel Management (DPM) and 
Department of Finance (DOF).” (Asian Development Bank 2003).  As a consequence of 
this one senior health official noted “human resource capacity is quite weak within 
Papua New Guinea.  It’s quite weak in terms of the number of staff with technical 
expertise and also weak in managerial expertise.  Also in terms of project management, 
time management, managing staff, supervision is weak.” (Anonymous 2 - Interview 
11th April 2008) 
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Further, there was no Health Workforce Planning with no reliable Health Workforce 
data available in the period leading up to 2006 (Asian Development Bank 2003, World 
Bank 2007, Research Field Notes November 2005, Research Field Notes November 
2006) at any level of government  -  National, Provincial and District. There was no 
ongoing planning or allocation of health staff based on need.  It was noted during the 
2006 field visit that “poor management and morale, and difficulties attracting nursing 
and medical officers to rural areas have resulted in a number of problems.  These 
include severely depleted staffing levels, particularly in rural health services; a mal-
alignment in the staffing balances between Provincial Administrative and rural service 
delivery.  In addition, there appears to be limited planning at the provincial/district 
level on how to make the best use of staff; aid-posts close to Provincial Hospitals 
remain staffed and underutilized, whilst those in the more isolated areas were not 
staffed.”(Research Field Notes November 2006) 
 
One further consequence of this lack of planning and coordination was the existence 
of a significant number of “ghost workers” and duplicate staff on the payroll of the 
PNG health system.  In the absence of any reliable workforce data a  World Bank 
review in 2007 estimated “there are over 1,000 more nurses on the payroll than is 
feasible, and about 1,700 more CHWs on the payroll than our analysis would 
suggest.”(World Bank 2007).  These “ghost workers” and duplicate workers on the 
PNG Health System payroll “have evolved over time, including staff who have 
abandoned their posts, deceased staff whose names remain on the payroll, and staff 
who change agencies but whose names are not removed from their former payroll.” 
(World Bank 2007).  Several attempts at conducting so called “payroll cleansing” have 
had very limited success (World Bank 2007, Research Field Notes November 2005, 
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Research Field Notes November 2006) due to the lack of accountability and 
coordination between the three levels of the PNG Health System, along with little 
political commitment to undertake such a task.  One interviewee commented that 
“until there can be recruitment selection on merit, and promotion on merit, and some 
sort of performance management system put in place in PNG the public service will 
remain as it is.”(Anonymous 3 - Interview 2nd June 2008).  Another interviewee 
commented that “the whole support for health workers is quite limited, sometimes you 
find people who have been working in aid posts who have been out at the aid posts for 
6, 7, 8 months, they haven’t even had a piece of communication from anyone, so they 
are not getting supported, they often feel very isolated and they can’t get access to 
new and emerging information let alone equipment, supplies and other 
resources.”(Anonymous 1 - Interview 10th April 2008) 
 NDOH Financial Management - Performance & Capacity in NDOH 6.3.3
As we have already seen, NDOH was responsible for developing national policies, as 
well as liaising with Development Partners (DP) who provided the greatest proportion 
of funds for disease control in PNG, including for TB control.  There was limited 
capacity to manage the finances required to run health programs due to the lack of 
high level financial capacity and accountability. This resulted in major irregularities in 
financial management and the procurement of goods, and outright misuse of 
government funds.  The 2003 ADB Health Sector review found “that controls over 
procurement and expenditure within NDOH were ineffective and were not conducive to 
efficient operation. In particular, there was an inadequate managerial control 
framework, inadequate operational procedures and controls that do not ensure 
compliance with the Public Finance and Management Act” (Asian Development Bank 
2003)  As with poor work performance, the misuse of government funds was not 
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addressed, due to the “inability or unwillingness of management to take appropriate 
action in the event of suspected breach of statutory requirements or ethical business 
practice.” (Asian Development Bank 2003) 
 
Often the lack of capacity and ability to plan and manage funds, rather than corrupt 
activity, lead to financial short-falls.  An example is when ADB funds for rural health 
projects had to be used to manage cash flow shortages within NDOH to prevent 
various short term crises such as “clearing shipments of medicines off the wharf 
because DOF (Department of Finance) was experiencing a cash flow crisis, reopening 
NDOH offices following lockout due to non-payment of electric bills, avoiding NDOH 
phone disconnections by covering final requests for payment, making up a shortfall in 
the cost of travel arrangements for essential purposes, and many other instances” 
(Asian Development Bank 2003)  
 
Finally, with regard to health financing, the National Department of Health had and has 
no direct responsibility for ensuring funds are appropriately allocated or spent at the 
Provincial or District level.  Under the 1995 New Organic Law on Provincial and Local 
Level Government NDOH has a “liaison and consultation” role only in the Provincial and 
District health budget preparation.  As a result the NDOH does not have a role in the 
budget preparation and approval process, or approving the release of funds, including 
donor funds to Provinces and Districts.  The central government agency the Provincial 
Health Administration and District Administration deal directly with is the Ministry of 
Finance when it comes to securing funding releases and also accounting for 
expenditure.  Again, there is a complete disconnect between the NDOH securing funds 
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from global donors, and being able to account for those funds as having been 
expended on the health services for which they are intended. 
 
With regard PNG Government recurrent budget for health programs, the performance 
of the Department of Finance in ensuring sufficient and continuing funds for health 
service provision is crucial.  However it was noted in 2005 that “there is ongoing and 
continued complaint that funds released by the Department of Finance for recurrent 
budget are not released until many months into the financial year, and then in such 
quantities to make ongoing expenditure difficult to plan. … these issues have had a 
significant impact on service delivery.” (Research Field Notes November 2005). 
 
The 1995 New Organic Law on Provincial and LLG devolution in effect drove the 
inefficiency, lack of accountability, nepotism and corruption, which had been 
introduced into the PNG Health Services as a consequence of the 1977 Organic Level, 
to the now lowest level of health service provision (Asian Development Bank 2003, 
Bolger, Mandie-Filer et al. 2005, Cammack 2008, Research Field Notes November 
2005, Research Field Notes November 2006), making the already complex and 
dysfunctional health service even more so.  It was this level of financial incapacity and 
lack of performance within NDOH that provided the context for the development and 
implementation of the 2005 PNG TB DOTS policy. 
 Provincial Level - Performance & Capacity 6.4
Under the 1977 Organic Law on Provincial Government, the provincial hospitals had 
been made the responsibility of provincial governments.  However, the latter did not 
provide sufficient funding. Over the subsequent twenty years curative services 
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declined markedly, reaching a crisis point by the 1990s, when Provincial Hospitals were 
no longer able to provide even basic curative services (Asian Development Bank 2003, 
Thomason and Kase 2009, Research Field Notes November 2005, Research Field Notes 
November 2006).  To address this decline in curative services the Public Hospitals Act 
1994 shifted responsibility directly to the Minister of Health, through the Hospital 
Board, with funding coming directly from NDOH. 
 
However, the provision of all other curative health services, as well as preventive / 
disease control programs provided through HCs and APs, shifted responsibility to the 
Provinces and Districts by the 1995 New Organic Law on Provincial and Local 
Government.  As a result the PHO became responsible only to the Provincial 
Administration “decentralization of government and administrative responsibilities 
under the New Organic Law, the Provincial Health Office (PHO) comes under the 
Provincial Administration ..” (Asian Development Bank 2003) 
 
However, the 1995 New Organic Law created confusion as it did not clearly spell out 
the roles and responsibilities of the Provinces, and this included a lack of clear detail of 
the Provinces’ role in the delivery of health services - “the implementation of the New 
Organic Law was not adequately prepared and lacked guidance from the central level.  
From the onset of implementation in 1995, different interpretations (of the Provinces’ 
roles & responsibilities) emerged among the provinces, which could not be reconciled 
by the central government” (Asian Development Bank 2003).  This resulted in health 
service provision not being a priority with provincial governments and administrations 
- “much has been said about the effect of the decentralisation of authority to the 
provinces and districts.  There seems to be reasonable agreement in health circles that 
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neither politicians nor public officials accept, particularly at the provincial and district 
levels, accountability and responsibility for delivery of primary health services and 
essential public health functions and that the NOL has led to fragmented 
responsibilities within the sector.” (Research Field Notes November 2005) 
 
The most apparent manifestation of this lack of commitment to health by Provincial 
Governments was the inadequate budget for health services.  Under the 1995 New 
Organic Law the Provinces had agreed to allocate 15% of their budgets to health. 
However - “many provincial authorities have not prioritized health services through 
budget support. Provincial governors have all agreed to allocate 15% of provincial 
revenue to health.  None have yet done so.  Peripheral health services have been 
damaged by disproportionate retrenchments of key health staff when savings have 
been required.” (Asian Development Bank 2003) 
 
In fact between 1997 and 2004 there was a 17% decline, in real terms, in Provincial 
health expenditure – The World Bank reported “Under the decentralizing NOL (1995 
New Organic Law), the provinces were to have much more control over the resources 
allocated to the health sector. Despite poor documentation of the provinces’ 
expenditures on health, total provincial health expenditures, the backbone of the rural 
health system  still declined 17 percent in real terms over this period.” (World Bank 
2007) 
 
This lack of funding and commitment to rural health services had a real impact on rural 
health infrastructure, i.e. Provincial governments failed in their responsibility to 
maintain health infrastructure in their provinces - “A constant complaint repeated in all 
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provinces visited is the lack of maintenance and repair of staff houses, health facilities, 
and vehicles.  Capital investment is a provincial and not a national responsibility.” 
(Research Field Notes November 2005) 
 
Added to this lack of commitment to funding and maintenance of rural health facilities 
was low capacity and performance on the part of Provincial Health Advisers (PHA) who 
manage and provide oversight to the PHO, and are responsible to the Provincial 
Administration for overseeing the provision of all those health services for which the 
Province was responsible.  As with NDOH Branch Heads, the PHA appointments were 
significantly affected by the cultural institutions of wantokism, nepotism and 
clientelism etc.  As a result “some … provincial health advisers are considered to lack 
the base educational and personal competencies to be able to be effectively trained (as 
managers).  They are simply the wrong people for the job and no amount of training 
will make a difference” (Research Field Notes November 2005). 
 
Poor performance and capacity in the senior health managers, at the Provincial level, 
often resulted in a lack of communication, loss of trust and poor performance as well 
as an inability to build and foster strategic and important linkages with other key 
health service providers and stakeholders.  In 2003 the ADB found that in many 
Provinces “the PHO would have a poor record of communication with health staff and 
local public health stakeholders. The resulting low levels of trust and isolation, both 
willed and physical, meant little cooperation could be found” (Asian Development Bank 
2003).  One result was an incapacity to provide effective supervision and direction to 
the lower levels of the PNG health system. 
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Further, when Provincial Health staff do try to contact NDOH staff for support they 
found support from and communication with NDOH technical staff difficult.  “The 
provinces are generally not able to make informal contact with key people in NDOH 
and generally, not able to access NDOH staff for information or problem solving on an 
impromptu basis.  Phones are rarely answered, and it is difficult to locate the 
appropriate person with the information required.  There are complaints from 
Provincial staff that they are not resourced with the information required on key health 
issues.  There is indication that policies are being developed and implemented at 
provincial / district level in the absence of guidance from NDOH”(Research Field Notes 
November 2005). 
 
This low level of capacity and performance at the Provincial level in the early 2000s 
provided the provincial level context for the development and implementation, of the 
2006 PNG TB DOTS Policy (Aia, Yadav et al. 2006). 
 
 Local Level Government / District Level - Performance & Capacity 6.5
A similar low level of capacity was and is found at the district and local level 
government (LLG) level.  Under the 1995 New Organic Law on Provincial and Local 
Level Government, Districts assumed responsibility for HCs, and LLGs were given 
responsibility for APs (Asian Development Bank 2003).In terms of Governance, each of 
the 19 Provinces in PNG is divided into Districts, with a total of 89 Districts.  Each 
District is further divided onto LLG (LLG), with a total of 284 LLGs in PNG.   
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Capacity at the District level is crucial in health service provision.  In PNG each District 
has a District Administration and a District Treasury.  The District Administration is 
overseen by the Joint District Planning and Budgetary Committee, which was and is 
strongly influenced by the Local Member of Parliament.  This resulted in “many 
complaints that politicians blocked development, making decisions based on nepotism 
and favouritism, rather than a commitment or understanding of the health issues.  
Under the political system, local politicians are members of the Joint District Planning 
and Budgeting Committee, and whilst they are unable to themselves access health 
funds, they are strongly influential in what additional sources of funding may be made 
available for” (Research Field Notes November 2005). 
 
Within the District Administration, the District Health Manager is directly responsible 
to the District Administration for the provision of health programs at the District and 
LLG levels, with no accountability to the Provincial or National level for health program 
implementation or performance.  This, combined with high levels of political 
involvement in District Administrations, resulted in “an attitude of ‘non-compliance’ 
among district level staff, who refused to recognize procedures or the authority of the 
provincial health advisers.” (Bolger, Mandie-Filer et al. 2005). 
 
This system of governance meant that those with greater experience in health service 
delivery were not able to influence how services would be delivered at the District 
level.  “Hospital CEOs, senior clinical staff and provincial health advisers with the 
knowledge and experience to run the health system (and to whom district staff report 
on technical matters) cannot discipline staff in rural areas, nor direct them with regard 
to financial and material resources.” (Bolger, Mandie-Filer et al. 2005) 
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The same issues with regard to low levels of performance and capacity, which we have 
already seen at the National and Provincial levels, extended down to the District level 
with wantokism, nepotism and clientelism strongly influencing the appointment of 
District Health Mangers.  Also, being the lowest level of the PNG health system, there 
were even fewer people with the necessary education and personal attributes to take 
responsibility for the planning, organization and delivery of health services.  “There are 
not enough qualified staff in PNG to manage these (health) functions in 89 districts” 
(Bolger, Mandie-Filer et al. 2005).  The result was that - “While planning has been 
devolved to the district level, planning capacity at that level is limited. As a result, 
district level plans and budgets tend to be unrealistic and initiatives are not prioritised 
or linked well to government policies.” (Bolger, Mandie-Filer et al. 2005). 
 
Significant additional difficulties are created by distance and the major physical 
barriers of the PNG terrain in accessing funds.  “Even when funds are committed by the 
provinces, they often do not reach district health facilities since the latter may not have 
access to banks or other means of cashing cheques. These financing and cash flow 
problems have contributed to diminished service delivery (especially in rural areas) with 
real consequences for overall sector performance.” (Bolger, Mandie-Filer et al. 2005) 
 
During the 2005 field visit it was found that “the general organisational capacity issues 
at the district level …. include poor supervision, poor transport, inadequate resourcing 
for rural health services, an inability to distribute allocated funds to district health 
facilities, poor budgeting, poor planning, erratic cash flow, and fragmentation of 
reporting, direction and control leading to blurred lines of accountability. Capacity 
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building at the district level is identified as a priority.” (Research Field Notes November 
2005) 
 
Performance and capacity was so limited that District Health Offices were seen as a 
bottle neck in the PNG Health System.  “In a vast majority of the provinces District 
Health Offices are so grossly ill-equipped, that attempting to push services through 
these offices is creating bottlenecks in the system.  In Sandaun (East Sepik) one district 
health office is comprised of one district coordinator and a clerk and this is not an 
isolated case.  This situation is not likely to improve in the foreseeable future…due to 
severe financial and human resource constraints.  The reform (1995 New Organic Law) 
requires a full complement of staff, similar to the provincial health office.  Under the 
current PNG situation this will continue to be wishful thinking.” (Research Field Notes 
November 2006)  As one long standing researcher and observer of the PNG health 
system stated “I think a district level or a provincial level where there has been a 
general breakdown of service and high levels of corruption and corruption ranges from 
a district officer taking a health department vehicle for his own use right through to 
taking swags of money, then it is very difficult for a health service to be any better than 
the general administration of the country because that’s the context in which they 
swim.” (Riley - Interview 10th February 2010) 
 
It was this low level of capacity and performance at the District level which was 
present in the early 2000s and provided the District level context for the 
implementation of the 2006 PNG TB DOTS policy.  The TB DOTS program - the 
diagnosis, treatment with DOT, establishing whether a patient has completed 
treatment and is cured, or otherwise, actually take place at the primary care level, 
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especially in PNG, where 85% of the population live in rural areas with difficult access 
to services. 
 
Thus far in this Chapter we have examined closely the impact of the 1997 Organic Law 
on Provincial Government, and 1995 New Organic Law on Provincial Level and LLG, on 
the performance and capacity of the National, Provincial and District levels of the PNG 
Health System.  We have found that both Performance and Capacity at all three levels 
declined markedly with each of these Organic Laws.  The final question to ask in this 
chapter is what was the impact of this loss of capacity and performance in the PNG 
Health System on Health Outcomes in PNG? 
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 PNG Health System Performance against National Health Core Indicators 6.6
The National Health Plan 2000-2010 provided the National Health Core Indicators by 
which the PNG Health System Performance could be measured over the 10 years of 
the Plan (See Table 6). 
Table 6 – PNG National Health Core Indicators 
 
Source: (Asian Development Bank 2003) 
 
By the early 2000s several reviews found PNG was in rapid decline with poor 
implementation as measured by the National Health Core Indicators (Asian 
Development Bank 2003, Bolger, Mandie-Filer et al. 2005, Cammack 2008).  In its 2003 
review the ADB found that PNG was not meeting any of the National Health Core 
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Indicators.  It found that “While inputs (measured by financial resources) to the health 
sector have increased significantly between 1995 and 2001, output indicators have 
shown only a marginal increase over the seven years and suffered a significant fall 
between 1999 and 2000 and further in 2001. The performance for 2001 was, for most 
indicators, worse than in 1995.” (Asian Development Bank 2003) 
 
By 2005-2006 there had been no improvement in the National Health Core Indicators 
as “only 69% of aid-posts were open in 2006 (against 72% in 2005).  There has been a 
plateau in the percentage of facility births (36%) and a plateau in the percentage of 
children under 5 who are moderately malnourished (weight for age) at 30%.  The 
pneumonia case fatality rate for children under 5 admitted to hospitals and HCs has 
worsened to 3.16% from 3.01% in 2005, suggesting possible concerns about quality of 
care.”(Research Field Notes November 2006) 
 
These data draw from the PNG NHIS which we know to have major limitations.  
However, the following studies on immunization coverage and maternal mortality, 
which do not rely on NHIS data, and which used internationally established and 
rigorous methodologies, confirm this rapid decline in PNG Health Outcomes in the 10 
year period leading up to 2006. 
 
 Immunization coverage in PNG 6.7
Immunization coverage is often used as a proxy indictor of health services coverage in 
developing countries, especially of maternal and child health services.  In 2005 an 
immunization coverage survey was conducted by NDOH with support from WHO, 
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UNICEF and AusAID (Toikilik, Tuges et al. 2010) using the internationally accepted and 
validated Expanded Programme on Immunization coverage survey method of 
randomly selecting 30 clusters of several children.  The survey found that only 66% of 
PNG children had received their third dose of their diphtheria, tetanus and pertussis 
vaccination (DTP3) before their first birthday (due by 9 months of age), with coverage 
as low as 13% in clusters classified as “hard to reach” (i.e. clusters in rural areas and 
situated more than 5 kilometres from a HC). Measles vaccine coverage reached only 
55% of children nine months or older. The study concluded that the “less-than-ideal 
coverage stemmed from a mixed picture of health service issues and lack of health care 
access and utilisation…. For almost 80% of women, three main categories of reasons 
were offered: parental lack of knowledge or misconceptions; issues with health 
services; and problems with transportation.” (Toikilik, Tuges et al. 2010) 
 
The team that carried out the 2005 immunization cluster survey outlined above also 
undertook a parallel study with the goal of identifying the “root causes for obstacles to 
higher coverage and local solutions” (Clements, Morgan et al. 2006) page 9.  For this 
study 30 rural PNG Health Centres were selected using a purposive sampling method 
(Clements, Morgan et al. 2006).  The study found major health worker and also parent 
and child carer personal and attitudinal barriers to accessing immunization services in 
PNG.  The major health system barriers to immunization were - low morale among 
health staff; poor housing; poor staff attitude and behaviour towards clients; poor staff 
attendance record; unreliable performance and service delivery; diversion of resources 
for personal gain; a lack of accountability for clients' wellbeing;, and a lack of passion 
for the health and wellbeing of the children of PNG; reluctance to pass on training to 
others; a lack of trust from the community towards the immunization services; 
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inadequate community participation; culturally determined behaviour patterns that 
lead to community violence and a sense of personal insecurity; and the wantok system 
of favouritism(Clements, Morgan et al. 2006). 
 
These findings point to major PNG Health System challenges beyond the immunization 
program.  The findings confirm that by 2005 the performance and capacity of the PNG 
Health System was poor.  They indicate a Health System which had poor coverage and 
reach, especially to rural and remote areas, where the majority of the PNG population 
lived and carried the highest burden of disease from TB. 
 
 Maternal Mortality & Child Mortality in PNG 6.8
In 2006 a Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) was conducted in PNG with the goal 
of providing accurate measures of infant, child and maternal mortality, as well as a 
range of other health indicators (GovPNG 2009).  The DHS methodology was 
developed in order to establish valid and comparable morbidity and mortality data in 
countries where HISs are weak, and has been validated in multiple resource poor 
settings (GovPNG 2009).  The 2006 PNG DHS surveyed 667 clusters, randomly selected 
in each of the 4 regions of PNG, with Household, Female Individual, and Male 
Individual Questionnaires applied in each cluster (GovPNG 2009).  The 2006 PNG DHS 
survey data was not reliant on the routine PNG HIS. 
 
The DHS found a Maternal Mortality Rate (MMR) for PNG of 733 maternal deaths per 
100,000 live births (MMR of 711 for urban women, 741 for rural women) (GovPNG 
2009).  It found that 52% of births took place in a health facility and 46% were still 
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delivered at home (GovPNG 2009).  This was the second highest MMR in the Asia 
Pacific region and high compared to the rest of the world (NDOH 2009).  The 1996 PNG 
DHS using the same standard DHS methodology had found an MMR of 730 maternal 
deaths per 100,000 live births.  There was a delay in the release of the PNG DHS to 
check and re-check the methodology given this very high MMR.  When the 2006 PNG 
DHS was finally released in 2009, the high and worsening level of the MMR caused a 
national outcry, which prompted the PNG Prime Minister, Sir Michael Somare, to 
establish a Ministerial Taskforce to examine the reasons for this very high MMR, and 
make recommendations (NDOH 2009).   
 
The Ministerial Taskforce’s key finding was that 88-98% of maternal deaths in PNG 
were preventable. (GovPNG 2009).  With regard to rural health services, where most 
of these mothers were dying, it found that “in PNG Rural health has improved very 
little in the last 30 years and is at the core of the problem of low maternal health status 
- as demonstrated by:  proportion of delivery rooms with running water and sinks 
decreased; perennial drug supply problems; reduced doctor supervisory visits; aid posts 
closed (in 2000 only 63% of the original aid posts are still open); number of health staff 
in rural facilities declined by 25% between 1987 and 2000, especially Community 
Health Workers; antenatal coverage much lower (and especially for the lowest asset 
quintile); contraceptive use low (especially in the lowest 2 quintiles of income; declining 
health infrastructure; rates of supervised deliveries remain low and have not greatly 
altered in the last decade.” (NDOH 2009) 
 
The Ministerial Task Force was clear in stating a central cause of the very high 
Maternal Mortality Ratio being “the decentralization of government roles and 
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responsibilities and financing, under the Organic Law, has seriously compromised the 
quality and functionality of health services, including maternal health…. The NDOH as 
the national steward and policy maker in the health sector has not had the capacity to 
meet its new role under decentralization.” (NDOH 2009) 
 
A recurring reason for women choosing not to access PNG Health Services to give birth 
was that “PNG people’s confidence in the existing health system is poor…. Women do 
not trust the health system to look after them respectfully and safely.  Maternity care 
can be disrespectful and contingent upon payment of fees.  Offensive and demeaning 
language by health personnel, and ridiculing of women’s poverty, clothing, parity, 
smell, hygiene, cries of pain, or desire to remain clothed is not only disrespectful, but 
abusive.” (NDOH 2009) 
 
The 2006 PNG DHS also found that the Under-Five Child Mortality (U5MR) was 74.7 
child deaths per 1,000 live births (GovPNG 2009).  Again this was one of the highest 
U5MR in the Asia Pacific Region.   
 
In a 1999 review of child health services in PNG, Duke (1999) concluded “Most 
childhood deaths occur in villages, and most children never receive medical 
assistance.”(Duke 1999)  The review further linked the continuing high child deaths in 
PNG to a Health System that had declined significantly in the years since 
Independence, and the decline in health services to the fragmentation caused by the 
Governance changes brought about by the 1977 Organic Law and 1995 New Organic 
law (Duke 1999). 
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These survey results and reviews demonstrate a decline in health outcome indicators 
due to low capacity and performance in the PNG Health system.  But also, by the early 
2000s, the emergence of a lack of trust in, and a lack of engagement with the Health 
System by the people of PNG.  People preferred to die at home rather than to access 
the PNG Health System. 
 
The capacity of the state in PNG to provide services had seriously declined in the 10 
years following the 1995 Organic Law on Provincial and LLG to the point where many 
Papua New Guineans living in rural areas did not come in contact with government 
services.  A 2005 European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM)  
review of the PNG health sector capacity, commissioned by AusAID, using interviews 
and focus groups went so far as to say that “for people living in remote areas the state 
is neither seen nor felt.  It is easier to seek divine intervention for healing than to seek 
medical help because people's capacity to access state help is eroded by its lack of 
presence'.”(Bolger, Mandie-Filer et al. 2005) 
 
 Conclusion 6.9
In this Chapter we have critically examined the evolution of Governance in PNG as a 
core component of political commitment in the period up to the 2006 PNG TB DOTS 
policy.  We have examined the historical evolution of governance structures in PNG.  
We described and critiqued the impact of the governance reforms on PNG Health 
System governance, health system capacity and performance, and health outcomes.  
We have found that the reforms have resulted in fragmentation of the whole PNG 
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Health System with a disconnection between the three levels of the Health System, 
and minimal or no responsibility or accountability.   
 
The 2003 ADB review of the PNG Health sector concluded that there was a “slow and 
steady collapse of the health system in rural areas.”(Asian Development Bank 2003) 
 
During the 2005 field visit for this research found "the collapse of the PNG health 
system.  As individual administrative and political entities retreated from their 
responsibilities to the collective government, they became both less transparent and 
less accountable.  This resulted in rapidly weakening inter-governmental processes.  
Lines of authority between the three tiers of government are largely absent.  
Increasingly dysfunctional central government agencies are threatening the integrity of 
government services.  The public health sector is failing to deliver services to the rural 
populations.  Throughout, one constant has undermined the performance of all 
government agencies: the avoidance of accountability.  The result is that under 
decentralization neither politicians nor public officials accept, particularly at the 
provincial and district levels, accountability and responsibility for delivery of primary 
health services and essential public health functions. The impaired government 
processes now facilitate avoidance of accountability and, in the process, also impair 
their own integrity – the impairment is both a consequence and a cause of the decline.” 
(Research Field Notes November 2005) 
 
The decentralization policy was implemented for politically expedient reasons, not for 
the benefit of health care; however it had a major detrimental impact on health 
services provision in PNG.  The reforms were implemented without any consideration 
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for addressing the continuing high burden of disease in the PNG population.  It 
resulted in a marked decline in health services, rather than improvement, especially in 
rural areas. 
 
The major constraint to health service provision in PNG was, and is, not financial.  
Financial resources to the PNG Health sector in fact increased in the 10 years leading 
up to 2006(Asian Development Bank 2003, World Bank 2007).  However, the health 
outcome indicators did not match this increase in funding; in fact health outcome 
indicators, and health service provision indicators, worsened during this same period.  
 
The resulting health governance structures we have examined in this chapter were the 
governance structures in place when the PNG DOTS Country Strategic Plan to Stop TB, 
2006-2010 Policy (Aia, Yadav et al. 2006) was formulated and were the structures 
under which the resulting Round 6 Global Fund Grant Proposal Form - Sixth Call for 
Proposals - Expanding and Implementing the Stop TB Strategy in Papua New Guinea 
(PNGCCM 2006) was to be implemented from 2006-2012. 
 
Given this PNG Health System contextual background it is now appropriate to 
specifically address and examine the capacity of the PNG Health System to implement 
a TB DOTS program.  We will specifically examine its capacity with regard to 
Component 3 – Standardized treatment with supervision and patient support, and 
Component 4 - Effective drug supply and management systems. 
 
Central to the TB DOTS policy in PNG is the question, that if the lack of capacity of the 
PNG state to implement policy was known in the early 2000s, how did the PNG DOTS 
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Policy address this lack of capacity?  If it was not possible to address the significant 
capacity issues brought about by the governance structures, why was TB DOTS 
adopted as a policy, and funded to the tune of millions of dollars.  If it was known by 
the early 2000s that the capacity of the PNG State and Health Service particularly was 
such that a comprehensive TB DOTS Program could not be delivered, why did donors 
support and fund such a program?   
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7  Political Commitment and TB DOTS in PNG – Standardized 
Treatment & Effective Drug Supply 
 
“Sustained political commitment and leadership are the foundation for any sound 
programme to control TB. The legal and regulatory context defines the potential as well 
as the structure and policies of the national TB and DR-TB control programmes. 
Political commitment is expressed through adequate financial support and appropriate 
infrastructure, including facilities and trained human resources. Coordination among 
the different components of public and private health programmes and organizations is 
essential for successful programme implementation. Sufficient training and retention of 
medical and public health personnel depend on long-term government planning and 
support.” (WHO 2006). 
 
 Introduction 7.1
The aim of this chapter is to describe and critique the capacity of the PNG health 
system to deliver a TB DOTS program.  We describe and critique the impact of 
governance reforms, a direct result of the particular PNG construct of “political 
commitment”, on the capacity of the PNG Health System to deliver two key 
components of TB DOTS, in the PNG context: 
“Component 3 -Standardized short-course chemotherapy for all cases of TB 
under proper case management conditions, including DOT.  Proper case 
management conditions imply technically sound and socially supportive 
treatment services” (WHO 2003). 
 
and 
 
“Component 4 - Uninterrupted supply of quality-assured drugs with reliable 
drug procurement and distribution systems” (WHO 2003). 
 
as set out in the 2003 "Treatment of TB - Guidelines for national programmes" (WHO 
2003), the WHO Guidelines in place when the 2005 PNG TB DOTS Policy (Aia, Yadav et 
al. 2006) was developed. 
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We describe and critique the contextual reality of the PNG Health System and the 
capacity of the PNG Health System to deliver components 3 and 4 of a TB DOTS 
Program leading up to 2006.  We ask, was it possible when developing the TB DOTS 
policy in PNG to guarantee “technically sound and socially supportive treatment 
services”(WHO 2003) (DOTS Component 3), and “reliable drug procurement and 
distribution systems” (WHO 2003) (DOTS Component 4).  What were the existing 
contextual realities with regard to the PNG Health System?  What was the capacity of 
the PNG Health system to deliver on these two essential components of a TB DOTS 
program?  To do this we take each of these two components and, in turn, look critically 
at the PNG Health System’s capacity to deliver each of them. 
 
 - Component 3 -Standardized short-course chemotherapy for all cases of TB 7.2
under proper case management conditions, including direct observation of 
treatment.  Proper case management conditions imply technically sound and 
socially supportive treatment services (WHO 2003). 
 
The goal of an ‘effective’ TB DOTS Program is to detect 75% of TB cases within a 
population and to achieve a cure rate of 85% of all sputum positive cases, and in so 
doing bring about a reduction of incidence of TB within populations, with the eventual 
goal of stopping transmission within populations (Kochi 1991).  In order to achieve this 
goal a health system has to ensure a “technically sound and socially supportive 
treatment services”(WHO 2003).  In other words, adequate health services need to be 
provided to a sufficient proportion of the population in order to detect 75% of TB 
cases, and then the health system needs to have the “technical” capacity to deliver 
treatment, i.e. direct observation of treatment (DOT) for six months, as per policy.  The 
“socially supportive treatment” envisaged in the policy means that communities and 
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TB patients are not only able to access, but are also supportive of and engage with the 
health service providing the TB DOTS Program.  So what was the situation with regard 
to TB DOTS Components 3 in PNG in the period leading up to the formulation of the TB 
DOTS Policy in 2005?  To answer this we need to examine what constituted the 
primary care system in PNG, how comprehensive and broad based it was in terms of 
population coverage, and also the quality of care the PNG health service was able to 
deliver.   
 
This matters because we have already seen that in PNG over 85% of the population 
live in rural areas, surviving largely by subsistence agriculture, many in quite difficult 
geographical settings.  The provision of a comprehensive TB DOTS service thus faces 
major logistical challenges.  We have also seen that rural PNG has some of the highest 
TB incidence rates in the world.  A well-conducted study found an incidence of 1290 
per 100,000 people per year in Gulf Province (Cross, Coles et al. 2014).  A Western 
Province study, based on Health Centre TB registers, found an incidence of around 500 
per 100,000 people per year (McBryde 2012).   
 
In the first section of this Chapter we examine the capacity of the PNG Health System, 
in 2005, to deliver Direct Observation of Treatment (DOT).  The delivery of Direct 
Observation of Treatment, according to the WHO Policy (WHO 2003), requires a well-
functioning Primary Health Care (PHC) structure providing broad population coverage, 
in order to diagnose 75% of TB cases, and undertake DOT to achieve an 85% cure of 
those TB cases (WHO 2003).   
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 Provision of Direct Observation of Treatment (DOT) in PNG 7.2.1
In PNG population coverage with basic PHC services, the basis for successful delivery of 
DOT, is provided by three key components of the PNG Health System.  The PNG Health 
System is organized in a pyramidal PHC structure: 
1. Aid Posts (AP) form the broad base of this PHC structure.  With officially 
2,400 APs throughout PNG, each AP serves a population of 500 to 3000 
people (Campos-Outcalt, Kewa et al. 1995).  Staffed by a Community 
Health Worker CHW they provide a basic package of curative and 
preventive services to villages throughout PNG.   
2. Health Centre (HC) - APs are supervised by a HC which serves a 
population of between 5,000 and 20,000 people (Campos-Outcalt, Kewa 
et al. 1995).  HCs are staffed by a varying combination of Health 
Extension Officers (HEO), Nurses and CHWs.  In the PNG Health System 
a CHW has undertaken a 6 to 12 month training program, and a Nurse a 
three year training program.  The HEO is a cadre of health worker who 
falls between a Nurse and Doctor, having completed four years of 
training, and able to undertake procedures requiring greater skills than 
those of a nurse, e.g. performing a vacuum extraction of an obstructed 
labour.  These higher-level skills are required in the remote rural 
communities of PNG where access is difficult and doctors are absent.  
Each HC is managed by an Officer in Charge (OIC) who has an important 
role within the HC, as described later.  
3. Health Patrols are conducted by HC staff to “clinic points” in those 
remote or inaccessible villages within the catchment region of the HC, 
that do not have easy access to an AP or HC.  These patrols are meant to 
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be conducted at least monthly.  Health Patrols fill in the gaps in 
population coverage, where there is no AP or HC. 
 
This combination of APs, HCs and Health Patrols is designed to provide broad-based 
population coverage of PHC services and forms the basis for the potential to diagnose 
75% of TB cases and provide the DOT of TB patients that will ensure an 85% cure of TB 
cases, set as the goals for a successful TB DOTS Program. 
 
This PHC structure, based on APs, Health Patrols and HCs are the basis of the PNG 
Health System.  It was the official policy approach of the PNG Government and 
National Department of Health through which the PNG National Health Plan 2000-
2010 would be delivered (GovPNG 2000, Asian Development Bank 2003). 
 
 Aid Posts – Impact of Governance Reforms & Poor Capacity 7.2.2
In 2006 “Aid-Posts (AP) are (still) the first point of contact of the community with the 
PNG Health Service.  Staffed by Community Health Workers CHWs and responsible to 
and employed by the District and Provincial Governments they are meant to provide 
basic curative and preventative services to the rural population of PNG.  The Aid-Post 
CHWs refer more complicated cases to either Health Centre (HC) or Provincial 
Hospitals.  The strength of Aid-Posts is their proximity to villages and thus a capacity to 
deliver a basic package of curative and preventive interventions at the community 
level” (Research Field Notes November 2006). 
 
The number of Aid Post (AP), and therefore access to health services, actually 
increased in the years immediately after Independence.  It was estimated that by 
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1982, 93% of the PNG population was within 2 hours walk of an AP (Reilly 1990, Duke 
1999, Pincock 2006).   
 
Under the 1995 New Organic Law on Provincial and Local Level Government (LLG) the 
funding, staffing and maintenance of APs became the responsibility of Provinces and 
LLG.  However, there was a low level of commitment to health by Provincial and LLG.  
These governance reforms brought about significant changes in the management, 
functioning and performance of APs. 
 
As Provincial and LLGs suffered budgetary constraints, APs were closed to save on 
salaries and maintenance (Duke 1999, Asian Development Bank 2003, Pincock 2006, 
Research Field Notes November 2005, Research Field Notes November 2006).  As a 
result, during the late 1990s, there was a decrease in the number of APs in PNG.  So 
that by 1998 in the eastern Highlands Province of PNG 82 (56%) of the 147 APs were 
closed and many others were derelict, with few drugs and no regular supply of 
vaccines etc.(Duke 1999).  Retrenchments and staff simply leaving their posts meant 
even those APs still officially open were often unmanned (Duke 1999).  “APs get closed 
because there are problems - sometimes the health workers don’t get paid for a long 
time so they leave, it’s too remote so they leave and they don’t get any shipment of 
drugs for like a year, so they just close.  Like, the plumbing might bugger up and what’s 
the point, people move. (Adepoybi - Interview 12th April 2008). 
 
During the period from 1995 to 2005 the closure of significant numbers of APs 
continued throughout PNG, albeit with variations in the proportion of closures in the 
different parts of PNG.  “The loss of Aid-Posts (throughout PNG), from 75% open in 
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1995 to 63% open in 2000, is continuing.  As the loss of basic services coverage is 
extended, unmet demand from the more remote populations increases”(Research Field 
Notes November 2005).  
 
By 2006 the National Newspaper (3rd October 2006), quoted the PHA from Eastern 
Highlands Province as saying that “Sixty percent of rural Aid-Posts in Eastern Highlands 
province have been closed down due to a number of internal and external factors.  
Some of the internal factors include lack of regular maintenance, staff postings, staff 
industrial issues and retrenchment exercises.  Another major contributing factor is 
ineffective deliveries of basic medical equipment and supplies.  External factors include 
law and order, politics, tribal fights and land compensation issues, lack of political and 
community support” (Zachery Per 3rd Oct. 2006).   
 
The 2006 field visit found that APs are “described as the backbone of the nation’s 
health and yet a large proportion are closing down.  Because of its importance, the 
status of the Aid-Post system needs to be reviewed to address the declining trend.  The 
roles of Aid-Posts must be broadened to include more preventive and promotive 
activities.  With the continuing high burden of disease and emergence of HIV/AIDS in 
rural populations, PNG cannot afford this rapid decline in the provision of primary level 
rural health services” (Research Field Notes November 2006). 
 
Due to the large number of closures of APs by 2006, instead of being within two hours 
walk of an AP, as was the case at Independence, “some villages now must travel up to 
4 days to reach medical aid” (Pincock 2006).  One interviewee noted that “the system 
is broken and it’s continuing to deteriorate, APs which are the first line of health service 
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delivery, a lot of them are shut, and so people are forced to walk over mountains, 
across rivers, on little mountain paths, to get to the next, closest health service provider  
and that may just be another AP, and APs are generally staffed by a person called a 
CHW” (Anonymous 1 - Interview 10th April 2008). 
 
In PNG the further people have to walk the less likely they are to access treatment.   A 
study conducted in 1998 in the Wosera District of East Sepik Province examined the 
effect of distance to a HC on attendance for treatment when sick.  The study found 
that when people had to walk further than 3.5 km there was a 50% decrease in 
attendance for significant illnesses such as pneumonia and diarrhoea (Müller, Smith et 
al. 1998).  People in PNG are not able, due to terrain, geographical isolation, fear of 
violence, and cost of transport to travel long distances to access health services, even 
in the case of life threatening illness (Müller, Smith et al. 1998).   
 
This marked decline in the number of APs and the resulting low level of coverage with 
health services provided the context, at the PHC level, for the development of the 
2006 TB DOTS policy.  With 50% to 60% of APs closed, the population coverage of and 
access to the PNG Health System was limited, kept declining, and had been declining 
significantly in the ten years leading up to the adoption of the 2005 PNG TB DOTS 
policy. 
 
 Health Patrols – Impact of Governance Reforms & Poor Capacity 7.2.3
In those rural and remote villages where there was no fixed AP or HC, Health Patrols 
were carried out regularly, usually on a monthly basis, from the closest HC to 
designated “clinic points” in rural and remote villages that do not have an AP or HC.  
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This meant that there was population coverage with health services, even in the more 
remote parts of PNG.  It was the combination of Aid-Posts, with regular Health Patrols 
where needed, that provided a comprehensive PHC service.  “The Health Patrols were 
often the only contact rural villages had with the provision of services by the 
government. … It is through outreach (health patrols) that most children, mothers and 
the community in general come into contact with preventive and public health 
activities” (Research Field Notes November 2005) 
 
Health Patrols, by achieving population coverage, are seen as essential to 
implementing the 2000-2010 PNG National Health Plan (GovPNG 2010), and are an 
indicator in the PNG National HIS.  “Outreach Patrols from all HCs in PNG are a priority 
… and are essential to achieving the NDOH Public Health Strategic Directions.  
Outreach is an indicator in the NHIS and is to be reported and reviewed on a quarterly 
basis”(Research Field Notes November 2006). 
 
Following the 1995 New Organic Law on Provincial and LLG there was a rapid, dramatic 
decline in the number of Health Patrols to rural villages.  “Although they are considered 
very important by the HC staff, outreach services are often not carried out due to lack 
of resources.  Sufficient transport and an operational budget in the HCs would go a 
long way to assure that patrols are carried out” (Research Field Notes November 
2005). 
By 2006 the PNG HIS indicated that “only 50% of outreach patrols planned are actually 
carried out and there is no indication of this improving.  This critical activity appears to 
be given low priority in HC activities” (Research Field Notes November 2006). 
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The 2006 field visit confirmed that “in those HCs visited there had been no 
Patrol/Outreach activities in the previous twelve months to the designated clinic points.  
Further there had been no supervisory visits by Provincial Health or District Health staff 
to those HCs in the preceding twelve months” (Research Field Notes November 2006). 
 
By 2006, 50% or less of Health Patrols were being carried out.  Again this decline in 
health service coverage of rural and remote villages in PNG by Health Patrols was the 
context for the development of the 2006 PNG TB DOTS policy.  
 
 Health Centres – Impact of Governance Reforms and Poor Capacity 7.2.4
Besides Aid Post and Health Patrols, the third and equally important component in the 
provision of Primary Health Care services in PNG, and therefore also central to the 
implementation of a TB DOTS policy, is the Health Centre (HC).  As we have already 
seen in the PNG PHC hierarchy HCs are placed above APs serving a population of 500 
to 3,000 (Campos-Outcalt, Kewa et al. 1995).  The 1995 New Organic Law on Provincial 
and Local Level Government resulted in the funding, staffing and maintenance of HCs 
becoming the responsibility of LLG (Districts) (Asian Development Bank 2003). 
 7.2.4.1 Health Centre – Staffing and Management 
Each HC is staffed by a varying combination of HEOs, Nurses and CHWs.  Managerial 
responsibility for each HC is with an Officer in Charge (OIC), either a HEO or Nurse, who 
takes responsibility for the management of the HC, and provides oversight of the 
implementation of the HCs Annual Activity Plan (AAP).  The AAP sets out the activities 
the HC will conduct in each 12 month period; this includes provision of curative 
services, health prevention / promotion activities with regard to disease control 
programs (HIV, Malaria, TB DOTS etc.), supervision of APs and conducting Health 
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Patrols to the designated “clinic points” in rural and remote villages.  The AAP activities 
are also meant to determine the amount of money the HC receives from the District 
and Provincial Administration for that year.  HC AAP’s are meant to be developed in 
consultation with the PHA and PHO so that the HC AAP aligns with the Public Health 
Strategies as outlined in the 2000-2010 National Health Plan (Research Field Notes 
November 2005, Research Field Notes November 2006). 
 
Before and for a short period after Independence, each District had its own DH, staffed 
by a District Medical Officer.  With the decline in rural health services DHs no longer 
have doctors working at this level and are now staffed by HEOs, Nurses and CHWs, and 
are, in effect, large HCs within the PNG Health System.   
 
7.2.4.2 Health Centre – Officer in Charge (OIC) 
The OIC role is crucial to the efficient and effective functioning of the HC.  “The role of 
the OIC in each DH or HC is the crucial person in communicating information about the 
activities outlined in AAPs.  The OIC is also crucial in submitting requests for (HC) funds, 
ensuring the appropriate acquittals are returned to the Provincial (Health Office) and 
also for other crucial administrative responsibilities such as signing requisitions for 
medications. (Research Field Visit Notes May 2007) 
 
As with management skills at National, Provincial and District levels the performance 
and capacity of OICs is generally poor because OIC appointments were, and are, often 
based on nepotism and wantokism, rather than ability.  “In some of the DHs  and HCs 
the OIC was absent for several weeks at a time for various reasons - on PHO activities, 
retired but not replaced as yet, suspended for inappropriate use of funds, etc.  So AAP 
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activities are not happening and staff not being informed of AAP activities. Therefore 
the OIC can be a major source of “the bottleneck” in implementing the AAPs and 
achieving the Public Health Strategic Directions” (Research Field Visit Notes May 2007). 
 
In Provinces with access and transport difficulties it is not possible for the HC OIC to be 
involved in the preparation of the AAP e.g. “In Western Province due to difficult access 
and cost of transportation it is not possible to involve the OIC in the preparation of the 
AAP” (Research Field Visit Notes May 2007).  In these settings HC staff are not even 
aware of NDOH Public Health Strategic Directions and new policies. 
 
7.2.4.3 Health Centre – Human Resources 
Human Resources are a major problem in HCs throughout PNG.  During the 2007 field 
visit it was noted that “the human resource problem at Provincial and District level is 
well known and well documented.  Districts are unable to attract or retain medical 
officers and current production rates are not expected to make an impact on the 
shortage of nurses and CHWs.  The skills mix at centres is poorly considered, and good 
staff are unable to adequately perform their roles through lack of essential 
complementary staff and resources.  Morale is frequently poor and staff discouraged” 
(Research Field Visit Notes May 2007). 
 
In rural and remote areas where access and transport to many HCs are difficult ”there 
is serious doubt about the provision of services in these facilities i.e. staffing levels, 
adequate provision of essential medicines, vaccines and equipment” (Research Field 
Notes November 2006). 
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Despite these constraints “you do have health facilities out there that have got staff, 
who come to work every day, and they are not delivering much in the way of health 
care because they don’t have drugs or nobody shows an interest in what they are 
doing, or they don’t really know what they are doing, and nobody is motivating them 
and there is an essential piece of equipment that is broken and has been broken for 2 
years”(Anonymous 4 - Interview 18th June 2008). 
 
7.2.4.4 Health Centre – Supervision & Support 
The PNG National Health Plan 2000-2010 emphasizes the importance of supportive 
supervision and on-site training (GovPNG 2000).  Two of the PNG National Health Core 
Indicators are: 
“18. The proportion of HCs with staff receiving at least one supervisory visits per 
year” and 
“19. Proportion of Health facility staff receiving at least one competency based 
in-service training session each year.” (Asian Development Bank 2003) 
 
Under the Public Health Administration Act of 1997, which outlines the roles and 
functions of the National, Provincial and District level health services in PNG; the 
Provincial level was required to conduct regular supervisory visits to each of the HC 
within the Province.  This was, and is still is, meant to provide oversight of 
implementation of the HC AAP as well as on-site training in existing and new health 
programs(Research Field Notes November 2006). 
 
Under the Public Hospitals Act of 1995 Medical Officers are meant to conduct 
supervisory visits to HCs also on a regular basis, with a view to ensuring curative and 
treatment protocols are being carried out in accordance with NDOH treatment 
guidelines. 
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However, by 2005 ”the percentage of HCs that had at least one medical officer visit per 
year declined from 37% in 2003 to 26% in 2005 (provincial range: 9%-60%).  The 
percentage of HCs that have received at least one supervisory visit from the PHO per 
year declined from 50% in 2003 to 44% in 2005 (provincial range: 10%-90%)”(Research 
Field Notes November 2006).  There was “a continuing downward trend for support 
and supervisory visits from provinces to districts and health facilities by medical officers 
and provincial health staff.  Supervision in general is not a priority in the majority of the 
provinces” (Research Field Notes November 2006) 
 
The reality was that by 2005 these supervisory visits had declined significantly.  The 
governance reforms of the 1995 New Organic Law on Provincial and LLG meant that 
there was a complete disconnect from the National to the Provincial, as well as from 
the Provincial to the LLG (HC and AP) level.  A lack of supervision by managers from the 
District and Provincial level meant that national policies and programs such as TB DOTS 
had no effective means of reaching the HC and AP level, or of effectively being 
monitored should such a policy come onto the PNG health policy agenda. 
 
7.2.4.5 Health Centre – Funding, Infrastructure and Staff Morale 
Funding of Health Services was not a priority at both the Provincial and LLG levels. By 
2005 very little recurrent budget was actually getting down to the primary care level - 
“overwhelmingly there are minimal resources reaching the HCs, Sub-HCs and Aid-Posts 
from recurrent (PNG Government) funding arrangements.  Many places rely on donor 
contributions through the Health Sector Improvement Program (HSIP) i.e. the donor 
funded Health Sector, SWAp) for the most basic services” (Research Field Notes 
November 2005). 
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As a result of funds not reaching the HC level there has been a lack of maintenance in 
both the HC and also HC staff housing.  “A constant complaint repeated in all provinces 
visited is the lack of maintenance and repair of staff houses, health facilities, and 
vehicles.  Capital investment is a provincial and not a national responsibility.  At facility 
level, the poor infrastructure and equipment, the inadequate supply of essential drugs, 
the lack of functioning transport, the unavailability of cash for outreach activities, and 
the lack of supportive supervision impede health services delivery. Health staff are 
often demotivated by the lack of response to their problems as well as deteriorating 
living conditions” (Research Field Notes November 2005). 
 
Despite these major constraints there were still “dedicated staff working under 
intolerable conditions:  poor water supplies, poor management and supervision, a lack 
of information and communication, limited finances, equipment, resources and 
accommodation” (Research Field Visit Notes May 2007). 
 
7.2.4.6 Health Centre – Communities and Quality of Care 
There was at the HC level little engagement with communities to involve the 
communities in the provision of services and to carry out Health Promotion activities 
and campaigns.  During the 2006 field visit this research draws on it was noted that 
“the services offered at HCs are often limited to treatment services only  .There was no 
evidence of engagement with communities to plan and participate in other Health 
Promoting activities such as Healthy Villages Projects or Village Health Volunteers 
(VHV).With a few commendable exceptions there is a seeming disconnect between 
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Health Workers and Health Promotion activities” (Research Field Notes November 
2006). 
All of these factors, along with inadequate ongoing staff training to maintain 
professional standards, have an impact on the community’s perception of the quality 
of care provided in HCs.  Those people who are able to do so, by pass what they 
perceive as poor quality care.  “Problems with declining quality of training of key 
cadres have contributed to a real and perceived loss of quality of care in many centres.  
Patients are bypassing these centres to seek services from hospitals or larger HCs, 
where the quality of care is seen to be better”(Research Field Notes November 2006). 
 7.2.4.7 Capacity to provide Direct Observation of Treatment 
In PNG PHC services to the broad population is based on APs, Health Patrols and HCs.  
It was this broad-based PHC System that provided the basis for a TB DOTS program, 
and particularly the DOT competent of TB DOTS, that would meet the WHO TB DOTS 
policy requirements (WHO 2003).  
However this research finds that the PNG Health Systems capacity to undertake DOT 
for six months had declined significantly due to: 
1.  Aid Post closures – by 2005, 50% to 60% of APs had closed across PNG.  The 
majority of these AP closures had taken place in rural areas with the highest 
incidence of TB in the ten years before the 2006 TB DOTS Policy. 
2. Health Patrols, which had provided regular patrols to those areas not served by 
an AP or HC, were not taking place for a variety of reasons – lack of funding and 
transport, lack of supervision and accountability for HC programs and activities 
from the Provincial or District level. 
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3. Health Centres had been in decline in the period since Independence but this 
had accelerated with the reforms of the 1995 New Organic Law, leading to low 
staff morale due to little of no funding reaching HCs, poor and deteriorating HC 
and staff housing infrastructure and maintenance, high levels of absenteeism 
and “ghost workers”, and as a result a decline in quality of care and perceived 
quality of care by communities, as well as low levels of engagement by the 
community with their health and health services.  
4. The key Health System components at the HC and AP level (Human Resources, 
Financing, and Service Delivery) had declined considerably. 
5. There is a lack of Leadership and Political Commitment at the National, 
Provincial and District level to address these major policy issues. 
A national PNG TB DOTS policy must address these fundamental Health System 
contextual issues to be able to provide DOT to achieve 80% population coverage and 
cure 75% of TB cases. 
 
 7B -  “Component 4 - Uninterrupted supply of quality-assured drugs with 7.3
reliable drug procurement and distribution systems” (WHO 2003) 
 
Similarly, with regard to TB DOTS Component 4 – Effective Drug Supply & Management 
System, the capacity of the PNG Health System to provide and manage an effective 
drug supply and management system had been in significant decline in the decade 
leading up to the adoption of the 2006 TB DOTS Policy.  The PNG Health System was 
not able to provide an effective regular supply of drugs to HCs and APs. 
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In order for the PNG Health System to deliver Component 4 - Uninterrupted supply of 
quality-assured drugs with reliable drug procurement and distribution systems of a TB 
DOTS Program, we need to understand why these regular stock-outs were (and still 
are) taking place, i.e. what were the constraints in the PNG pharmaceutical supply 
chain that a TB DOTS policy needed to address. 
 Organization of Pharmaceutical Supplies in PNG 7.3.1
The 1995 New Organic Law on Provincial and LLG had a significant impact on the 
provision of pharmaceuticals and drugs to the Provincial and District level in PNG.  The 
Medical Supply Branch (MSB) in the National Department of Health (NDOH) became 
responsible for: 
1. Purchase of all pharmaceuticals for the PNG Health System through a 
competitive tendering process, and 
2. Maintaining regulatory control over all pharmaceuticals imported into PNG. 
 
The MSB supplies pharmaceuticals to the Provinces.  Based on requisitions submitted 
to the MSB by the Provincial level Area Medical Stores (AMS), pharmaceuticals are 
shipped to the AMS.  The MSB no longer has responsibility for pharmaceuticals once 
they reach the AMS.  The AMS is then responsible for the distribution of the 
pharmaceuticals to Provincial and DHs, HCs and APs.  HCs and APs complete and 
submit requisitions to the AMS, based on need.  The AMS is then meant to supply 
pharmaceuticals to HCs and APs, in a timely fashion (Research Field Notes November 
2006). 
 
However, by the late 1990s the inability of the AMSs to supply essential drugs to HCs 
and APs reached crisis point with frequent "stock outs" of essential medicines 
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(Anonymous 1 - Interview 10th April 2008, Ongugo - Interview 22nd November 2010, 
Duke 1999). 
 
This had not improved by 2006 with less than 60% of HCs having an adequate supply of 
essential medicines.  It was noted in field notes for this research that “availability of 
adequate supplies is affected by the inefficient system as a whole (procurement, 
distribution, management at AMS and facility level, non-coordinated push/pull system).  
Drug availability has been unacceptably low during the past five years with the NHIS 
reporting the national average of months that hospitals and HCs are adequately 
stocked (i.e. none of the key medicines is out of stock) varies between 56 and 59%.  
There is high variation between provinces” (Research Field Visit Notes May 2007). 
 Aid Post and Health Centre Medical Kits 7.3.2
By 1998 the shortage of drugs and supplies to APs in rural PNG had reached a point 
where APs were not able to provide a basic level of medical care due to drug 
shortages.  As a result, in 1998 the ADB took on responsibility, through its Health 
System Development Project (HSDP), to assemble and supply AP Medicine kits, via a 
private contractor, as well as providing transport for the distribution of the AP Kits.  
This AP Kit supply mechanism was completely separate from the Government’s AMS 
routine drug and medical supplies requisition scheme that was meant to supply 
APs(Asian Development Bank 2003, Research Field Visit Notes May 2007). 
 
In 1999 AusAID commenced a similar project to supply HC medicines kits.  Again the 
preparation and supply of HC Kits was by a private contractor, bypassing the AMS 
requestion mechanism.  Initially seen as an interim measure this had, by 2006, become 
an integral element of the pharmaceutical supply chain to HCs (Anonymous 1 - 
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Interview 10th April 2008, Adepoybi - Interview 12th April 2008, May - Interview 17th 
June 2008, Research Field Visit Notes May 2007). 
 
The result was that by 2006 medical supplies to rural and remote HCs and APs were 
being delivered by three separate supply mechanisms, due to the significant ongoing 
managerial problems in the AMS.  One system through the PNG NDOH AMS routine 
pharmaceutical requisition system; one through a private contractor to supply HC kits; 
and another also through a private contractor to supply AP kits.  The latter two had 
initially been established as a short term measure until the AMS system had been 
strengthened (Research Field Notes November 2006).  
 
 Area Medical Store  – Provincial Level 7.3.3
The effects of a lack of accountability, a lack of responsibility for actions, and low 
management capacity had a significant impact on performance in the Area Medical 
Store (AMS).  During the field trip for this research it was observed that whilst medical 
supplies were reaching the provinces, these supplies were not distributed from 
Provincial Health headquarters to facilities in a timely manner with drugs being held up 
for weeks or even months (Research Field Visit Notes May 2007).  The lack of transport 
to distribute drugs was the most common reason given for this hold up.  But also 
inadequate stock management practices at AMS lead to wastage of supplies (expiry; 
damage, high risk for theft) and stock-outs.  Performance of AMS is below standard 
e.g. long lead times as reported by clients; not service oriented; lack of communication 
etc.(Research Field Visit Notes May 2007).  This was confirmed by interviews and 
reports (Anonymous 1 - Interview 10th April 2008, Anonymous 2 - Interview 11th April 
2008, Adepoybi - Interview 12th April 2008, Ongugo - Interview 22nd November 2010).  
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As part of the fragmentation of the health system, supervision of the provincial level 
AMS from the national level NDOH Medical Supplies Branch (MSB) was very weak.  
Similarly, accountability for performance by the AMS to the MSB was weak, as with 
other components of the PNG Health System (Research Field Visit Notes May 2007).  
The MSB and AMS also suffered significant human resources, as well as governance 
and organizational, weaknesses and challenges, with a high staff vacancy rate, and 
high rates of staff absenteeism(Research Field Visit Notes May 2007).  Those provinces 
with trained pharmacists (i.e. greater human resource capacity) had fewer problems 
with the management and supply of drugs (Research Field Notes November 2005) 
 
In summary it was found during the 2007 field visit that distribution of pharmaceuticals 
from AMS to hospitals and provinces, and from provinces to health facilities was 
fragmented and ad-hoc; distribution plans are not available in most places; money to 
pay for transport is not released on time and/or insufficient (in one provincial transit 
store visited, the HC kits about to expire were piling up).  Consequently supplies 
available in the system were not reaching health facilities and patients (Research Field 
Visit Notes May 2007).  This was especially so in the mostly rugged rural and remote 
areas of PNG (Research Field Visit Notes May 2007).  The absence of essential 
medicines was a major factor in people not attending HCs and APs(Research Field Visit 
Notes May 2007, Research Field Notes November 2005) 
 
 Medical Supplies Branch of National Department of Health – National Level 7.3.4
At the MSB national level there was no comprehensive drug management information 
system in place that provided routine information for assessing performance of the 
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medical supply system “including, e.g. supplier lead times, analysis of which items 
consume the largest share of the budget, province’s share of distributed supplies in 
money terms, lead times and order fulfilment rate per AMS, availability of vital supplies 
in the system” (Research Field Visit Notes May 2007). 
As “estimates of national requirements for procurement purposes are based on 
unreliable and incomplete data; either too much or too little is being procured and 
emergency procurement at higher prices becomes necessary” (Research Field Visit 
Notes May 2007). 
 
The problem with drug supply “is not one of financing for pharmaceutical supplies in 
PNG.  The recurrent budget and donor partner funding levels for drugs in PNG was 
sufficient to meet the needs of the PNG Health System and population” (Research Field 
Visit Notes May 2007). 
 
 Capacity to provide quality-assured drugs with reliable drug procurement and 7.3.5
distribution systems (DOTS 4) 
To summarize, with regard to the PNG Health Systems capacity to deliver TB DOTS 
Component 4, this research has found: 
1.  Frequent “stock-outs” – drug supplies to the Primary Care level are not 
organized to guarantee a regular supply of drugs; frequent disruptions to drug 
supply occur with periods where over 60% of HCs do not have essential 
medicines. 
2. No drug information system, resulting in frequent over- and under-ordering of 
drugs, with the need to purchase emergency supplies at higher cost to the PNG 
Health System. 
169 
3. Poor or absent communication and accountability with regard to drug 
procurement and distribution. 
4. Inadequate Human Resources to manage the drug supply in PNG with 
insufficient trained pharmacists and pharmacy technicians to ensure 
appropriate management of pharmaceutical supplies within the PNG Health 
System. 
5. There were sufficient levels of funding from donors and the recurrent budget 
to supply the required pharmaceuticals to the PNG population. 
6. In order to maintain supplies of drugs to the Primary Care Level, parallel 
pharmaceutical supply systems are required via AP Kits and HC kits, with donor 
funds and managed though the private sector, to ensure drugs reach APs and 
HCs. 
7. There is a lack of Leadership and Political Commitment at the National, 
Provincial and District level to address these major policy issues. 
 Conclusion 7.4
The capacity of the PNG Health System to deliver primary care services had declined 
during the 1980s and 1990s.  The New Organic Law of 1995 and the resulting 
governance reforms entrenched clientelism, wantokism, nepotism, low standards of 
management and corruption in the PNG Health System, accelerating this decline in the 
ten years before the 2006 TB DOTS Policy.  The PNG Health System was not immune 
from the impact of the governance reforms.  There was limited leadership and political 
commitment to address these fundamental structural governance barriers.  This 
provided the policy context for the 2006 TB DOTS Policy that needed to be addressed 
to successfully implement the policy.   
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“The slow and steady collapse of the health system in rural areas.  The causes for these 
failures (in the health system) are complex, including cultural and social issues in 
personnel management, but many are rooted in the breakdown of the vertical 
integration of health services brought by the New Organic Law.  Decentralization can 
alleviate overloading of central government and improve access to decision-making 
and participation by more people.  However, decentralization can also lead to 
deterioration in the use and control of resources if the administrative capacity is 
lacking, which is the case in Papua New Guinea.” (Research Field Notes November 
2005) 
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Part 4 - Agenda Setting of 2006 PNG TB 
DOTS policy 
 
Part 4 of this thesis deals with Objective 3 - To describe and critique the 2006 PNG TB 
DOTS Policy Agenda Setting Process from 2004 – 2006.  Part 4 examines in detail the 
role of various policy actors – the power relationships between PNG and international 
donors, the influence of  international advisers on the PNG policy process, and the 
sequence of events in this period which moved TB DOTS onto the policy agenda in PNG 
in the period from 2004-2006 resulting in the 2006 PNG TB DOTS Policy: 
• Chapter 8 - Agenda Setting and International Actors in the 2006 PNG TB DOTS 
Policy describes and critiques the policy actors at the regional and global level 
who exert significant influence and power in the 2006 PNG TB DOTS policy 
agenda setting process. 
• Chapter 9 - Agenda Setting within PNG 2004-2006 in the 2006 PNG TB DOTS 
Policy describes and critiques the agenda setting process in the 2006 PNG TB 
DOTS policy, the role of key policy actors and entrepreneurs in PNG in that 
process PNG during this period.   
 
The first relevant research method for Part 4 of this thesis is the multiple streams 
framework which finds that policy making does not proceed neatly in stages, steps or 
phases (Kingdon 2011).  The multiple streams framework identifies three independent 
policy making streams which flow through the policy process all at once, each with a 
life of its own (Kingdon 2011): 
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1. The problem stream refers to the process by which, out of multiple policy 
problems confronting society and government, one particular policy problem 
becomes of sufficient importance as to come to the attention of policy makers 
(Buse, Mays et al. 2006).   
2. The policy stream consists of “the ongoing analyses of problems and their 
solutions together with the debates surrounding their proposed solutions.” 
(Buse, Mays et al. 2006).   
3. The politics stream “operates quite separately of the other two streams and is 
comprised of events such as swings of national mood, changes of government 
and campaigns by interest groups.” (Buse, Mays et al. 2006).   
The politics stream takes place at the political level, when a problem becomes 
sufficiently important to require a policy to respond to the problem.  It is only when 
these three streams come together in what is a policy window that the policy moves 
onto the government’s policy agenda.   
 
It is the context, actors, process, content methods (Walt and Gilson 1994, Buse, Mays 
et al. 2006) adaption of the three streams framework to resource poor settings which 
enables to undertake an analysis of the power structures and relationships in the 
policy process which makes this method also relevant in this Part 4 of the thesis.  
Critically examining and understanding the role of power in relationships in the policy 
process is crucial in low and middle income countries, where complex external power 
relationships with aid donors, technical adviser’s etc. influence the policy process.  This 
framework enables the researcher to critically examine and understand the dynamic 
and complex PNG TB DOTS policy process – the actors (internal and external) including 
the power relationships between those actors, the complex PNG policy context 
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(cultural institutions, governance and health system), and the capacity to formulate 
and implement health policy in PNG, which means this framework provides a relevant 
method to undertake analysis of the 2006 TB DOTS Policy in PNG. 
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8 Agenda Setting and International Actors in the 2006 PNG TB DOTS 
Policy 
 
 Introduction 8.1
The aim of the next two chapters is to describe and critique the agenda setting process 
leading to the adoption of the 2006 PNG TB DOTS policy.  We are interested in the 
roles, the interactions and relationships between the policy actors within PNG, but just 
as importantly within the region and globally, in the agenda setting process for the 
2006 PNG TB DOTS policy.  We are particularly interested in understanding where 
power lies in these relationships and how it is exercised.   
 
The aim of this chapter is the describe and critique the roles international policy actors 
played, why they took those roles at that particular point in time, as well as their 
interactions with each other during the period from 1997 to 2006, leading up to the 
adoption of the 2006 PNG TB DOTS policy.  These roles and interactions provides the 
international policy context for this agenda setting analysis. 
 
To identify the global and regional actors in the 2006 PNG TB DOTS Policy process we 
start by examining how and by whom the PNG health sector is funded.  Whilst it is the 
PNG Government, through the National Department of Health, the provincial and 
district level governments who have statutory responsibility for health policy 
formulation and implementation in PNG it is the funders of the PNG health services 
who exercise the most power in the health policy agenda setting process in PNG.  If 
these actors do not agree to fund the policy then it is a policy in name alone and has 
no chance of implementation.     
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We use the multiple streams framework (Kingdon 2011) which identifies three policy 
streams – the problem stream, the policy stream and the politics stream, which come 
together in a policy window for the policy to come onto the policy agenda.  As a major 
component of each of the streams takes place at the regional and global level by and 
with international donors we use the context, actors, process, content method 
adaption of the multiple streams framework to analyse the power relationships which 
drove the 2006 TB policy  process.  It is the part of the policy process which takes place 
outside of PNG, dominated by the global and regional actors, which we analyse in this 
chapter.  Given the power exerted by these policy actors we deal with this regional and 
global process before moving to the agenda setting process within PNG.   
 
 PNG Dependence on Donor Assistance for Health Service Provision 8.2
PNG was, and remains, dependent on donor partners (DPs) for one third to half of its 
Annual Health Budget, (Table 7).  
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Table 7 – Total PNG Health Expenditure / Appropriation 2001-2005 
 
(nominal and real Kina (millions)) 
Source: (Foster, Condon et al. 2009) 
 
In the period from 2001 to 2006, there was an increase in both PNG Government and 
donor partners annual expenditure on Health in PNG for 264.7 million kina to nearly 
392.00 million kina(Foster, Condon et al. 2009).  However, the “Real Expenditure”, i.e. 
the actual amount spent on health, was significantly less than the amount allocated to 
health.  This was because of the very limited capacity to move health funds, both 
recurrent PNG Government and donor funds, from the central Port Moresby Ministry 
of Finance to the provincial and district levels.  This had a major impact on health 
services provision and health outcomes, as we have seen in detail in Chapters 6 and 7. 
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 Australia as an International Policy actor in PNG  8.3
It became apparent from the interviews and field notes for this research that one of 
the major influences or policy actors in TB Control in PNG was and is Australia. 
Australia’s role requires close examination (Konstantinos - Interview 7th May 2008, 
Adepoybi - Interview 12th April 2008, Research Field Visit Notes May 2007, Research 
Field Notes November 2006). 
 
Australia was the colonial power governing PNG from 1918 until PNG independence 
from Australia in 1975.  Besides being the former colonial power and largest bilateral 
donor of development assistance to PNG since Independence, Australia has a common 
maritime border with PNG, the Torres Strait.  The Australian border extends up to the 
high tide mark on the PNG side of the Torres Strait, see Map 9.1.  The majority of the 
Torres Strait Islands between Australia and PNG are Australian territory.   
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Figure 3 -- Map of the Torres Strait region, showing the boundaries between 
Australia and Papua New Guinean territory 
 
Source: (Brolan, Upham et al. 2011) 
 
Further, there are long-standing kinship links between the citizens of the Western 
Province of PNG, and the Australian Torres Strait Islands, which were only separated 
by the border determined in 1978.   The Torres Strait Treaty of 1978 ensures the 
freedom of movement of Australian Torres Strait Islanders and Papua New Guinean 
citizens from the Western Province of PNG for cultural ceremonies, trade and marriage 
(Burmester 1982, Arthur 1992, Lawrence 1998).  For these reasons, Australia has been 
the largest aid donor or Development Partner (DP) to PNG since Independence in 
1975.   
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Table 8 – Net Aid and Australian Aid to PNG and to the Health Sector (AUD millions) 
 
Source:  (Foster, Condon et al. 2009) page 18 
 
As can be seen in Table 8, Australia, through its then development agency AusAID, 
contributed between 70% to greater than 95%, of all annual Overseas Development 
Assistance (ODA) to the PNG Health Sector in the period from 2001 to 2005 (AusAID 
2006, Senate of Australia Official Committee Hansard 2006, Foster, Condon et al. 
2009).  This dropped to 46.8% of all Health Sector DP aid in 2006 (Table 8) as a result of 
the large 2003 Round 3 GFATM Grant for $US20m for Malaria Control (Aug 2004 to 
31st July 2009)(GFATM 2004) and 2004 Round 4 GFATM Grant for HIV/AIDS 
$US17.5mill (1st Sept 2005 to 31st August 2010)(GFATM 2004), both projects coming 
online in PNG in 2006 combined with Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation 
(GAVI) funds(Foster, Condon et al. 2009). 
 
 Australia’s Move from Direct PNG Budgetary Aid, to Individual Bilateral Project 8.4
Based Aid 1995-2000 
Direct budgetary support by Australia to the PNG Government Budget was in place 
from independence in 1975 to 1995, amounting to $300 mill per year on average 
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during this period.  With direct budgetary support, the PNG Government had total 
control over how those funds were expended. 
 
In 1995 Australia took the policy decision to move its development assistance from 
direct budgetary support to the PNG Government, to bilateral individual project based 
donor support.  These individual bilateral projects were managed by private 
contractors, not through the relevant PNG Government Departments, such as the PNG 
Department of Health.  
“AusAID is the biggest donor in the health sector.  Australia has provided 
general budgetary support of approximately $Aus300 million per year to the 
government of Papua New Guinea.  In a change of policy, budgetary support 
has been phased out in favour of project aid between 1995 and 2000.  Early in 
this transition, AusAID focused on hospital management and operations as well 
as providing assistance in the training of health professionals.  The Health 
Sector Support Program, which provides comprehensive assistance to NDOH 
and targets six provinces, came online in 1998-1999.  The Women and 
Children’s Health Project, designed to improve vaccination coverage and 
women and children’s health extension activities nationwide, began 
implementation in earnest during the same period” (Asian Development Bank 
2003). 
 
Despite this policy change the Australian Government guaranteed that development 
assistance funding to PNG would remain at $Aus300mill: 
“The change from direct budget support from the aid program to jointly 
programmed aid was completed in 1999. Australia’s aid program in PNG will be 
significantly more effective, transparent and accountable. A maximum 
indicative annual planning figure of $300 million nominal will be provided, 
subject to performance against benchmarks” (Downer 9th May 2000)  
 
This was a major policy shift and one that was not fully endorsed by the PNG 
government.  The projects were much more specific and the private contractors had 
full control of the funds.  It also meant the PNG Government now had to meet all of its 
recurrent budget costs.  This marked a major change in the relationship between PNG 
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and Australia and how donor assistance between the two countries was delivered and 
managed.   
Figure 4 – AusAID support to the Health Sector in PNG Major Activities 
 
Source: (Foster, Condon et al. 2009) 
 
As can be seen in Figure 4, Australia continued to provide major bilateral project 
health sector funding to PNG from 1998 to 2008 across those parts of the health sector 
that were essential to the provision of basic health services.  The Women’s and 
Children’s Health Project  (WCHP) ($Aus 48mill) provided funding for all key parts of 
Women and Children’s Health services in PNG from the national, provincial, down to 
the district level, with Australian technical assistance, training and supplies(Asian 
Development Bank 2003).  The Health System Strengthening Project  (HSSP) ($Aus131 
mill), was the largest single bilateral health project providing broad assistance to the 
National Department of Health, and also at the provincial and district levels for 
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management and technical support down to the procurement and delivery of drug kits 
for HCs and APs from 2001 onwards.  These drug kits made up for major deficiencies in 
the routine PNG drug supply system from the national level down.  The Medical 
Equipment Management Project (MEMP) ($22Aus mill) ran in parrallel with the HSSP, 
and provided basic essential medical equipment, along with training to maintain the 
equipment.  Implemented in parallel with the HSSP Project, the Pharmaceutical 
Upgrade Project (PUP) ($Aus45mill) provided long-term Technical Assistance to the 
MSB, AMS’ss and hospitals to address the major constraints with regard to drug 
purchases and distribution in PNG(Foster, Condon et al. 2009, Research Field Visit 
Notes May 2007).  The Medical Officers, Nurses and Allied Health-Workers Project 
MONAHP ($Aus 11mill) funded doctors, nurses, midwives and allied health 
professionals to undertake post graduate studies in PNG, Australia and the Asia- Pacific 
Region. The Tertiary Health Services Support Project (THS) ($Aus6mill) funded 
Australian Specialist Medical Teams to travel to PNG to provide Specialist Medical 
treatment such as plastic and heart surgery.  The PNG Insitute of Medical Research 
(PNGIMR) support program ($Aus11mill) provided a signifigant proportion of the 
research activities and recurrent budget of the PNGIMR.  The Central Public Health 
Laboratory Project (CPHLB) ($Aus8mill) funded a major renovation of the Central 
Public Health Laboratory in Port Moresby, as well as the training of staff to work in and 
manage the PHL.  The University of PNG Medical School Support Project (UPNGs MSSP) 
($Aus3mill) funded the provision of Australian Technical Support to the University of 
Papua New Guinea (UPNG) Medical School so that the Medical program could be 
taught.  The WHO technical support ($Aus3mill) provided funding to WHO to support 
technical assistance to PNG in the areas of Disease Surveillance, HIV and TB, and which 
funded the position of Dr Yadav, the WHO Stop TB Medical Officer, who provided 
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techincal assistance to the NDOH in developing the 2006 PNG TB DOTS policy.  The 
HIV/AIDS ($Aus16mill) was the major source of funding for HIV activities in PNG up 
until the successful 2004 Round 4 GFATM Grant for HIV/AIDS $US17.5mill (1st Sept 
2005 to 31st August 2010)(GFATM 2004).  
 
Australia, through AusAID, remained by far the largest development partner (DP) in 
PNG, and to the PNG health sector.  If PNG was to successfully fund a TB DOTS Policy, 
then AusAID was the logical and most likely source of both initial and ongoing funding.  
As such, AusAID’s approval and agreement to fund a PNG TB DOTS policy was 
essential. 
 
 The Asian Development Bank and the PNG Health Sector Wide Approach  8.5
The ADB was the second largest development partner (DP) to the PNG Health Sector, 
with several major rural health projects to build capacity in the rural health services in 
PNG dating from 1982:  
“Since 1982, ADB has supported a succession of relatively large scale projects.  
These have focused on establishing and extending rural health infrastructure 
(health centers, APs and staff housing) and rural water supply and the 
procurement of medical, transport, and radio communication equipment.  The 
most recent of these projects also addressed the maintenance and renovation 
of health infrastructure and pursued a program of institutional capacity 
building within NDOH and the PHOs”  (Asian Development Bank 2003). 
 
It was the ADB which proposed to the PNG Government and AusAID that a Health 
SWAp would be a more effective mechanism for delivering development assistance to 
PNG’s health sector(Asian Development Bank 2003).  
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A SWAp is meant to provide a single funding mechanism or account through which all 
donor assistance (aid) is channelled to implement agreed specific goals and targets, 
usually as set out in the National Health Plan for the Health Sector (Cassels and 
Janovsky 1998).  Health sector SWAps had gained considerable support as a 
mechanism for the delivery of development assistance throughout the 1980, 1990s 
into the 2000s (Sundewall and Sahlin-Andersson 2006).  A SWAp removes the 
significant administrative requirements of a large number of bilateral development 
projects – multiple accounts, multiple and varying bilateral project goals and targets, 
multiple external project review teams annually etc.(Hill 2002).  A SWAp is also meant 
to enable and ensure direct involvement by the National Department of Health in the 
implementation of health programs where bilateral projects often run in a semi-
parallel manner, separate from the Department of Health (Cassels and Janovsky 1998, 
Hill 2002, Sundewall and Sahlin-Andersson 2006, Chansa, Sundewall et al. 2008).  
 
In the year 2000, Australia’s policy on the provision of development assistance to PNG 
evolved further with the commencement of discussions with the PNG Government and 
the Asian Development Bank (ADB) on the formation of a PNG Health SWAp (Downer 
11th May 2004, Asian Development Bank 2003): 
“With the PNG Government taking the lead, there has been greater focus in the 
health sector on using a sector–wide approach to improve services. Since 1999, 
Australia has been funding the Health Sector Improvement Program. This 
program has … brought together the Government of PNG and all key donors, 
who have agreed to work towards a single set of priorities that they will 
collectively monitor. There is a stronger emphasis on working through 
mainstream PNG service delivery mechanisms and government systems, and 
using these systems where they are suitably accountable to manage donor 
funds. In addition, this approach is progressively integrating technical advisers 
into the PNG health system (rather than sitting outside government under the 
project model) and looking at ways to introduce incentives to encourage 
provincial and national governments to deliver health services more effectively” 
(Downer 11th May 2004). 
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With the agreement of AusAID and ADB, the two largest donors to the PNG Health 
Sector, and the Government of PNG, the HSIP  became the single SWAp account or 
fund through which these major donors to the PNG Health Sectors agreed to channel 
all their Development Assistance (Asian Development Bank 2003, Research Field Visit 
Notes May 2007, Research Field Notes November 2006), a process formally introduced 
by Australia in 2005-2006.   
 
What was important for the PNG Government and the PNG health sector was that 
despite this change in the mechanism by which donor funding would be available to 
the PNG health sector, i.e. through a health sector SWAp, the commitment by 
Australia to maintain its development assistance at about the $Aus300mill level was to 
continue.  (Downer 9th May 2006, Downer 10th May 2005, Kwa, Howes et al. 2010, 
Research Field Visit Notes May 2007, Research Field Notes November 2006). 
 
 The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB & Malaria (GFATM) and the PNG TB DOTS 8.6
Policy 
A more recent major international policy actor in the PNG TB DOTS Policy was the 
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria (GFATM).  It was the $US20m 2006 Round 6 
GFATM PNG TB DOTS Grant  (PNG CCM 2006) that funded the implementation of the 
PNG TB DOTS Policy.  Without this Round 6 GFATM Grant there would have been a TB 
DOTS Policy in PNG in name alone.   
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The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria (GFATM) was established in 2002 to 
mobilize funds to assist developing countries to achieve the specific MDG 6 targets to 
reduce the global burden of HIV, TB and Malaria by 2015: 
“The purpose of the Fund is to attract, manage, and disburse additional 
resources through a new public private partnership that will make a sustainable 
and significant contribution to the reduction of infections, illness, and death, 
thereby mitigating the impact caused by HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria in 
countries in need, and contributing to poverty reduction as part of the 
Millennium Development Goals”  (GFATM 2001) 
 
 
As can be seen from Table 9 it is also important to note that Guiding Principle A of the 
GFATM is that “it is a financial instrument, not an implementing entity.”   GFATM 
Guiding Principle C is that GFATM needed to “reflect national ownership and respect 
country-led formulation and implementation processes”.  GFATM Guiding Principle F 
states that GFATM grants needed to be based “on the most appropriate scientific and 
technical standards that take onto account locals’ realities and priorities”.  GFATM 
Guiding Principle H2 states that GFATM Grants “will support and reflect high level, 
sustained political involvement and commitment in making allocations of its resource”.  
GFATM Guiding Principle H3 states that GFATM funded Grants would “support the 
substantial scaling up and increased coverage of proven and effective interventions, 
which strengthen systems for working within the health sector, across government 
departments, and with communities”.    
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Table 9 – The Guiding Principles of the Global Fund 
 
Source: (GFATM 2001, Sherry, Mookherji et al. March 2009) 
 
In its first five years from 2002, which cover TB DOTS coming onto the policy agenda in 
PNG, the GFATM mobilized $US9.6billion globally for HIV, TB and Malaria programs in 
developing countries (Feachem and Sabot 2007).  The establishment of the GFATM in 
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2002, and the significant funds it made available for TB control, are important 
components of the policy window opening for the adoption of TB DOTS policy in PNG.  
Further, the GFATM was established when Australia was looking for mechanisms to 
continue to maintain $Aus300mill per annum of development assistance to PNG.  Once 
the capacity of the GFATM to successfully deliver development assistance to 
developing countries was established, the GFATM became another mechanism by 
which Australia could deliver development assistance to PNG. 
With Australian Policy moving from direct budgetary support to bilateral project 
specific support to deliver its aid to PNG, the establishment of the Global Fund in 2002 
provided a new mechanism for Australia to provide funds to PNG in order to maintain 
Australia’s funding levels at the $Aus300mill per annum level.  Further, the Global 
Fund governance structure, auditing and reporting requirements, which provided a 
high level of accountability, were attractive to AusAID: 
“International health facilities such as the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) will be important vehicles for Australian aid 
in the health sector. … The aid program will continue to support the Global Fund 
to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria through a contribution of $15 million. In 
2005-06, Australia brought forward an additional $2 million of its 2006 pledge 
to enable Round 5 grants to proceed, including grants to the Pacific region” 
(Downer 9th May 2006). 
 
Australia’s level of funding to the Global Fund increased further to $Aus45 mill in the 
2007 Australian Government Budget: 
“increased funding for the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
of 
up to $45 million in 2007-08” (Downer 8th May 2007). 
 
The founding of the Global Fund to fight AIDS, TB and Malaria (GFATM) in 2002 
provided a convenient mechanism for AusAID to provide funds to the PNG Health 
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Sector.  It was the combination of these events and policy decisions that meant 
significant levels of funding became available to PNG for HIV, TB and Malaria.  These 
events form an important part of the policy window opening for TB DOTS in PNG.  
 
 World Health Organization (WHO) and PNG TB Control 8.7
A further central international policy actor in the 2006 PNG TB DOTS Policy is the WHO. 
The first major contribution WHO made to TB control in PNG was the TB DOTS Policy 
(Kochi 1991).  The WHO TB DOTS Policy dates from the declaration of TB as a global 
emergency in 1993 and the subsequent development of the official TB DOTS Policy 
(Kochi 1994, WHO 1999, WHO).  In 1994 TB DOTS was framed as the policy solution to 
this Global Emergency(Ogden, Walt et al. 2003).  It was strongly advocated as the only 
evidence-based policy solution in the years up to its adoption as the official TB Policy in 
1994.  This occurred despite major reservations by researchers and practitioners that 
this would reduce funding for further research on new drugs and diagnostics for TB 
(Brown 1997, Ogden, Walt et al. 2003).  TB DOTS was and is the WHO Policy on TB 
Control in developing countries since the early 2000s(Blower and Daley 2002, WHO 
2006).  As such the Global Fund took TB DOTS as “the evidence-based approach” 
(GFATM 2001, Feachem and Sabot 2007) to TB Control.  As can be seen in Figure 5 TB 
DOTS received 100% of Global Fund funding for drug sensitive TB.  No other TB Control 
policy approach was being funded by the GFATM. 
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Figure 5 – GFATM Programmatic Results Achieved.  Percent of two year targets 
reached by Phase 2 Grants 
 
Source: (Feachem and Sabot 2007) 
 
That global policy then needs to be adapted to the country level taking into 
consideration the local context, but should not be adapted so as to make the policy 
implementable to the point where they are no longer going to be effective: 
“in the resource poor context I think having a global program setting the norms 
makes sense … the adaptation at the country level should try to adapt to the 
realities of the context of transport, communications and the level of education, 
health workers, all of those things, without losing the effectiveness of the 
intervention … On the other hand there is a limit, you can’t water down the 
guidelines to make them implementable into developing countries with poor 
resources to the point where they are no longer effective”  (Anonymous 4 - 
Interview 18th June 2008) 
 
The second major contribution WHO made to the development of the 2006 PNG TB 
DOTS policy was the technical assistance of a WHO Medical Officer Stop TB to provide 
technical expertise to the PNG National TB Control Program (NTP).  Dr Rajendra Yadav, 
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who was appointed to this position in 2004, became a major policy entrepreneur, on 
behalf of WHO and its global TB DOTS Policy, in the policy process resulting in TB DOTS 
coming onto the policy agenda in PNG as we will see in the next chapter.  
 
So whilst WHO did not bring a significant amount of funding to the 2006 PNG TB DOTS 
policy process it did bring a high level of credibility in global policy development and 
the provision of technical expertise.  This was attractive to international donors as well 
as resource poor governments such as PNG. 
 
 AusAID support to WHO for TB Control in PNG 8.8
In 2000 AusAID signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Western 
Pacific Regional Office (WPRO) of WHO to fund a position in the WHO Office in Port 
Moresby for a TB Medical Officer, supported by a Secretarial Assistant from 2001 to 
2005 (Aia, Yadav et al. 2006).  The MOU and associated funding for this TB Medical 
Officer with WHO in Port Moresby was renewed from 2006-2008 (Aia, Yadav et al. 
2006).  Dr Rajendra Yadav took up this position in 2004. 
 
In a World TB Day press release, the then Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign Affairs 
Mr Greg Hunt committed Australia to spending $Aus1.8m between 2001-2008 to 
support WHO TB initiatives in PNG(Greg Hunt - Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs 2007). 
 
The majority of this was to fund WHO staff positions to support the National TB 
Control Programme in PNG.  It was this funding through AusAID aid that paid for the 
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position of Dr Yadav.  The AusAID funding to the PNG TB control program from 2000 
up to 2006 was insufficient to cover a national roll out of a PNG TB DOTS Policy. 
 Australian Domestic TB Policy Problem- the Australian Torres Strait 8.9
TB has not been a major public health problem in Australia for many years, having 
been successfully controlled since the 1960s and 1970s, with only small numbers of TB 
cases in subpopulations such as migrants and Indigenous Australians (Li, Roche et al. 
2004, Simpson, Clark et al. 2006).  Australia’s increased interest in TB and TB control in 
PNG was influenced and shaped by an increase in TB cases in Papua New Guineans 
crossing the Torres Strait border to seek treatment in Australian Clinics in the Torres 
Strait. 
 
In 1999, Dr Graham Simpson, the Chest Physician in the TB Clinic at Cairns Base 
Hospital in far north Queensland, Australia, reported the first cases of TB in PNG 
citizens from the Western Province of PNG who had crossed the border for TB 
treatment in HCs in the Australian Torres Strait Islands (Simpson and Knight 1999).  
Cairns Base Hospital was and is the major referral centre for complicated medical 
conditions (including complicated TB and MDR-TB) for all of North Queensland, 
including the Torres Strait, and also conducted regular visits to HCs in the Torres Strait.  
In 2006, Dr Simpson reported an increase in the number of TB patients, as well as a 
change in the type and severity of TB in PNG patients presenting in the Torres Strait 
HCs (Simpson, Clark et al. 2006).  There was an increase in the number of TB cases 
from 7 in the period 1993-1997, to 44 in the period 1998-2002; MRD-TB cases 
increased from 1 to 3, whilst cases of TB with HIV co-infection increased from 0 to 2.   
“The most striking finding was the dramatic increase in (TB) cases in people 
from PNG.  The outer Australian Islands in the Torres Strait are only 3 kilometres 
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from the PNG coast, and there is free movement of people across the border 
under a treaty arrangement.” (Simpson, Clark et al. 2006) 
 
These data are routinely reported to the Australian National TB Advisory Committee, 
which is made up of representatives of the Australian Commonwealth Department of 
Health and Ageing, as well as all Australian State and Territory Departments of Health, 
whose responsibilities include monitoring and reporting changes in communicable 
diseases patterns, new disease outbreaks, and emerging threats in and to Australia, to 
the Australian Minister of Health and Government. Whilst these numbers are small by 
comparison with the burden of TB in PNG, they had a significant impact on total TB 
cases and TB incidence in Australia, given the low TB incidence in Australia otherwise.   
 
As a result, at the Political level in Australia, HIV and TB in PNG were being identified as 
a foreign policy issue or policy problem for Australia by 2006.  In the Australian 
Parliament during 2006, TB and HIV were both being discussed and referred to in 
speeches in the Australian Senate; the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade 
Legislation Committee Estimates meetings; and in direct questions on TB and HIV in 
PNG and Australia’s aid response.  (Senator Anne McEwen 14 June 2006, Senate of 
Australia Official Committee Hansard 2006, Senator Lyn Allison and Senator Helen 
Coonan 2006).  
 
These reports were subsequently taken up by the Australian media with headlines 
such as of “Papuans bringing diseases to North” of Australia (Parnell 11th June 2007). 
 
As well, published Queensland Department of Health surveillance data reported that 
between 2000 and 2006, of the 60 PNG TB patients crossing from the Western 
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Province of PNG to seek treatment in Australian Torres Strait Heath Centres, 15 had 
MDR-TB (Gilpin, Simpson et al. 2008), an increase in the proportion of TB patients with 
MDR-TB from  6.8% (1998 to 2002) to 25%.  Again this was taken up by the Australian 
media who dramatically reported a “Threat from PNG patient flood”(Parnell 1st March 
2008).  These media reports about TB in the Torres Strait of Australia followed reports 
in 2007 about HIV infections in male Australian tourists and workers returning from 
PNG (Elliot 2008).   
 
 AusAID support for TB Control in PNG 8.10
So, by 2006 the Australian policy with regard to TB control in PNG had become much 
more supportive.  By 2006 Australia not only agreed to fund WHO technical support, 
i.e. Dr Yadav, but also to support Dr Anastasios Konstantinos, Director of TB services 
for the state of Queensland as a consultant to assist in the preparation of the 2006 
GFATM PNG TB DOTS Round 6 Grant Application:  
“We (AusAID) also assisted acceptance by the Global Fund of a reformulated 
US$20.8 million grant proposal for tuberculosis control”(AusAID 2006) page 8 
 
 Conclusion  8.11
PNG was dependent on foreign aid to fund essential health services.  There was also 
low health policy capacity in PNG generally, and in the National Department of Health 
in particular, to develop PNG specific evidence based health policy.  This meant that 
aid donors, along with those international agencies with existing so called “evidence 
based” health policies, combined with advocacy skills, became and were significant 
policy actors in the health policy process in PNG.  Australia was a major policy actor in 
the PNG health sector by virtue of the size of its aid to the sector.  Further, Australia 
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had an emerging, or re-emerging, policy problem with an increase in TB cases crossing 
its common border with PNG in the Torres Strait of north Queensland.  WHO, whilst 
not a major aid donor, had a ready-made TB control policy, TB DOTS, and the ability to 
advocate for this policy using WHO policy entrepreneurs to provide policy solutions to 
TB as a policy problem.  Finally the Global Fund to fight AIDS, TB and Malaria (GFATM) 
emerged in the early 2000s with an ability to mobilize significant levels of funding to 
support AIDS, TB and Malaria projects in developing countries.  It emerged at a time 
when the largest bilateral aid donor to PNG, Australia, was looking for new funding 
mechanisms as its policy on aid delivery to PNG evolved.  These global and regional 
policy actors provide an important part of the regional and global policy context for us 
to now describe and critique the agenda setting process for the 2006 PNG TB DOTS 
policy at the PNG level in the next chapter. 
 
The policy agenda setting process for the 2006 PNG TB DOTS policy takes place at two 
levels – a global level, and a PNG level.  These are quite different and distinct 
processes.  The influence of the global policy actors – WHO, the Global Fund, and 
Australia in the agenda setting process far outweighs that of the NDOH and PNG 
political level policy process.  PNG is dependent on foreign aid to fund essential health 
services.  There is low capacity within the National Department of Health, as well as at 
the Provincial and District levels of government to formulate, fund or implement a PNG 
specific, evidence based health policy. 
 
The narrative about the 2006 PNG TB DOTS policy process as presented in the 2006 
PNG TB DOTS policy documents is one of a unitary process which takes place wholly 
within PNG.  This research demonstrates that this is not the case.  The PNG part of the 
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agenda setting process is truncated and cut off, as the key policy decisions are actually 
made at the global level. 
 
The three policy streams actually come together and a policy window opens at the 
global level that result in the 2006 PNG TB DOTS policy coming onto the PNG health 
policy agenda.  The events at the PNG level by which TB DOTS comes onto the policy 
agenda are secondary to and would not have occurred except for this global agenda 
setting process. 
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9 Agenda Setting, Policy Actors and Policy Process PNG TB DOTS Policy 
2004-2006 
 
 Introduction 9.1
The global agenda setting process for the 2006 PNG TB DOTS Policy involved three key 
international policy actors who brought the three policy streams together in 2006.  
Firstly, Australia had an emerging TB policy problem with Papua New Guinean TB 
patients crossing the Torres Strait border to seek treatment in Australian Clinics.  
Secondly, WHO had an “evidence based” policy solution, TB DOTS, which it was 
advocating as the policy solution to a global TB emergency.  Thirdly, the Global Fund, 
established in 2002, was successfully mobilising significant funds, including Australian 
funds, for TB control in developing countries.  It was the combination of these three 
policy actors, the events within these groups and organizations, and their positions of 
power in relation to health policy in PNG, which opened a policy window at the global 
level for TB DOTS to come onto the PNG Health policy agenda in 2006. 
 
However, from 1997 to 2006 TB was not a health policy priority for the PNG 
Government or National Department of Health.  The National Health Plan 2000-2010 
(GovPNG 2000) explicitly states that HIV and malaria are the health policy priorities.  
As such HIV and malaria were the main focus of international donor aid to the health 
sector for technical assistance and aid funding.   
 
Despite this from 2004 to 2006 TB control policy underwent an intensive and active 
agenda setting process that brought TB DOTS onto the health policy agenda by the end 
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of 2006, with TB being declared a “national emergency” by Sir Peter Barter, the 
Minister for Health and HIV.  
 
For analysis we continue to use the multiple streams policy agenda setting framework 
(Kingdon 2011)as applied in recent global agenda setting research(Walt and Gilson 
1994, Buse, Mays et al. 2006) which identifies three policy streams – the problem 
stream, the policy stream and the politics stream, which come together in a policy 
window for the policy to come onto the policy agenda.  It is the part of the agenda 
setting process which takes place within PNG from 2004-2006 which we analyse in this 
chapter.  We describe and critique how the global agenda setting process and the 
power exerted by global policy actors on PNG health policy brings TB DOTS onto the 
health policy agenda in 2006.   
 
 Policy Entrepreneurs in the PNG TB DOTS Policy agenda setting process 9.2
Central to this analysis is the role of three so called policy entrepreneurs.  Buse defines 
policy entrepreneurs as “key players who work to link particular policy “solutions” to 
particular problems and at the same time create the political opportunity for 
action”(Buse, Mays et al. 2006). 
 
In the 2006 TB DOTS agenda setting process the first policy entrepreneur was Dr Paul 
Aia, a Papua New Guinean medical graduate who had been the Communicable Disease 
Control Officer in Western Highlands Province and who in 2004 was promoted to the 
position of Director of the National TB Control Program in Port Moresby.  As such Dr 
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Aia had primary and line responsibility for all matters relating to TB Control Policy in 
PNG(Konstantinos - Interview 7th May 2008, Adepoybi - Interview 12th April 2008). 
 
The second was Dr Rajendra Yadav who was appointed WHO Country Medical Officer 
(Stop TB), PNG, in September 2004, and held this position until October 2009.  Dr 
Yadav came from the position of Consultant (Revised National TB Control Program) for 
WHO in India.  He worked on the Indian TB Control Program from October 1999 to July 
2004, acquiring extensive experience in implementing TB DOTS.  He was known as a 
hardworking and efficient manager.  Dr Yadav was the WHO Technical Adviser to Dr 
Aia(Konstantinos - Interview 7th May 2008, Adepoybi - Interview 12th April 2008).  
 
The third was Dr Anastasios Konstantinos, Director Queensland Health State TB 
Control Centre, who undertook a short term consultancy from January to February 
2006.  As Director of the Queensland TB Control Centre, Dr Konstantinos was 
responsible for the TB Control Services in Queensland, the Australian State that shares 
a common border with PNG, in the Torres Strait of north Queensland.  He was an 
expert in TB DOTS, overseeing its implementation in Queensland.  He also oversaw the 
treatment of those PNG Western Province TB patients who were crossing the 
Australian – PNG Torres Strait border to seek treatment in Queensland Department of 
Health Clinics.  So not only was he very much aware of the increasing numbers of PNG 
TB patients crossing the border, but also of the emergence of MDR-TB in these 
patients(Konstantinos - Interview 7th May 2008, Gilpin, Simpson et al. 2008).  
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Both Dr Yadav and Dr Konstantinos were employed with funds provided by Australia, 
either directly by AusAID in Dr Konstantinos case, or through WHO in Dr Yadav’s 
case(Konstantinos - Interview 7th May 2008). 
 
A close examination of these three actors, their relationship to each other, and their 
interactions with donor agencies, especially AusAID and the Global Fund, is central to 
understanding how TB DOTS came onto the policy agenda in PNG, and about the 
broader PNG TB DOTS policy process from 2004 to 2008. 
 
 The Problem Stream – TB in PNG 9.3
According to the multiple streams framework (Kingdon 2011) of the three independent 
policy making streams which flow through the policy system all at once, each with life 
of its own’ the problem stream is made up of the multiple policy problems confronting 
society and government from which one particular policy problem becomes of 
sufficient importance to  receive the attention of policy makers.  “Policy makers learn 
about problems through indicators, feedback from existing programmes, pressure 
groups, or sudden focusing events such as crises i.e. the perception of problems as 
public matters requiring government action.”(Buse, Mays et al. 2006).  We now deal 
with how TB was perceived and dealt with as a policy problem in the years leading up 
to 2006, how it moved from not being identified as a priority disease to become a so 
called Tier 1 health policy problem.  What was the process by which this major change 
happened, and who were the major actors in this process? 
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 TB NOT a Tier 1 Priority Disease in PNG 9.3.1
Applying the multiple streams framework, TB was not receiving attention as a health 
policy problem in the period leading up to 2006.  In the PNG National Health Plan 
2000-2010 (GovPNG 2000) HIV and malaria were identified as the two, so called Tier 1, 
priority disease control programs.  In the National Health Plan it notes that HIV 
incidence cases were increasing rapidly, and that malaria was the commonest 
presentation to health facilities in the period leading up to the development of the 
Plan.   As such HIV and malaria were the Tier 1 priority diseases for GovPNG recurrent 
funding and donor aid to the health sector.  As a Tier 2 disease TB did not receive any 
significant funding, i.e. only small amounts of GovPNG recurrent funding were 
allocated to TB, nor was it a priority for donor aid (Konstantinos - Interview 7th May 
2008, GovPNG 2000). 
 
 Successful PNG GFATM Grant Applications for Malaria (Round 3), and HIV/ADS 9.3.2
(Round 4)  
HIV and malaria were the two policy problems dominating the health policy problem 
stream and receiving political attention.  A 2003 $US20m Round 3 GFATM Grant 
Community-based Malaria Prevention and Control in Papua New Guinea - Nationwide 
Insecticide-treated Nets (ITN) Distribution and Expansion of Confirmed Diagnosis and 
appropriate treatment of Malaria (Aug 2004 to 31st July 2009) was approved(GFATM 
2004).  A 2004 $US17.5m Round 4 GFATM Grant Scaling up HIV/AIDS prevention, care 
and treatment through an intensified multi-sectorial community-based programme in 
Papua New Guinea (1st Sept 2005 to 31st August 2010) was also successful (GFATM 
2004).   
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Both the 2003 Malaria and 2004 HIV/AIDS GFATM Grants included a broad 
representative range of sub-recipients in the Grants.  The Malaria Grant Application 
included several private sector and NGO sub-recipients, most notably Rotary Against 
Malaria (RAM), who had a strong track record in implementing malaria bed net 
programs in other parts of the world(GFATM 2004).  Likewise, with the HIV Grant 
Application the principal recipient was the National Aids Council, which was based 
outside the National Department of Health, and was directly responsible to the Prime 
Minister’s Department.  This 2004 Round 4 HIV Grant application had also included 
Faith Based Organizations and NGOs who had strong track records over several years 
in carrying out HIV activities in PNG, especially in rural PNG where the majority of the 
PNG Population lives(GFATM 2004). 
 
 Rejection of 2005 Round 5 GFATM PNG TB DOTS Grant Application 9.3.3
Despite TB being a Tier 2 disease in 2005 the National Department of Health submitted 
a GFATM Round 5 Grant application for funding to implement a PNG country wide TB 
DOTS policy.  However, the 2005 Round 5 TB DOTS Proposal was rejected by the Global 
Fund.  The Global Fund’s reasons for this rejection included(Konstantinos - Interview 
7th May 2008, Adepoybi - Interview 12th April 2008, PNG CCM 2006):   
1. As TB was not a Tier 1 priority disease, and so not being given policy or funding 
priority by the PNG Government and NDOH, it was not a priority for donors i.e. 
TB was not on the policy agenda in PNG.  
2. There was a lack of capacity to deliver a TB DOTS Program within the National 
Department of Health (NDOH), and through the PNG National TB Control 
Program in particular.   
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3. There was no actual PNG TB Control Strategic Plan or Strategy in place in 2005 
that could be submitted as supporting evidence that the existing, though 
limited, TB DOTS pilot programs had been effective in the PNG context.   
4. The Round 5 Grant application did not include Grant recipients other than the 
National Department of Health (NDOH), and did not demonstrate a wide 
consultation with and inclusion of, other stakeholders involved in TB control in 
PNG.   
5. The application needed to include and be seen to carry out joint TB/HIV 
activities. 
 
The low priority of TB was further demonstrated in the 2005 Strategic Plan for the PNG 
Health Sector 2006-2008(Mann 2006), with four Strategic Directions for the NDOH in 
the period 2006-2008:   
1. Fully immunize every child under 1 year;   
2. Reduce malaria prevalence in districts with high endemic malaria;   
3. Reduce maternal mortality in the districts with high maternal deaths; and  
4. Reduce the rate of increase in HIV and STI.   
These priorities were based on outpatient attendances and the main causes of 
mortality in PNG health facilities.  This demonstrates that as late as 2005-2006, a 
national TB DOTS Policy was not one of the NDOH four strategic policy priorities.   
 
During his consultancy visit to PNG in January and February 2006, Dr Konstantinos 
confirmed that “TB wasn’t recognised as being in the first level of importance in the 
PNG government at the time … There was a Tier 1 and a Tier 2 (classification of priority 
diseases) and TB was in Tier 2, so it wasn’t in the highest level of importance … for the 
206 
national health program.  Because it wasn’t given a Tier 1 priority in the Health 
Department it wasn’t supported by AusAID in getting Global Funds.”(Konstantinos - 
Interview 7th May 2008)   
 
Both the Global Fund and AusAID would and could not fund a TB DOTS Program in PNG 
whilst it remained a lower disease control priority for the PNG Government and NDOH.  
International donors were directing all funding to the two Tier 1 diseases – HIV and 
malaria.  TB remained a Tier 2 Disease in PNG until mid-2006.  
 Lack of Capacity within NDOH and NTP to formulate and implement a TB DOTS Policy 9.3.4
A major factor for TB not being a Tier 1 disease in PNG was a poorly functioning 
National TB Control Program (NTP).  In January and February 2006, Dr Konstantinos 
found a circular argument in place in PNG, as well as amongst donor agencies.  “The 
big reason it (TB) wasn’t put into Tier 1 is because the (TB Control) program wasn’t 
functioning.  There was also this circular argument that we can’t put it into a Tier 1 
unless the (TB Control) program is functional, and that was the big 
reason.”(Konstantinos - Interview 7th May 2008)   
 
Dr Konstantinos found a lack of capacity and poor management within the NTP.  “Dr 
Aia is the actual Director of the TB program so he has to sign everything off in the end 
…   I got the impression that there was a marked lack of advocacy (leadership) in the TB 
program, it simply could be that Dr Aia just wasn’t a strong enough advocate or it could 
be that he didn’t have the system behind him, whatever the cause.  I think that when 
things went wrong it was sort of “what can I do.”(Konstantinos - Interview 7th May 
2008)   
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Only a few months before Dr Konstantinos’ findings, the PNG Health Sector (SWAp) 
Independent Monitoring and Review Group (IMRG) had also found and expressed a 
deep concern about the capacity of the PNG NTP.  “Tuberculosis control is poor in PNG. 
The DOTS programme started in 1997 currently covers only 64 health facilities in 15 
provinces.  Programme data are not timely, are incomplete and not very reliable.  
Overall NDOH’s TB Unit is weak and unfocused, which might be one of the reasons why 
GFATM is not yet supporting tuberculosis control activities in PNG.  NDOH needs to 
consolidate its current DOTS pilot provinces and make these work, BEFORE it attempts 
to expand to the whole country. The fear is that expanding a non-functioning model to 
the entire country will just be a waste of money” (Research Field Notes November 
2005) 
 
A lack of capacity within the NDOH to manage and acquit a Global Fund Grant was a 
further reason for the rejection of the Round 5 GFATM application.  “The government 
had originally applied to the Global Fund to get the money itself, but Global Fund said: 
“No, you don’t have the capacity to manage and acquit those funds … the Department 
of Health is not transparent, we won’t give you the money.” ”(Adepoybi - Interview 
12th April 2008)   
As has been noted the capacity to develop and implement Health Policy within the 
PNG government, and particularly in the NDOH was very limited.  In 2006 meetings of 
the NDOH Executive Committee, where final decisions about health policy should take 
place, were not being held.  There was poor communication between the NDOH 
Disease Control Branches and the Executive Branch.  Relationships based on the 
wantok system took precedence over other relationships, with a high level of nepotism 
in appointments.  Engagement with and by the Provincial and District levels in the 
208 
Policy Process was limited or non-existent.  These fundamental structural governance 
constraints to a TB DOTS policy were identified as being central to why TB was a major 
health problem. 
 
 Lack of a PNG TB Control Strategic Plan in 2005 9.3.5
Further, at the time of submitting the Round 5 GFATM Grant application, there was no 
written PNG TB Control Strategic Plan that demonstrated a strategic approach that 
would be taken to control TB in the next five years.  Also there had been no Situational 
Analysis, drawing on the pilot TB DOTS projects which had been underway in Lae and 
the National Capital District since 1997, in order to document that a TB DOTS Policy 
could be successfully implemented.  This lack of a clear and detailed strategic approach 
to TB control is clearly acknowledged in the 2006 Country Status Report of the National 
TB Program 1997-2005(Aia, Yadav et al. 2006), and Country Strategic Plan to Stop TB 
2006-2010(Aia, Yadav et al. 2006). 
 
 Need to include a broader group of Grant Recipients 9.3.6
In the Round 5 PNG TB DOTS GFATM Grant application the NDOH was the principal 
and sole recipient of the grant.  There were no community, NGO or private sector sub-
recipients to work with the NDOH in implementing a TB DOTS program throughout 
PNG (Aia, Yadav et al. 2006).  The GFATM Grant process clearly indicates the need for a 
multi-sectoral and community inclusive approach to implementing GFATM Grants as a 
requirement for GFATM applications as set out in the GFATM Guiding Principles 
(GFATM 2001). 
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The rejection of the 2005 Round 5 PNG TB DOTS application was itself an indication of 
the low level of leadership combined with a lack of understanding of the Global Fund 
requirements for Grant applications.   
 
 The Re-Framing of TB as a Policy Problem in PNG 9.3.7
The first step needed to get TB on the policy agenda in PNG was to re-frame TB as 
major health policy problem in PNG in order to convince the key actors at the politics 
level in PNG. 
 
When the Round 5 PNG TB DOTS GFATM Grant was unsuccessful, Dr Yadav took the 
lead in reframing TB as a policy problem in PNG (Konstantinos - Interview 7th May 
2008, Adepoybi - Interview 12th April 2008).  He recognized the need to address each 
of the reasons given for the rejection of the Round 5 PNG TB DOTS GFATM application.  
 
The Country Status Report of National TB Control Papua New Guinea 1997-2005 (Aia, 
Yadav et al. 2006) was developed following the Global Fund rejection as the statement 
of TB in PNG as a health policy problem demanding a policy response.  A 31 page 
document, the Country Status Report provides a clear statement of the very high 
burden of TB in PNG, with PNG having the third highest incidence, prevalence and 
mortality rates from TB in the WHO Western Pacific Region.  “According to the WHO’s 
estimates (2004), among the 36 countries and areas of the Western Pacific Region of 
the WHO, Papua New Guinea (PNG) ranks third in terms of estimated incidence, 
prevalence and death rates (233/100,000 per year, 448/100,000 and 42/100,000 per 
year, respectively).” (Aia, Yadav et al. 2006) 
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Further, it is important to note that the Report also places the high burden of TB in 
PNG as a regional health policy problem justifying a policy response and funding from 
regional neighbours, and that addressing TB in PNG has a regional benefit. 
 
 The Success of Pilot TB DOTS in Lae & National Capital Districts 9.3.8
The Report then goes further to assemble evidence suggesting that TB DOTS had, in 
the period from 1997 to 2005, been successfully implemented in the National Capital 
District and Lae District, quoting cure rates of up to 88%(Aia, Yadav et al. 2006).  It was 
a statement that TB DOTS could be successfully delivered in PNG, thus providing an 
evidence-based policy solution to TB as a policy problem. 
 
 Existing Constraints to a TB DOTS Policy can be overcome 9.3.9
The Country Status Report acknowledges the quality of TB DOTS pilot projects in Lae 
and National Capital District had been poor.  
However, the Status Report conveys that existing constraints in the PNG Health System 
could be overcome with sufficient staff and funding.  “The quality of DOTS 
implementation has generally been poor in most of the districts, partly due to lack of 
adequate funding and staffing (leading to poor supervision and training) and partly due 
to poor geographical accessibility, exorbitant cost of travel and poor communication 
networks.”(Aia, Yadav et al. 2006) 
 
 Leadership of the PNG National TB Control Unit (Program) 9.3.10
The Country Status Report also attempted to convey that despite the concerns raised 
there was effective leadership in the NTP capable of delivering a National TB DOTS 
Program.  “Over the past 7-8 years (1997-2005), the NTP Unit (National T B Program 
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Unit) has introduced the DOTS strategy in several provinces of the country, by 
conducting a series of provincial level training. As a result, health facilities from 38 
districts (out of the 87 districts of the country) had started reporting under DOTS, until 
2005. The population coverage with DOTS was about 47%, based on quarterly reports 
received.”(Aia, Yadav et al. 2006) 
 Authorship of the Country Status Report of National TB Control PNG 9.3.11
The authors of the Country Status Report are Dr Paul Aia, NTP Manager, NDOH, Dr 
Rajendra Yadav, Medical Officer, TB, WHO-PNG, and Dr Anastasios Konstantinos.  It 
was crucial that Dr Paul Aia was the first author, so that at the politics level in PNG, the 
PNG Director of the National TB Control Program is seen to be articulating TB as a 
major health problem.  It was also important that Dr Konstantinos, who has credibility 
with AusAID on TB control policy, was also included as an author and supports the 
document as the statement of TB as a policy problem, to ensure AusAID and thus the 
Global Fund, accept the Country Status Report as a true representation of the policy 
problem.  
 
In summary the Country Status Report presents TB in PNG as a major health problem 
that must be addressed.  The Status Report presents this as a problem that the 
National TB Control Program in the National Department of Health has the capacity, 
with sufficient funding and human resources, to address with a national TB DOTS 
Policy.  It was a clear statement of the policy problem as well as pointing to TB DOTS as 
a viable policy response or solution. 
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 What the PNG Country Status Report National TB Program PNG 1997-2005 Doesn’t 9.3.12
Deal With - Omissions  
The Country Status Report presents TB as a major health problem.  However, the 
policy problem was not simply a high burden of TB.  Central to the policy problem were 
the governance, lack of political leadership and health system challenges faced in 
health service provision in PNG that were major factors in a high burden of TB.   
 
These major structural governance policy problems will not be addressed by simply 
providing more donor human and financial resources. 
 
The fact was that by 2005 the PNG Health System had been declining, and was 
continuing to do so significantly; over 40% of APs, the backbone of the PHC System had 
closed.  APs were the obvious means of undertaking DOT, a central component of TB 
DOTS.  Drug supply was irregular and inconsistent.  Due to the Organic Laws there was 
no accountability, in fact a disconnection, between the NDOH and the Provincial and 
District Health Services.  There was a lack of political commitment and leadership at 
the National, Provincial and District levels to address these fundamental structural 
constraints.  There was low level of leadership capacity in the National Department of 
Health, within the National TB Control Program, and down to the Provincial and 
District Health Service levels.  Underlying the problem was the wantok system of 
patronage and nepotism in appointments at the political and health system levels 
resulting in institutionalized incompetent leadership and management capacity and 
corruption.  These were actually central and key components of the TB problem.  If TB 
was to be addressed to ensure sustained reductions in TB prevalence and incidence 
these structural governance constraints must be identified as central to the policy 
problem and addressed in any policy response.  
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 Dr Anastasios Konstantinos - Key Findings about the PNG Health System 9.3.13
Dr Anastasios Konstantinos, The Director of the Queensland TB Control Centre, was 
engaged as a consultant by AusAID to assist the NTP to review and report on the status 
of PNG’s current TB control program,  i.e. the Country Status Report of the PNG 
National TB Program 1997-2005 (Aia, Yadav et al. 2006), as well as to contribute to 
writing a strategic plan for TB control in PNG, namely the Country Strategic Plan to 
Stop TB 2006-2010 (Aia, Yadav et al. 2006).  He visited PNG from 23 Jan 2006 to 3 Feb 
2006. 
 
During the interview with Dr Konstantinos for this research, it was apparent at he was 
aware of the fundamental governance, cultural institutions and major health system 
constraints to health policy formulation and implementation in PNG. 
 
Dr Konstantinos found that the TB Control Program was not functioning because of the 
entrenched cultural institutions and governance structures in PNG – wantokism with 
patronage and nepotism.  “There are a lot of issues in PNG  ...  -The wrong people seem 
to be promoted in PNG.  And you have this whole Wantok system in PNG where people 
have their allegiances to their villages rather than national strategy, they are all things 
that make it a little bit complex, but at the end of the day the TB program was defeated 
by the system”(Konstantinos - Interview 7th May 2008). 
 
Dr Konstantinos found that governance and accountability for funds at the Provincial 
level was very weak.  “There are a lot of issues in PNG - you have the issues on how the 
money is fed down to the provinces, at the national level they do have (TB) strategies, 
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but the funding goes to provinces in block, they don’t get funding specifically for the TB 
program for instance” (Konstantinos - Interview 7th May 2008). 
He also identified the need for strong and determined leadership and political 
commitment to overcome these major cultural institutions and governance 
constraints.  “The thing is with political commitment, you almost need to be bloody 
minded I think.  You need to keep driving home the message, you need to drive home to 
the provinces they should be spending their money on TB and sometime it seems like 
you are bashing your head against a brick wall. As far as I could see, the national TB 
program in PNG had been defeated by that whole process”(Konstantinos - Interview 
7th May 2008). 
 
Dr Konstantinos found that at the periphery there were dedicated health workers.  
“The thing I noticed in PNG is you have a very dedicated peripheral group of workers 
when you go to the peripheral communities and they all see TB as one of their major 
priorities, they are very dedicated but they quickly become demoralised because 
somewhere in the middle it (support, medications, funding) seems to all 
dissipate.”(Konstantinos - Interview 7th May 2008).   
 
Another central finding by Dr Konstantinos was the lack of a basic functioning Primary 
Health System.  “You need  ... a good Primary Health Care system.  And I think that’s a 
fundamental thing that is lacking in PNG, I think people undervalue how important it is 
to have a good primary health care system where people have access to care and 
where people start to have some positives from attending a health care system so that 
they have more faith in it.” (Konstantinos - Interview 7th May 2008) 
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There is no point in creating awareness of the symptoms of TB within the community 
when the community does not actually have a health system to which they could 
present when they have symptoms.  In Western Province he found “there are few HCs 
and APs, they are very poorly manned and their upkeep is poor.  It’s very hard to sell a 
health message where you are wanting to diagnose people with infectious TB when 
there is no Health Centre for those people to access and there is no diagnosis …  the 
whole issue is they have got nowhere to present.”(Konstantinos - Interview 7th May 
2008)   
He saw a TB DOTS Program, if done well, could help deliver this PHC system.  “I really 
tried to push hard the message of the importance of TB control in PNG, both from the 
effect on disease, but also as a mechanism of introducing a primary health care 
structure in the country, if you do it well.”(Konstantinos - Interview 7th May 2008) 
 
However, these significant constraints identified by Dr Konstantinos are not addressed 
in detail in the Country Status Report as being the fundamental policy problem in the 
provision of a TB control program.  This was because Dr Konstantinos himself was 
drawn between presenting his observations and following Dr Yadav’s instructions.  “Dr 
Yadav wanted the picture painted very positive”. (Konstantinos - Interview 7th May 
2008) 
 
 AusAID Knowledge of the PNG Health System 9.3.14
In Dr Konstantinos’s eyes, AusAID lacked an understanding that a TB DOTS program 
needs an effective health system to deliver a TB DOTS Program.  AusAID advocated for 
raising community awareness about TB and its symptoms, and the need to present to a 
HC or AP with the symptoms of TB.  However, “that was one of the things that I struck 
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in PNG with … the funders of the aid programs there, I even got this impression from 
AusAID, it was an impression that you should be doing more to make people aware of 
the symptoms of TB so that they can present, but the whole issue is they have got 
nowhere to present, and they’ve got no treatment.”(Konstantinos - Interview 7th May 
2008) 
 
He found a lack of awareness in AusAID of the lack of a basic PHC system in PNG.  
“While I was there I did a lot of emailing back and forth to AusAID and I tried to redirect 
the way they support the TB program.  I was critical of their focusing on education 
programs to make people present earlier for TB treatment when there was nothing for 
them to present to.  I argued strongly that it’s important to develop a DOTS program in 
PNG because you need to develop a primary health care system anyhow.” 
(Konstantinos - Interview 7th May 2008) 
 
In summary the Country Status Report frames TB as being a major health policy 
problem demanding attention at the political level.  It does makes reference to the 
major structural governance constraints, which have been fundamental to PNG having 
an extremely weak health system with poor health outcomes, including a high burden 
of TB, resulting in limited capacity to deliver a national TB DOTS policy.  The Country 
Status Report does not deal with these fundamental constraints for a national TB DOTS 
policy, but rather implies that these fundamental constraints can be overcome simply 
with sufficient funding and human resources.  Further there was a seeming lack of 
understanding of the actual state of the health system, and the need for a well-
functioning health system to deliver a TB program on the part of the major aid donor. 
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 The Policy Stream – Solution to the Policy Problem of TB in PNG 9.4
We next examine how TB DOTS became the policy solution to the now identified 
problem of a high burden of TB in the Status Report.  When applying the Multiple 
Streams Framework analysis of agenda setting the policy stream consists of “the 
ongoing analyses of problems and their solutions together with the debates 
surrounding their proposed solutions.”(Buse, Mays et al. 2006).  We now examine how, 
from the different TB control policy options TB DOTS became the preferred policy 
approach in PNG in 2006.  We will see that rather than this being the policy approach 
which had the greatest evidence of successful implementation in the PNG context, it 
was more the background and expertise in TB DOTS of two central policy 
entrepreneurs, and the power of the international groups they represented in the 
policy process which lead to this outcome.  We describe and critique the role of the 
key policy entrepreneurs in the 2006 TB DOTS agenda setting process.   
 
The Country Strategic Plan to Stop TB Papua New Guinea 2006-2010 (Aia, Yadav et al. 
2006) was the statement of TB DOTS as the policy response and solution to the high 
burden of TB identified in the Country Status Report.  A 55 page document, the 
Country Strategic Plan provides a detailed outline of the process which took place in 
PNG in 2005 and 2006 resulting in TB DOTS becoming a Tier 1 disease and moving onto 
the policy agenda.  It also outlines in detail the content of the national TB DOTS policy 
with specific goals and objectives.  Further, it also provides details of the funds 
required, and the inability of the PNG government recurrent budget to fund a national 
policy rollout. 
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 Actors, Policy Entrepreneurs and the TB DOTS Policy Process 9.4.1
The relationship between Dr Paul Aia, the Director of the National TB Control Program, 
and Dr Rajendra Yadav, World Health Organization Country Medical Officer (Stop TB) 
PNG, as a WHO Technical Adviser, was crucial in the development of the Country 
Strategic Plan.   
 
As Director of the NTP it was Dr Aia on whom Sir Peter Barter, the then Minister for 
Health and HIV, would rely for advice on TB control policy.  Without Dr Aia’s approval, 
development of a TB DOTS policy could not take place.  However Dr Aia depended on 
Dr Yadav for technical expertise.  “Dr Aia is the actual Director of the TB Program, so he 
has to sign everything off in the end.  I think that in principle you will find that he relies 
heavily on the support work done by Dr Yadav for him to sign off on things.” 
(Konstantinos - Interview 7th May 2008).  Also “(Dr Yadav’s’) technical advice, I think 
it’s of a high standard.  And I don’t like to imagine how the (PNG TB Control) program 
would be without the WHO technical component.” (Adepoybi - Interview 12th April 
2008) 
 
It is apparent from this research that the person who actually drove the policy process, 
and developed and wrote the Strategic Plan, was Dr Yadav.  “He (Dr Yadav) took the 
lead, essentially I went up and we discussed the National Plan, what was needed, I 
produced a report for AusAID and that report was also used, he also sourced that 
report for input into his National Plan, I think I would have to give him credit for being 
the main person who developed that Plan and I gave him some support of some 
consultation.”(Konstantinos - Interview 7th May 2008).  Also “that consists at the 
national level Dr Yadav doing everything, by providing all the Policy (directions) even 
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the Strategic Plan (PNG Country Strategic Plan to Stop TB 2006-2010).  There are a lot 
of people’s names down on that but I know it was Dr Yadav that did it.” (Adepoybi - 
Interview 12th April 2008)  
 
However, as a Technical Adviser Dr Yadav had to take a much nuanced approach to 
achieving the goal of getting TB DOTS onto the policy agenda generally, but especially 
with Dr Aia.  “I think the difficulty with Dr Yadav is that he can’t be seen to be the one 
who is in charge, in fact if he is seen to be the one in charge it will make his work a lot 
harder, he will be slapped over the wrists for interfering, so I think it’s a very difficult 
role he’s playing, so his way around it is to humour the current management, as much 
as possible, so they will sign off on the things that are needed.” (Konstantinos - 
Interview 7th May 2008) 
 
It was Dr Yadav who recognized that each of the issues that had resulted in the 
rejection of the 2005 Global Fund PNG TB DOTS grant application needed to be 
addressed to maximize the chances of success with a subsequent application 
(Konstantinos - Interview 7th May 2008, Adepoybi - Interview 12th April 2008).  This 
meant: 
1. TB needed to become a Tier 1 disease for the National Department of Health 
and Government of PNG if a future Global Fund Grant application was to be 
successful.  To this end Dr Yadav’s relationship with Dr Paul Aia was crucial in 
establishing within the PNG politics stream that TB was indeed a major health 
policy problem. 
2. A TB policy needed to demonstrate leadership and capacity within the NTP to 
implement a national TB policy. 
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3. There was a need to document that a broad based stakeholder consultation for 
developing a TB DOTS policy had taken place, and also that stakeholders were 
part of a future Global Fund Grant application. 
4. The policy needed to include and be seen to carry out joint TB/HIV activities. 
5. There needed to be engagement with, and endorsement by, the key 
international policy actors in a TB DOTS policy, if a further future Global Fund 
application was to be successful. 
The Country Status Report was written so as to address each of these issues. 
 Broad Stakeholder Engagement 9.4.2
The Foreword to The Country Strategic Plan to Stop TB 2006-2010 describes the 
genesis of a PNG TB DOTS Policy as arising from  a “a prolonged consultative process 
(which began in February 2005), involving major program partners as well as officers 
from the national and provincial governments”(Aia, Yadav et al. 2006).  The Strategic 
Plan makes no reference to the global actors and policy process which had been taking 
place at the global level and which had influenced and led to the PNG country level TB 
DOTS policy process. 
 
The unsuccessful Round 5 Global Fund application had only the National Department 
of Health as the principal and sole recipient.  If a further Global Fund Grant application 
was to be successful a new application needed to demonstrate engagement with, and 
ownership of, a PNG TB DOTS policy process by a much broader range of stakeholders. 
 
The successful malaria and HIV Global Fund applications had included co-recipients 
credible to AusAID and the Global Fund.  The 2003 $US20m Round 3 GFATM Grant for 
Community-based Malaria Prevention and Control in Papua New Guinea - Nationwide 
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Insecticide-treated Nets (ITN) Distribution and Expansion of Confirmed Diagnosis and 
appropriate treatment of Malaria (Aug 2004 to 31st July 2009)(GFATM 2004) included 
as co-recipients Rotary Against Malaria (RAM) and the PNG Churches Health Services, 
representing the various Faith Based Organisations, which provide the majority of 
Health Services in rural and remote PNG.  The $US17.5m 2004 Round 4 GFATM Grant 
for HIV/AIDS -Scaling up HIV/AIDS prevention, care and treatment through an 
intensified multi-sectorial community based programme in Papua New Guinea  (1st 
Sept 2005 to 31st August 2010) (GFATM 2004)  included the National Aids Council 
(NAC), which was outside the National Department of Health, as well as the Faith 
Based Organizations, as co-recipients. 
In order to now demonstrate a similar broad stakeholder engagement in and support 
for a national TB DOTS policy, the Country Strategic Plan outlines four Stakeholder 
Meetings between February 2005 and August 2006.  It was crucial that the NTP was 
seen to convene and coordinate these meetings in order to demonstrate and convey 
that the NTP had the capacity to formulate and implement a national TB control policy.  
 
According to the Strategic Plan the TB DOTS policy process commenced with the first 
of these meetings the TB Control Program Partners Meeting on 11th February 2005  All 
groups involved with or potentially involved with a TB DOTS Policy in PNG were 
carefully documented as being in attendance at these meetings.  The Strategic Plan 
refers to these groups as “Program Partners” from Government (NTP Unit, Disease 
Control Branch; TB Clinic, Port Moresby General Hospital; National AIDS Council 
Secretariat; PHO, National Capital District; HSIP (SWAp)); International Agencies (WHO 
and AusAID); NGOs (World Vision, Hope Worldwide, PNG National Doctors’ 
Association); and Faith Based Organizations (National Churches Council) (Aia, Yadav et 
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al. 2006).  The Strategic Plan needed to establish that the TB DOTS policy came from 
the representatives of these bodies and was a consensus policy approach to TB 
control. 
 
The next step in the process was to document engagement with, and agreement by, 
NDOH branches key to TB control.  So the second National Department of Health Intra- 
and Inter-Branch Meetings 15-22 March 2005 were a series of meetings held within 
the NDOH with the following units/branches - National TB Program Unit; Disease 
Control Branch; HIV/AIDS Unit; Health Promotion Branch; Central Public Health 
Laboratory; Monitoring and Research Branch; MSB; Human Resource Management 
Branch; Health Sector SWAp Program; and Health Budget Branch; and also National 
AIDS Council Secretariat (Aia, Yadav et al. 2006).  The Strategic Plan documented the 
support of the technical groups within NDOH for a national TB DOTS policy. 
 
The third National TB Review Meeting and Workshop 21-23 March 2005 next brought 
all stakeholders together to form a consensus agreement on the Strategic Plan.  Again 
all central stakeholders in TB control were present:  Representatives from 19 out of 20 
provinces in PNG; with representatives from government (Disease Control Branch; 
NDOH HIV/AIDS Unit; Health Promotion Branch; TB Clinic, Port Moresby General 
Hospital; National AIDS Council Secretariat ; UPNG School of Medical and Health 
Sciences); NGOs (World Vision; Hope Worldwide; National Doctors’ Association; 
International Agencies (AusAID) (Aia, Yadav et al. 2006).  It was emphasized, in italics 
that representatives of 19 of the 20 PNG provinces were present.  This was an 
acknowledgement that the final decision about adopting and implementing a national 
TB DOTS policy rests with the provincial governments. 
223 
Inclusion of HIV/AIDS Collaborative Activities 
The fourth meeting to discuss and formulate a Draft Country Policy for Collaborative 
TB/HIV Activities, held 10-11 August 2006 was nearly eighteen months after the three 
initial meetings.  By 2006, WHO, in its new Global Plan to Stop TB 2006-2010 actions 
for Life – Towards a World Free of Tuberculosis (Stop TB Partnership and World Health 
Organization 2006), was emphasizing the importance of addressing HIV and TB in the 
one program, not as separate programs.  As a result, by 2006, the GFATM was viewing 
favourably TB DOTS Grant applications that included at least a reference to 
collaborative TB/HIV activities (Feachem and Sabot 2007).  This workshop was 
attended by stakeholders engaged in HIV and/or TB control with representatives from 
government (NTP, Disease Control Branch, TB Clinic, Port Moresby General Hospital, 
PHO, Eastern Highlands, Alotau General Hospital, Milne Bay Province, Angau General 
Hospital, Morobe Province, National AIDS Council Secretariat); international agencies 
(WHO, UNDP, UNAIDS, AusAID); and NGOs (Hope Worldwide, Anglicare, Family Health 
International (Aia, Yadav et al. 2006).  Also it is important that Dr Fabien Ndenzako, 
Medical Officer HIV, WHO PNG, was included as a co-author of the Strategic Plan  to 
flag that HIV was an important component of the Strategic Plan (Aia, Yadav et al. 
2006). 
 AusAID Engagement with the TB DOTS Policy Process  9.4.3
Dr Yadav recognized the need to have AusAID agree, as the major donor to the health 
sector, to support a TB DOTS policy before the Global Fund would fund one.  AusAID 
was invited to, and was the only donor present, at all of these meetings.  We have 
seen that AusAID and the Global Fund had commenced working together to support 
HIV, malaria and TB programs in the Asia Pacific region (Downer 9th May 2006, 
Downer 10th May 2005).  Dr Yadav recognized that there were concerns within AusAID 
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regarding funding the weak TB Program in PNG, and that someone who carried weight 
with AusAID was needed to convince AusAID that investing in TB DOTS in PNG would 
lead to beneficial outcomes both in PNG and in the Torres Strait Islands of Australia.  
That person was Dr Anastasios Konstantinos, the Director of the Queensland TB 
Services.  “It was Dr Yadav who pushed to have an AusAID consultant come up there, 
and I think there was some resistance in the (PNG) TB program to having an AusAID 
consultant involved.  There was no real impression in the TB service, that I got, that 
AusAID was very supportive.” (Konstantinos - Interview 7th May 2008) 
 
Dr Konstantinos had no doubt about his own role, which was to produce a report to 
AusAID that would make a national TB DOTS policy acceptable to AusAID.  He also had 
not doubt Dr Yadav was instrumental to, and the leader in the policy process for 
developing the TB DOTS policy(Konstantinos - Interview 7th May 2008). 
 
 Authorship of the Country Strategic Plan to Stop TB 2006-2010 9.4.4
The authors of the Country Strategic Plan are Dr Paul Aia, NTP Manager, NDOH, Dr 
Rajendra Yadav, Medical Officer, TB, WHO-PNG, Dr Anastasios Konstantinos, Director 
Queensland Control Centre, and Dr Fabian Ndenzako (MO-HIV/AIDA, WHO-PNG). 
 
Whilst the process of developing the Strategic Plan was driven by Dr Yadav it was 
crucial that Dr Paul Aia was the first author.  At the politics level in PNG, the Director of 
the National TB Control Program must be seen to be articulating TB as a policy 
problem, as well as being the person managing and directing this policy response 
process.  It was also crucial that Dr Konstantinos, who had credibility with AusAID on 
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TB control policy, was included as an author and supported the Strategic Plan as the 
policy solution, to ensure AusAID and thus the Global Fund acceptance.   
 
 Provincial Governments and the the Country Strategic Plan to Stop TB 2006-2010  9.4.5
The Provincial Governments’ role within the policy process is also central.  The 
introduction to the Strategic Plan states that the “the provincial governments can use 
this national plan to design their own province-specific strategic plans.” (Aia, Yadav et 
al. 2006) 
 
At Meeting 3 - National TB Review Meeting and Workshop, which was held by the NTP 
Unit on 21-23 March 2005, it is emphasized  that “Representatives from 19 out of 20 
provinces in PNG” (Aia, Yadav et al. 2006) attended the Meeting.  However, the 
Strategic Plan fails to deal with the limitations of PNG’s governance structure. The 
Provinces were not compelled to develop a Provincial Plan, nor are they required to 
actually participate in any way in the implementation of a Country Strategic Plan.  All 
their health funding is received in a block grant from the National Treasury and can be 
expended on whatever the Provincial Government decides are its priorities.  A national 
TB DOTS policy did not mean any of the Provincial Governments were compelled to 
spend these moneys on TB Control.   
This significant limitation on implementation was not identified in the Status Report.  
The Strategic Plan also did not address these fundamental structural governance 
constraints. 
 
As we have also already shown in detail, there is very limited capacity to develop 
health policy, even if there were a willingness to develop and implement a provincial 
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TB control policy.  Further, there is little political commitment at the Provincial level to 
fund a health policy dealing with any major disease, should one be developed.  There is 
no mechanism outlined in the Strategic Plan to overcome these fundamental 
governance constraints to implementing the Plan. 
 Consideration of Alternative TB Control Policies 9.4.6
In the process of developing the Strategic Plan and also in the interviews for this 
research there is no consideration of alternative TB control policy approaches other 
than TB DOTS.  The process was driven by a TB DOTS Technical Adviser, employed by 
WHO which was strongly advocating for TB DOTS.  This policy approach was in turn 
endorsed by the AusAID consultant who had extensive experience in TB DOTS in 
northern Australia.  Given this, alternative policy approaches to TB control and 
whether alternative approaches may or may not be relevant to the PNG context were 
not considered.  This decision had already been made at the international level as we 
have examined in detail in the previous chapter.  The policy actors and the policy 
process in that decision were at the international level – WHO, AusAID and Global 
Fund.  
 
 The PNG Stop TB / TB DOTS Policy - Content 9.4.7
The PNG Country Strategic Plan outlines the content and goal, objectives and targets of 
the policy framework for TB control in PNG from 2006-2010.   
 
Of the four components of the framework TB DOTS was the first and central 
component.  The DOTS target was to detect 70% of smear positive TB cases; to achieve 
at least an 85% cure rate in those cases; and to achieve at least 80% population 
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coverage with the TB DOTS Program, the so called 70/85/80 target, in the period from 
2006 to 2010. (See Figure 6) 
 
The other three components of the Country Strategic Plan to Stop TB 2006-2010 were:   
2.  Responding to MDR-TB and TB-HIV.   
3.  Conducting a Drug Resistance Survey (DRS), and   
4.  Implementing TB-HIV collaborative activities.  
 
It states “The Country Strategic Plan to Stop TB for 2006–2010 is ambitious but 
realistic. It is backed by sound analysis of the strategies, actions and resources needed 
over the next 5 years.” (Aia, Yadav et al. 2006).  There is no detail of the “sound 
analysis” on which the goals and targets are based.   
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Figure 6 – Framework of the Country Strategic Plan to Stop TB for PNG (2006-2010) 
Note: Unless indicated, all targets are set for 2010 
Source: Country Strategic Plan to Stop TB for Papua New Guinea (2006-2010) (Aia, Yadav et al. 2006) 
page 20  
 
In fact the PNG Country Strategic Plan to Stop TB 2006-2010 is based directly on and 
follows exactly the WHO Global Plan to Stop TB 2006-2015 – Actions for Life - Towards 
a World Free of Tuberculosis (see Figures 6 and 7) (Raviglione and Uplekar 2006, Stop 
TB Partnership and World Health Organization 2006).  This Global Plan had at its core 
the 5 Components of Direct Observation, Short Course (DOTS).  However, drawing on 
new International Standards for Tuberculosis Care (Tuberculosis Coalition for Technical 
Assistance 2006), and newly released WHO Guidelines for the Programmatic 
Management of Drug-Resistant Tuberculosis (WHO 2006), the WHO Global Plan also 
now included TB control activities that addressed multi-drug resistant TB, as well as 
strategies for delivering collaborative TB-HIV Services.   
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 Health Systems Strengthening 9.4.8
The Global Plan also emphasized the importance of Health Systems Strengthening.  It 
stated that TB control policy is to “Contribute to Health System Strengthening (by) 
actively participating in efforts to improve system-wide policy, human resources, 
financing, management, service delivery, and information Systems.” (Raviglione and 
Uplekar 2006).  It spells out that without strong and effective health systems, TB DOTS 
programs cannot be delivered and sustained (Stop TB Partnership and World Health 
Organization 2006). 
 
The new Global Plan emphasized the importance of engaging and empowering people 
who have TB, and the communities they live in, as well as all care providers, 
government and non-government, in TB Control in developing countries.  With the 
broadening of the previous WHO policy for TB control in developing countries to 
include MDR-TB, HIV/TB collaborative activities, health systems strengthening, and 
broader community engagement, the Global Plan became known as the “DOTS-Plus 
Strategy”.   
230 
 
 
231 
 
Figure 7 – Global Plan to Stop TB 2006-2015  
Source:  (Raviglione and Uplekar 2006) 
 
Each Component in the Global Strategic Plan, with the exception of DOTS Component 
1 - Political commitment with increased and sustained financing, had specific target 
indicators (see Figure 7).  The PNG Strategic Plan did not provide any detail on the 
process by which the Global Plan was adapted, or on how the "measureable targets” 
were determined so they could be achieved in the period 2006-2010(Aia, Yadav et al. 
2006)  (See Figure 6).  It does not provide details as to how each component could be 
achieved in the complex geographical, cultural, social, and political, governance and 
health system mix that makes up the PNG context, and that had impacted on the PNG 
Health System’s capacity to deliver health services. 
 
With regard to DOTS Component 1 - Political commitment with increased and 
sustained financing, there is a very general statement.  “The National Government is 
committed to high quality expansion and implementation of DOTS because TB control 
is one of its top priorities among all health programs. The Government is committed to 
fostering sub-national, national and international partnerships, which will be linked to 
medium- as well as long-term strategic action plans to Stop TB. This medium-term 
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Country Strategic Plan aims to address technical and financial requirements and 
promote accountability for results at all levels of the health system.“ (Aia, Yadav et al. 
2006) 
 
Being explicit about how to address the governance blocks in PNG between the 
National, Provincial and District levels needs to be addressed in DOTS Component 1 
which was particularly pertinent given the decentralized governance structures.  There 
was no obligation on the Provinces and Districts to adopt a TB DOTS Policy.  Funding 
was allocated to the Provinces as block grants, and TB DOTS funding was not allocated 
in such a way that those funds have to be spent on TB DOTS activities.  The Country 
Strategic Plan does not set out strategies to address the political commitment required 
to make the governance changes that would ensure this happens. 
 
Rather than identifying a lack of political commitment, governance, corruption and 
health system fragmentation as blocks the Strategic Plan only identifies the need for 
extra funding and human resources as the major constraints to be overcome for the TB 
DOTS policy to be successfully implemented in the 5 year period 2006-2010. 
 
 Funding a PNG TB DOTS Policy 9.4.9
In his introduction to the Country Strategic Plan Dr Nicholas Mann, the Permanent 
Secretary for Health, states that the Plan has two purposes:  “The primary aim of this 
plan is to share information with all stakeholders about the Stop TB Strategy that we 
plan to expand across the country in the next 5 years. In addition, the National 
Department of Health plans to use the plan to mobilize resources to Stop TB in the 
country.” (Aia, Yadav et al. 2006)  The Plan estimates the funds required for the 
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national implementation of the various components of the Plan as $US25m (see Figure 
8).  This addresses the increased and sustained financing part of DOTS Component 1 - 
Political commitment with increased and sustained financing, whilst not addressing the 
understanding of political commitment in terms of the governance and health system 
structures necessary to deliver a TB DOTS policy. 
 
Figure 8 – Summary of Funding Needs for the Program for the next 5 years 
Source: Country Strategic Plan to Stop TB for Papua New Guinea (Aia, Yadav et al. 2006) 
 
The Plan also states: “If the level of funding through domestic and external non-GFATM 
sources remains constant in the next 5 years, the NTP Unit will receive only about 
US$4.17 million over the next 5 years. Thus, the estimated funding gap is US$20.87 
million for the next 5 years. Full funding of the Plan is essential for the full 
implementation of the Stop TB Strategy and national achievement of the MDG and the 
WHO targets, as a step towards our vision of a TB-free nation, by 2050.  The National 
Government will also seek these funds from the Global Fund to fight AIDS, TB and 
Malaria (GFATM) and other international donor agencies, as required.” (Aia, Yadav et 
al. 2006) (see Figure 9).  The Plan leaves no doubt that external Donor Assistance is 
vital.  Without AusAID and the Global Fund, and their engagement in the PNG TB DOTS 
policy process, the PNG TB DOTS policy would not become a reality. 
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Figure 9 - Funding gaps for Country Strategic Plan to Stop TB for PNG 2006-2010 
Source: Country Strategic Plan to Stop TB for Papua New Guinea (Aia, Yadav et al. 2006) 
 
 Promised Impact of the Country Strategic Plan to Stop TB for PNG 2006-2010 9.4.10
The Strategic Plan promises that: “Full implementation of the Plan will mean: 
 5,000 – 6,000 additional lives will be saved in the next 5 years (2006-2010) 
 the country will be closer to the TB target of the UN Millennium Development 
Goals ("to have halted by 2015, and begun to reverse the incidence of TB") and 
those of the WHO (“to halve the prevalence and death rates in 2015 compared to 
the 1990 baseline”) 
 
This is an ambitious but realistic scenario if the required resources (especially, funding 
and staffing) can be mobilized. “ (Aia, Yadav et al. 2006) 
 
This promise of significant numbers of lives saved makes a national TB DOTS policy 
very attractive to the politics level in PNG as a policy solution to the high burden of TB, 
if the donor funds can be sourced to implement the policy.  It is the statement of the 
high burden of TB in the Country Status Report which establishes TB as a major health 
problem.  The Country Strategic Plan outlines a TB control policy which provides a 
policy solution with the promised saving of 5,000-6,000 lives in 5 years as well as 
helping to achieve the MDGs.  Applying the Multiple Streams Framework the problem 
stream and policy stream are now aligned.  
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In summary, whilst it does bring the problem stream and policy streams together the 
content of the PNG Country Strategic Pan to Stop TB 2006-2010 was written to achieve 
the goal and targets of the WHO Global Plan to Stop TB 2006-2015.  It was written 
from the global TB control policy perspective, not from a perspective asking which TB 
control policy with a realistic and achievable goal, objectives and targets, was best for 
PNG with its unique set of circumstances.  It addresses TB DOTS Component 1 - 
Political commitment, with increased and sustained financing, narrowly only in terms 
of the financing of the TB control policy.  It does not address the understanding of 
political commitment as ensuring the fundamental governance and health systems 
structures required to successfully implement a national TB control policy in a way the 
PNG health system could sustain. 
 
 The Politics Stream – Policy Actors and Process  9.5
We now examine the actors at the politics level in PNG that had a major influence in 
TB DOTS moving onto the PNG policy agenda in 2006. 
 
 Policy Capacity at the Political Level in PNG 9.5.1
We have seen that the cultural institutions underpinning political commitment and 
leadership were influenced and determined by the wantok system, clientelism and 
corruption, which resulted in a very high turnover of politicians.  As a result, 
engagement with the policy process at the political level was very limited.  Survival in 
parliament for longer than one term, and ensuring the maximization of clientelism in 
order to maximize the chances of re-election, was the main concern of PNG politicians.  
We have seen that the resulting governance structures at the National, Provincial and 
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District levels in PNG meant that meaningful engagement by the political level with the 
health policy process was minimal.   
 
Despite these major constraints at the political level, the TB DOTS policy came onto the 
policy agenda in 2006.  To understand how this happened, we need to examine the 
events at the politics level leading up to 2006. 
 
In this context of low capacity for policy formulation, the point where the political level 
in PNG built momentum, and became open to a range of health policy initiatives, was 
the 2002 election of Sir Peter Barter to the PNG Parliament, and his appointment as 
Minister of Health and HIV, from 2002 to 2007.  A trained airline pilot, Peter Barter 
came from Australia to PNG in 1965, as a volunteer pilot with the Franciscan Catholic 
Mission in Aitape, Sandaun Province(Pacific Friends of the Global Fund 2014).  He then 
joined a local airline, Territory Airlines (Talair), eventually buying the airline.  With a 
reputation as a hardworking, efficient manager, he developed and broadened the 
airline to become a successful multimillion dollar tourism venture.  Peter Barter served 
two periods in the PNG Parliament.  From 1992 to 1997 he was elected as member for 
Madang Province, initially as an independent before joining the government and 
serving a period as Minister for Health, then as Minister for Provincial and Regional 
Affairs.  Barter was re-elected in 2002 and made the Minister for Health and HIV, as 
well as Minister for Bougainville, in the Government of Sir Michael Somare(PNG 
Government 2006).  He brought to the role of Minister for Health and HIV a 
commitment to health policies that was to benefit Papua New Guineans, especially in 
rural areas.  The then Prime Minister, Michael Somare, is quoted as saying of Peter 
Barter: 
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“The people and government salute Sir Peter Barter for dedicating much of his 
public and private life to the development of Papua New Guinea. Papua New 
Guineans will remember Sir Peter ….. for lifting the profile and commitment of 
the public health sector.  But I will remember Sir Peter as a colleague who was 
always there when his people needed him urgently.  His mercy flights with his 
helicopter to help an expectant Mother, an injured youth or victims of a natural 
disaster are well documented. On a personal level, Sir Peter pushed for the 
health sector to be given greater attention. Some of his achievements include 
real increases in budgetary and aid supports for HIV/AIDS, more orderly 
procurement of drugs and other medical supplies, and the efforts to recruit 
doctors from Cuba. More often than not, he has also expended his personal 
resources”(Newington College 2009). 
 
The establishment of the Global Fund to fight AIDS, TB and Malaria in 2002, with the 
associated rapid increase in the level of funding for HIV, TB and malaria, was a factor in 
Peter Barter’s favour as Minister for Health and HIV.  Within two years of becoming 
Minister for Health and HIV, the two Tier 1 priority diseases in the PNG Health Plan 
2000-2010, HIV and malaria, (GovPNG 2000), had secured large Global Fund Grants - in 
2003 a Round 3 $US20m GFATM Grant for Malaria Control (1st Aug 2004 to 31st July 
2009) was secured; and a 2004 Round 4 $US17.5m GFATM Grant for HIV/AIDS (1st Sept 
2005 to 31st August 2010) was also successful.  Without these Global Fund grants this 
level of funding for disease control programs would not have been possible given the 
budgetary constraints of the PNG Government.  With the Global Fund also providing 
grants for TB control the politics level would now increasingly favour a TB control 
policy.  However, a 2005 Round 5 TB DOTS Grant application was rejected partially 
because TB was not a Tier 1 policy priority. 
 
 Policy Window Opens for the 2006 PNG TB DOTS Policy 9.5.2
By 2006 TB in PNG was on the international policy agenda.  The politics stream in 
Australia was looking for policy options to address TB and MDR-TB in the Torres Strait.  
In the global policy stream TB DOTS was being advocated as the “evidence based” 
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policy by WHO which had global as well as PNG political level credibility in the 
provision of health policy.  At the same time the Global Fund was mobilizing significant 
levels of funds, and Australia was increasing its funds through the Global Fund for HIV, 
malaria and TB control activities in the Asia Pacific region.  These factors combined at 
the regional and global level for a policy window to open for a TB DOTS policy.  
 
Dr Yadav taking on the role of policy entrepreneur recognized that a favourable report 
from an AusAID consultant endorsing the capacity of the PNG NTP to implement a 
national TB DOTS policy would address remaining AusAID concerns about the PNG NTP 
program.  Dr Konstantinos also taking on the role of policy entrepreneur having 
credibility with AusAID supported Dr Yadav’s assertions about the capacity of the NTP 
to implement a national TB DOTS policy.  This favourably influenced the Australian 
political level to provide funds through the Global Fund for a national TB DOTS policy.  
The global policy agenda setting process was being feed into the PNG policy process by 
these two policy entrepreneurs on behalf of the key global policy actors. 
 
The circumstances were now favourable for all three policy streams coming together 
i.e. a policy window opening for a national TB DOTS policy. 
 
 2006 TB a “National Emergency” in PNG – “Policy Window” Opens and TB DOTS 9.5.3
makes it onto the Policy Agenda in PNG 
Peter Barter in accepting the Country Status Report of National TB Control 1997-2005 
(Aia, Yadav et al. 2006) endorsed at the politics level that TB was indeed a major health 
policy problem.  In launching the Country Strategic Plan to Stop TB 2006-2010 (Aia, 
Yadav et al. 2006) the politics level endorsed TB DOTS as the policy response to that 
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problem, offering significant reductions in deaths from TB and the achievement of the 
TB MDGs.  With the likelihood of a Global Fund grant if TB became a Tier 1 disease he 
declared TB a “national emergency” requiring an urgent response. 
“TB is a national emergency. It is estimated that TB kills more adults in Papua 
New Guinea than any other infectious disease. Hence, urgent action is 
necessary to scale up our efforts to Stop TB in Papua New Guinea. Fortunately, 
tuberculosis is a curable disease. 
I would like to congratulate the National Department of Health for having 
drafted this Country Strategic Plan to Stop TB for the period 2006-2010. The 
potential outcomes, given adequate support, are exciting, not only for the 
National TB Program but also for all other health programs because of the 
cross-cutting effects expected from the interventions and the initiatives 
planned.   
 
The Plan makes a compelling case for greater investment in tuberculosis. We 
have the chance to save thousands of lives in the next 5 years by 
implementation of the Plan, which clearly spells out what needs to be done. We 
have an obligation to act and we should do so now! The costs of not doing so 
are too serious to ignore. The dual epidemic of TB and HIV can lead to 
immeasurable human sufferings, thousands of deaths and a serious effect on 
the national economy. 
 
The payoff for this investment is measurable not only in terms of lives saved, 
but also in economic terms. The economic savings far outweigh the costs. TB 
hits hardest those people who are in their most productive years, destroying 
livelihoods and plunging families into poverty. TB is curable and we have a 
proven strategy. The cost of medicines for an entire course of 6 months is only 
about K60.  Within a few weeks of starting treatment, patients can be back at 
work, supporting their families.”  (Aia, Yadav et al. 2006)  
 
With this statement from the PNG Minster for Health and HIV, TB moves to become a 
Tier 1 disease in PNG.  TB was now on the policy agenda, the three policy streams 
(problem, policy and politics) had converged, and a policy window had opened for TB 
DOTS, with funding to follow (see Figure 10). 
 
Critical Junctures in the  PNG TB DOTS Policy Window Opening 
 
240 
Framing TB as a 
Policy Problem 
(from the Problem 
Stream) 
• Australia Domestic TB problem: 
o TB cases increase across the Torrs Strait border with 
PNG 
o Australian Press – “health threats” across Torres Strait 
border 
• PNG National Health Plan 2000-2010 
o HIV, malaria Tier 1 policy priority diseases dominate 
problem stream 
o TB NOT a Tier 1 disease control policy priority 
• Rejection of Round 5 2005 GFATM PNG TB DOTS Application 
• Dr Yadav, WHO Stop TB Medical Officer: 
o Four Stakeholder Consultation Meetings held   
o Country Status Report of National TB Control 1997-
2005 written 
 First clear articulation of TB as a PNG Health 
Policy Problem – high burden of TB 
o A clear statement of TB as a PNG health policy problem  
• 2006 - TB declared a “National Emergency” by Minister for 
Health and HIV 
 
 DOES NOT address PNG Leadership & Governance, PNG 
Health System Structural Problems, or weak or absent PNG 
policy capacity (formulation & implementation) as the 
FUNDAMENTAL POLICY PROBLEM resulting in high TB 
incidence requiring a policy response. 
 
The Policy Solution 
(from the Policy 
Stream) 
• Advocated by WHO in the 1990s TB DOTS, emerges from the 
global policy stream as the evidence based response to the 
global TB emergency. 
• Dr Yadav, WHO Stop TB Medical Officer: 
o Four Stakeholder Consultation Meetings held 
o Country Strategic Plan to Stop TB 2006-2010 written 
 Provides TB DOTS as the policy solution to TB as 
a policy problem. 
 Will save 5,000-6,000 lives in 5 years; help to 
achieve MDGs 
• Dr Konstantinos, AusAID Consultant, despite reservations, his 
report supports AusAID funding of a PNG TB DOTS Policy 
• No consideration of alternative TB control policy approaches 
 
 DOES NOT provide a policy response to the PNG Leadership & 
Governance, PNG Health System Structural Problems, or weak 
or absent PNG Policy capacity (formulation & implementation) 
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Figure 10 – Critical Junctures in the PNG TB DOTS Policy Window Opening  
 The 2006 PNG TB DOTS Policy 9.5.4
The Country Strategic Plan to Stop TB 2006-2010 (Aia, Yadav et al. 2006) sets out the 
strategy to achieve coverage of the PNG population with TB DOTS in the five year 
period 2006-2010.  The Global Fund Round 6 Grant Proposal Form – Expanding and 
Implementing the Stop TB Strategy in PNG (PNG CCM 2006) built on and used the 
Country Strategy to support the GFATM submission requesting $US20mill.  Thus the 
The Politics Stream • Australia Domestic TB policy problem: 
o TB cases increase across the Torrs Strait border with 
PNG 
o Australian Press – “health threats” across Torres Strait 
border 
• Australian Development Assistance to PNG: 
o Main donor, shift from direct budgetary support to 
bilateral support to PNG 
o Looking for other mechanisms to provide bilateral 
support at the same time that GFATM being founded. 
• Global Fund to Fight Aids, TB Malaria founded in 2002: 
o Looking to established funding in the Asia Pacific 
Region 
o Provided another mechanism for AusAID funds 
• Sir Peter Barter, Minister for Health & HIV, 2002-2007 
o Major health problem identified - high TB burden 
o Promised saving of 5,000 lives 
o Donor funding only available for TB DOTS policy 
 
 DOES NOT address the fundamental PNG Governance, 
Leadership and Structural Health System Problems 
 
PNG TB DOTS Policy 
“Window Opens” 
• Sir Peter Barter in 2006 declared TB in PNG a “National 
Emergency” launching the Country Strategic Plan to Stop TB 
2006-2010 
• 2006 Round 6 GFATM PNG TB DOTS Grant Application 
successfully submitted 
 
 Still DOES NOT address the fundamental PNG Governance, 
Leadership and Structural Health System Problems 
 
242 
Round 6 GFATM PNG TB DOTS Grant Proposal(PNG CCM 2006) is the full statement of 
the 2006 PNG TB DOTS Policy because in 2006 the GFATM approved funding of this 
application.   
 
The goal and targets of the 2006 PNG TB DOTS policy were:  
Goal: To reduce morbidity and mortality due to TB in PNG 
Objectives:  
1. To achieve high quality expansion and implementation of DOTS in order to increase 
the DOTS coverage rate to at least 80%, case detection rate to at least 70%, and 
treatment success rate to at least 85% - in 66 out of the 87 districts in PNG by Year 
5 
2. To address the challenge of TB/HIV co-infection by implementing collaborative 
TB/HIV activities in 16 major districts (which constitute 30% of the population) by 
Year 5 
3. To assess the MDR-TB situation in 2 major provinces (which constitute 16% of the 
population) in Years 3-4 
4. To contribute to the health system strengthening in 66 out of the 87 districts in 
PNG  (which constitute 80% of the population) by Year 5 
 
The Goal and Objectives were aligned with the WHO Stop TB Global Strategy which 
had exactly the same targets of detecting 70% of sputum smear positive cases and 
curing 85% of these cases.  
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 Substantial increase in human and financial resources for the 2006 PNG TB 9.6
DOTS Policy. 
The GFATM approved a massive funding injection agreeing to the full $US20m 
requested in the Round 6 Grant application.  This would enable a significant increase in 
dedicated TB DOTS staff at all levels of the PNG Health System for the five years 
intensive stage of the PNG TB DOTS Grant implementation to establish a strong 
supervisory and coordination network including: 
“1 Technical Advisor, 6 National, 4 Regional and 40 Provincial Coordinators, 20 
Laboratory Technicians, 67 support staff, 66 Senior Pastors and 32 Civil Society 
Organizers” (PNG CCM 2006). 
 
These extra staff would be employed for the five year intensive phase of the 2006 PNG 
TB DOTS policy i.e. the five years of the 2006 GFATM Grant.  After this intensive phase 
the Round 6 Grant application stated  that there would be no ongoing need for extra 
staff, as the NTP will be able to absorb all ongoing TB DOTS activities(PNG CCM 2006).  
There would also be an increase in vehicles dedicated to the implementation of the 
2006 PNG TB DOTS policy: 
“The contractual staff will be assigned vehicles (procured through the WHO 
procurement mechanisms) and contractual drivers (2 at the national level, 20 
for the provinces, one each), which will be shared with the national and 
provincial government officers for joint program efforts” (PNG CCM 2006).  
 
This was a major increase in financial, human and logistical resources for TB control in 
PNG.   
 
 Conclusion to Part 4 – Agenda Setting for the 2006 PNG TB DOTS policy  9.7
The process by which TB DOTS moved onto the health policy agenda in 2006 took 
place at two levels – a global level and a PNG level. 
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At the global level, as has been described and critiqued in Chapter 8, key policy actors, 
who by the power they were able to exert on the PNG policy process, actually brought 
TB onto the policy agenda. 
 
In Australia, PNGs immediate neighbour and largest aid donor, TB and MDR-TB in 
Western Province Papua New Guineans crossing the Torres Strait border for treatment 
was being identified as an increasing health problem by Australian disease control 
surveillance data and the Australian media.  By 2006 TB in PNG was receiving attention 
as a policy problem at the politics level in Australia.  Despite reservations about the 
capacity of the NTP AusAID was increasingly open to a PNG TB control policy given the 
level of domestic political attention. 
 
Two other global actors in the agenda setting process were the Global Fund and WHO.  
Founded in 2002 the Global Fund rapidly began to mobilize significant donor funds for 
HIV, TB and malaria control in developing countries to achieve their MDGs.  By 2006 
Australia was directing significant levels of funding to the Global Fund to be used in the 
Asia Pacific Region at the same time as the manner in which it directed and managed 
its aid to PNG was evolving from direct budgetary support to bilateral based funding.  
As the two major donors Australia and the Global Fund brought significant power to 
health policy decisions in PNG in 2006. 
 
WHO brought a policy approach to TB control, TB DOTS, which it had been strongly 
advocating since the mid-1990s as the evidence based policy for the control of TB in 
developing countries.  The policy stream debate about TB DOTS had taken place at the 
global level during the 1990s and emerging from that debate the WHO TB DOTS policy 
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became the dominant and only approach to TB control.  Present in PNG since 
independence in 1975, WHO had credibility in providing technical and policy expertise 
in disease control.  As the only recommended WHO policy approach to TB control it 
was the only approach the Global Fund would agree to fund. 
 
At the global level, one of these three actors (Australia) had an identified health policy 
problem arising from TB in PNG.  One (WHO) had a policy response to that problem.  
The third (the Global Fund) had significant funds available for a national TB control 
policy.  At this global level the three policy streams had started to converge to open a 
policy window. 
 
However, in PNG, as has been described and critiqued in this Chapter, TB was not 
receiving policy attention as a significant health problem.  Due to the rapidly increasing 
burden of HIV and the continuing high burden of malaria these two Tier 1 diseases 
were the policy problems identified by the National Health Plan 2000-2010 and the 
NDOH Strategic Plan 2006-2008.   
 
In order for TB to come to the attention of the politics level it needed to be reframed 
as a major health problem.  Two key policy entrepreneurs took on the role of 
facilitating this process - Dr Rajendra Yadav, WHO Stop TB Medical Officer PNG; and Dr 
Konstantinos, Director, Queensland Health TB Program, and AusAID consultant.  It was 
crucial in this process that Dr Paul Aia, Manager, PNG TB Control Program was seen to 
be directing and driving this process.  The Country Status Report of the National TB 
Control 1997-2005 is the articulation of TB as a major health problem demanding 
attention.  It is presented by its authors as a PNG TB Stakeholder consensus statement 
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that TB in PNG has high morbidity and mortality, and that PNG has the third largest TB 
burden in the Western Pacific Region of WHO, so must be addressed as a policy 
problem.   
 
The PNG Country Strategic Plan to Stop TB 2006-2010 provides the policy solution that 
is "ambitious but achievable”.  Again this is framed as a PNG TB stakeholder consensus 
policy response.  It proposes the WHO TB DOTS approach to TB control and is based on 
the 2006 WHO Global Plan to Stop TB 2006-2010.  Again the key actors are Dr Rajendra 
Yadav, WHO Stop TB Medical officer PNG, and Dr Konstantinos, Director, Queensland 
Health TB Program, and AusAID consultant, take the role of policy entrepreneurs whilst 
ensuring Dr Paul Aia, Manager and PNG TB Control Program is seen to be directing the 
process. 
 
The politics level was weak and policy capacity and decision making was driven by 
culturally determined wantokism, clientelism, nepotism and corruption.  This 
weakness combined with a dependence on foreign aid to fund essential health services 
including HIV, malaria and TB gave aid donors significant power and influence in the 
health policy process.  The appointment of Sir Peter Barter, as PNG Minister for Health 
and HIV, 2002-2007 built momentum for new health policies addressing PNG’s major 
health problems – HIV, Malaria and TB.   
 
As a result of this intensive agenda setting process, the three policy streams – the 
problem stream, the policy stream and the politics stream, came together in mid-2006 
with Sir Peter Barter, at the launch of the PNG Country Strategy to Stop TB 2006-2010 
declaring TB a “national emergency” and that “TB is curable and we have a proven 
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strategy” in TB DOTS.  With that, TB moved firmly onto the policy agenda.  The funding 
of a national PNG TB DOTS policy would definitely now take place. 
 
In this process the fundamental policy problem of leadership and political commitment 
with governance and health system dysfunction, along with weak or absent policy 
capacity (formulation & delivery) were receiving no attention at either the global or 
PNG levels. 
 
This is a case study in agenda setting in a resource limited setting and how the TB 
policy process and health policy process generally takes place in such settings.  The 
power relationships in this process and how power is exercised through the provision 
of technical expertise and how funding is allocated is a central finding of this research. 
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Part 5 – Political Commitment and 
Policy Implementation 
In the thesis we have now dealt with the main questions and objectives of the 
research: 
 1) To describe and critique the burden of TB in PNG (Part 2),  
2) To describe and critique political commitment (Part3),  
3) To describe and critique agenda setting (Part 4), in the policy process resulting in the 
2006 TB DOTS policy.  
 
Chapter 10 – Policy Implementation 2007 - 2012.   
The aim of this chapter is to examine the implementation of the 2006 TB policy given 
the findings, to this point in the thesis, with regard to low levels of political 
commitment and engagement in policy formulation, weak governance and 
fragmentation of the health system, and the dominant role of global actors and their 
policy entrepreneurs.  Did the policy achieve its goal and objectives?  Were the stated 
principles and objectives of the global actors – the Global Fund, WHO and AusAID in 
terms of “country lead implementation”, “taking into account local realities and 
priorities” to “strengthen health systems” achieved by 2012?  
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10 Political Commitment in Implementation of 2006 TB DOTS policy 
 
 Introduction 10.1
The aim of this chapter is to describe and critique the implementation of the 2006 TB 
DOTS policy with regard to political commitment.  How did the policy actors at the 
political level in PNG, as well as the global policy actors, deal with and ensure the 
necessary health system governance structures were in place to deliver a national TB 
DOTS policy?   Secondly, did the implementation of the policy achieve the goal and 
targets of detecting 70% of smear positive TB cases, achieve at least an 85% cure rate 
in those cases, and achieve at least 80% population coverage with the TB DOTS 
Program in the period from 2007 to 2012?  Thirdly, did the implementation of the 
policy achieve the stated goals and principles of the global policy actors who 
committed $US20m in aid funds to the 2006 policy?  
 
The major policy problem in the implementation of the 2006 TB DOTS policy, which 
required political commitment, was entrenched corruption, a lack of accountability, 
and dysfunction between the national, provincial and district levels of government and 
the health system(Bolger, Mandie-Filer et al. 2005).  This was having a major impact on 
the provision of health services.  Up to 60% of Aid Posts had been closed, the capacity 
of HCs to deliver even basic services was in rapid decline, health patrols were not 
happening, staff morale and performance was low.  The community and patients had 
little trust in the health system to deliver basic services (Bolger, Mandie-Filer et al. 
2005).  As a result health outcome indicators were poor with low immunisation 
coverage rates (Toikilik, Tuges et al. 2010), high maternal mortality (GovPNG 2009, 
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NDOH 2009) and the emergence of drug resistant TB (Gilpin, Simpson et al. 2008, 
Phuanukoonnon, Suarkia et al. 2008).  This provided the policy context requiring 
political commitment in the implementation of the 2006 TB DOTS policy. 
 
To undertake this analysis of political commitment in the implementation of the 2006 
policy we apply the Fox et al framework (Fox, Goldberg et al. 2011) in order to assess 
the three central components of political commitment:    
1) Expressed commitment 
• public pronouncements in line with scientific evidence and internationally 
recognized standards  
2) Institutional commitment 
• established bureaucracies,  
• adoption of laws and regulations,  
• surveillance and monitoring and evaluation mechanisms  
3) Budgetary commitment 
• disbursement and allocation of funds  
 
 2006 PNG TB DOTS Component 1 - Political Commitment 10.2
The Round 6 Grant application in outlining the 2006 policy acknowledged the major 
challenges in political commitment in PNG and the resulting significant structural 
governance challenges: 
“A new “Organic Law on Provincial Governments and Local Level Governments” 
mandating decentralization of all governmental services and activities was 
introduced in 1995. This law has transferred the responsibility of rural health 
services to the local level governments (generally three per district), limiting the 
role and responsibility of the National Department of Health (NDOH) to policy 
development, technical and quality standards setting, and monitoring and 
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evaluation (as defined in the National Health Administration Act, 1997)” (PNG 
CCM 2006). 
 
The Policy also acknowledged the devastating impact of the 1995 Organic law on PNG 
Health System Governance: 
Launched without sufficient preparation for its implementation, it has proved 
extremely disruptive for the health system, breaking down the vertical 
integration that is essential to ensure a strong link between policy development 
and implementation. A recent review of the health sector revealed the lack of a 
performance based public service, the lack of prioritization of health services, a 
sound health policy but lack of implementation, inadequate supervision, and 
inadequate focus on service delivery” (PNG CCM 2006). 
 
These political changes had a devastating effect on the rural health services of PNG 
where the components of the PNG TB DOTS policy must be implemented: 
“In recent years, rural health services have deteriorated significantly because 
many rural health facilities have closed down and the staff have been 
retrenched or retired. The shortage and misdistribution of human resources is a 
serious issue in PNG. There is an acute shortage of nurses and community 
health workers in most rural areas” (PNG CCM 2006). 
 
However, when applying the Fox et. al.(Fox, Goldberg et al. 2011) framework, which 
has three components for assessing  political commitment(expressed commitment, 
institutional commitment, and budgetary commitment), to the 2006 PNG TB DOTS 
Policy there is evidence of only one component, which is expressed commitment.  
Expressed commitment was evident when TB was moved from being a tier 2 policy 
disease to a tier 1 policy disease, when the Minister for Health launched the Country 
Strategy to Stop TB 2006-2010.  The 2006 PNG TB DOTS Policy acknowledges this when 
addressing political commitment as a challenge to the 2006 policy:  
“Political commitment: Until 2006, the NTP (National TB Control Program) was 
a second-tier priority with limited staffing and funding support from the 
Government and its Development Partners. However, this has now changed due 
to the reprioritization of the NTP as tier-one priority in June 2006. The challenge 
now is to advocate the same to the provincial governments” (PNG CCM 2006). 
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It is the last sentence in the above quote - “The challenge now is to advocate the same 
to the provincial governments”(PNG CCM 2006) page 39, that is the central policy 
challenge in terms of institutional commitment in the 2006 PNG TB DOTS Policy. 
 
The first and major problem in the implementation of the 2006 TB DOTS policy was 
that provinces and districts in PNG are not responsible to the national level for any 
policy implementation as a result of the 1995 New Organic Law.  Policy priorities at all 
level of government were elsewhere i.e. wantokism, clientelism and nepotism.  The 
limited or absent institutional commitment at the provincial and district level to health 
policy was reflected in the rapid decline in rural health services in the 10 years leading 
up to the 2006 PNG TB DOTS Policy.  The institutional commitment component of 
political commitment is absent at the provincial and district level in PNG.  To change 
this required major legislative changes which would re-centralize the control of health 
services to the national government, ensuring the restoration of lines of responsibility, 
and a performance management system throughout the PNG health system.  It is only 
then that components 2, 3, 4, and 5 of a TB DOTS Policy could be implemented.  An 
opportunity to address and reform these governance constraints and implement 
institutional commitment to the 2006 TB DOTS Policy came with the Provincial Health 
Authorities Act of 2007.   
 
 Provincial Health Authorities Act 2007 10.3
An opportunity to support and implement the institutional commitment component of 
political commitment came about in 2007 when the PNG Parliament enacted the PHA 
Act (GovPNG 2014).  Initiated by the Ministry of Health the PHA was a concrete step 
towards addressing the fragmentation and lack of accountability within the Health 
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System by recentralized authority over the provision of health services.  The PHA made 
both the Provincial Hospital Boards (curative services) and Provincial Health 
Administration (rural health services) responsible to a new PHA which was appointed 
by and directly responsible to the Minister for Health.  This would recentralize 
responsibility for all health services to the Minister for Health, and National 
Department of Health, with clearer lines of responsibility and reporting.  The PHA was 
a direct attempt to address and re-establish lines of reporting and responsibility for 
health service provision which the 1995 New Organic law had dismantled.  However, 
the PHA was voluntary and could not be imposed on Provinces.  In 2009 three 
provinces Milne Bay, Eastern Highlands, and Western Highlands, passed the provincial 
legislation required to bring the PHA into force (GovPNG 2014).  Six more provinces 
(West New Britain, West Sepik, Enga, Manus, East Sepik and Southern Highlands) had 
expressed interest in forming a PHA but to 2014 had not taken steps to do so (GovPNG 
2014).   
 
It is important to note that the PHA was not initiated and passed by the PNG 
Parliament to specifically address the needs for institutional commitment required to 
implement the 2006 PNG TB DOTS policy.  The PHA resulted from repeated requests by 
some PNG policy actors within the NDOH, as well as internationally, to address the 
fragmentation and dysfunction of the health system.  This opportunity to support and 
implement the institutional commitment component of Fox’s framework had and still 
has not been largely taken up by the Provincial governments. 
 
So despite these attempts to establish bureaucracies that would have facilitated the 
implementation of the 2006 policy a 2014 external review of the NTP found that the 
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NDOH and NTP still only had direct control and responsibility for “the national referral 
hospital, 1 specialist, 4 regional hospitals and 16 provincial public hospitals and since 
NTP and hospital management are within the same (administrative) structure, it allows 
NTP to have easy access to provincial hospital teams to communicate and coordinate 
NTP and GF related activities.”(GovPNG 2014)  However, “the same is not true for the 
coordination of TB control related activities at provincial and district health facilities, 
because NTP and provincial and district health facilities are not under the same 
structure. Based on the Organic Law, the PHO comes under the provincial 
administration and 30 district-level health facilities are under the district 
administration.  Therefore, NTP and World Vision staff endeavour to work closely with 
the provincial hospital, PHO and District Administrators in order to access the provincial 
and district health facilities.”(GovPNG 2014) 
 
Despite this lack of political commitment to implement the needed structural 
governance changes to streamline lines of responsibility and accountability the Round 
6 Grant implementation went ahead. 
 
 Policy Implementation 10.4
With the release of the first tranche of funds in September 2007 the implementation 
of the Round 6 Grant actually commenced on 1st October 2007 so that agreed 
activities (GFATM 17th Oct 2007) to achieve the goals and objectives:  
 
The Round 6 Grant was to be implemented in two phases.  Commencing 1st October 
2007 the first phase was to scale up DOTS to 9 provinces by 1st October 2009 and was 
valued at $US5,007,911 (GFATM 17th Oct 2007, Ahmadova, Heldal et al. 2012).  The 
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second phase was to increase DOTS coverage to the remaining 11 provinces by 1st 
October 2012, and was valued at $US14m, the balance of the Grant (GFATM 17th Oct 
2007, Ahmadova, Heldal et al. 2012).  (See Figure 11) 
 
 
PNG Provincial Schedule for Implementation of 2006 Round 6 TB DOTS Policy 
 
Year Province 
 
2008 
 
National Capital District, Central, Morobe, 
Madang, Milne Bay,  
 
2009 
 
Simbu, Western Province, East Sepik, 
Southern Highlands 
 
2010 
 
East New Britain, West New  Britain, Enga, 
Central and Oro 
 
2011-2012 
 
New Ireland, Bougainville, Sandaun, Manus, 
Gulf and Western Highlands 
Figure 11 – PNG Provincial Schedule for Implementation of 2006 Round 6 TB DOTS 
Policy 
Source: (Pennas 2008) 
 
The Grant goal and targets were: 
“Goal: To reduce morbidity and mortality due to tuberculosis in Papua New Guinea. 
Objectives:  
1. To achieve high quality expansion and implementation of DOTS in order to increase 
the DOTS coverage rate to at least 80%, case detection rate to at least 70% and 
treatment success rate to at least 85% - in 66 out of the 87 districts by Year 5 
2. To address the challenge of TB/HIV co-infection in 16 of the 87 districts by Year 5 
3. To assess the Multi-Drug Resistant TB (MDR-TB) situation in 2 of the 20 provinces in 
Years 3-4 
4. To contribute to the health system strengthening in 66 of the 87 districts by Year 5. 
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The main activities of the Round 6 Grant “will include high quality expansion and 
implementation of all 5 components of DOTS and the new elements of the Stop TB 
Strategy (in a phased manner, over 5 years, using a package4 approach), through a mix 
of government health care providers and church/ NGO/ private networks. This will 
involve a sequence of events, province by province, as detailed below: 
 
1. A strong supervisory and coordination network will be set up through the 
recruitment, training and deployment of 1 Technical Advisor, 6 National, 4 Regional 
and 40 Provincial Coordinators, 20 Laboratory Technicians, 67 support staff, 66 
Senior Pastors and 32 Civil Society Organizers. 
2. The supervisory network for providing technical assistance and support will be set 
up by the World Vision International (for the ACSM/ Community-DOTS components 
and Madang Province), the World Health Organization (for the diagnostic and 
treatment components), the Hope Worldwide (for National Capital District, Central 
and Simbu Provinces), the Capacity Building Service Center (for M&E component), 
the City Pharmacy (for the P&SM component) and the JTA International (for 
Western Province). 
3. Community leaders (especially, the churches) will be oriented and involved from the 
beginning so that the strong community networks (especially, the extensive pastor 
networks) that are already in existence can be used to strengthen the human 
resource capacity for ACSM activities and the establishment of community-based 
DOTS network and patient support groups. 
                                                          
4 Package approach will include all the 5 classical components of the DOTS Strategy in addition to other elements 
envisaged under the Stop TB Strategy, particularly addressing the challenges of HIV/AIDS and MDR-TB. The Stop TB 
Strategy that is planned to be rolled out in Papua New Guinea will have a strong cross-cutting health system 
strengthening component to take care of the health system weaknesses that are widespread. 
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4. Cascade training will be done over 5 years: 20 each of trained National Trainers, 
Provincial ACSM/ Community-DOTS Coordinators (with assistance from Senior 
Pastors) and Provincial Project Coordinators will train about 2000 each of Clinical 
Officers, Voluntary DOT Providers and Government DOT Providers, respectively. 
5. At least 80 microscopy centers in 66 districts will be established or strengthened 
and over 400 non-microscopy health facilities will be supported for transportation 
of sputum specimens to the nearest microscopy centers to improve access to lab 
diagnosis.  
6. Collaborative TB/HIV Activities will be introduced and expanded to cover at least 16 
of the 87 districts. 
7. The MDR-TB situation will be assessed in two provinces in Years 3-4. 
8. External technical assistance will be sought from International Experts for P&SM, 
M&E, ACSM, TB/HIV, Drug Resistance Survey and External Quality Assurance.”(PNG 
CCM 2006) 
 
The Principal Recipient (PR) of the Round 6 Grant was the National Department of 
Health (NDOH) (GFATM 17th Oct 2007, Ahmadova, Heldal et al. 2012).  This meant that 
all Grant funds flowed to the NDOH which had responsibility for ensuring funds were 
distributed to the Sub-Recipients (SRs) responsible for implementing different 
components of the Grant.  As PR the NDOH was also responsible for ensuring the Sub-
Recipients were held accountable for the acquittal of funds along with the 
implementation of all activities (GFATM 17th Oct 2007, Ahmadova, Heldal et al. 2012).  
“The CCM is confident that the Principal Recipient will be able to perform the desired 
activities and thereby achieve the objectives. It has sought to ensure this success 
through the proposed provision of technical assistance and increased number of 
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support staff, managed through strong implementing partners like the World Vision, 
the World Health Organization, the Capacity Building Service Center, the City 
Pharmacy, the Hope Worldwide and the JTA International. These non-governmental 
organizations and private agencies will manage the extensive supervisory network and 
cascade training programs that have been planned” (PNG CCM 2006). 
 
The Sub-Recipients were a mix of private for profit companies, consultancy companies, 
non-government organizations and faith based organizations.  These organizations 
applied for funding as SRs, subject to approval from  the PNG GFATM Country 
Coordinating Committee (CCM) as being capable of delivering their designated 
components of the TB DOTS Policy(PNG CCM 2006).  In practice, the responsibility for 
the delivery of the key components of the 2006 PNG TB DOTS Policy was taken out of 
the hands of the NDOH. 
 
The involvement of SRs was partly to address one of the major grounds the GFATM 
gave for rejecting the 2005 Round 5 GFATM PNG TB DOTS Grant application. The 
Global Fund objected to the NDOH being the Principal (and sole) Recipient in the 
Round 5 GFATM PNG TB DOTS Grant application.  The NDOH had excluded all other 
stakeholders in TB control in PNG including the private sector, non-government sector, 
and people living with or affected by the disease, violating the GFATM Grant criteria.  
However, the focus on Sub-Recipients would also addressed another reason given for 
the rejection of the 2005 Round 5 GFATM PNG TB DOTS application; the low 
managerial capacity within the NDOH and PNG Health System to deliver a national 
PNG TB DOTS policy. 
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The Round 6 Grant application stated that after the five year Round 6 Grant “The 
Government is confident that it will be able to sustain the NTP through its own 
resources and assistances from its usual development partners because the recurrent 
costs are likely to be lower and affordable once the program has gained and developed 
momentum” (PNG CCM 2006).  In 2006 there was no identified need for any future 
funding requirements for TB control after the 2006 Round 6 Grant ended on 1st 
October 2012.   
 
 2006 PNG TB DOTS Component 2 – TB Case detection through quality-assured 10.4.1
bacteriology 
In order to be diagnosed as having TB, under the TB DOTS policy, a patient must have a 
positive sputum smear using the Zeil-Nielsen staining technique.  This requires 
microscopists who are trained in this technique to be within reasonable access to the 
AP or HC where TB patients would be presenting with symptoms of TB.  WHO was the 
designated sub-recipient charged with sole responsibility for delivering this 
component:   
“The World Health Organization will focus on lab diagnosis and treatment 
components by recruiting, training and deploying contractual 1 National 
Laboratory Coordinator, 4 Regional Laboratory Coordinators, 20 Lab 
Technicians (for remote areas) and 20 Provincial Project Coordinators to assist 
the NDOH and Provincial Health Offices” (PNG CCM 2006)  
 
 2006 PNG TB DOTS Component 3 - Standardized treatment, with supervision and 10.4.2
patient support 
The third component of the TB DOTS Policy requires a diagnosed TB patient to be 
directly observed each time they take their TB medication to ensure treatment 
compliance and therefore increase cure rates.  An Advocacy, Communication and 
Social Mobilization (ACMS) component of the TB DOTS Policy aimed to raise 
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community awareness so that people with signs and symptoms of TB present to a 
health facility for sputum microscopy.   
 
This third component of the 2006 PNG TB DOTS Policy was awarded to World Vision, 
an international faith based organization, which had built an extensive network over 
some years throughout PNG: 
“The World Vision International will focus on ACSM and Community-based 
DOTS by networking with local level governments, administrators, churches, 
village-level pastors and other community volunteers through a network of 1 
Technical Advisor, 20 Provincial ACSM/ Community-DOTS Coordinators, 66 
Senior Pastors and 32 Civil Society Organizers, who will twin with the Provincial 
Health Promotion Officers and provide them with technical assistance and 
support for these efforts” (PNG CCM 2006) 
 
 2006 PNG TB DOTS Component 4 - An effective drug supply and management system 10.4.3
An uninterrupted supply of TB drugs is required throughout the six months TB 
treatment to ensure high cure rates.  Disruption or failure of drug supply results in 
relapse, and possible development of drug resistant forms of TB. 
 
City Pharmacy, with the largest chain of private pharmacies in PNG covering most 
provincial capitals, became the sub-recipient responsible for TB drug Procurement and 
Supply Management (P&SM) down to the HC and AP level: 
“The City Pharmacy will assist the government by setting up a strong P&SM 
system closely coordinated by a network of contractual National Logistics 
Coordinator and Assistant (one each) and 20 Provincial Project Assistants for 
P&SM, who will provide technical assistance to the existing government 
National and Provincial Logistics Officers” (PNG CCM 2006) 
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 2006 PNG TB DOTS Component 5 - Monitoring and evaluation system, and impact 10.4.4
measurement 
The fifth component of the TB DOTS Policy is monitoring and evaluation (M&E), and 
measuring the impact of the TB DOTS Policy.  A robust HIS is required to ensure that 
data on the correct indicators to monitor and evaluate the implementation of the TB 
DOTS policy is being collected and analysed in a timely manner. 
 
The Capacity Building Service Centre (CBSC) was the Sub-Recipient responsible for the 
M&E component of the 2006 PNG TB DOTS policy.  The CBSC was a partnership 
between AusAID, the National Department of Health and a private contractor, Jane 
Thomason and Associates International: 
“The Capacity Building Service Centre will support the Principal Recipient in the 
recruitment, management and performance assessment of one contractual 
National M & E Coordinator, one National M&E Assistant and 20 Provincial 
Project Assistants for M&E (one per province). Through these staff who will be 
placed with the NDOH and the Provincial Governments, it will support the 
setting up of database management and communication hubs to assist in the 
establishment of a strong M&E network in the government health system” 
(PNG CCM 2006) page 40 
 
In short, the 2006 policy responded to the failings of TB DOTS Component 1 – political 
commitment, and the resulting fundamental governance and health system 
governance constraints, by contracting the delivery of four key DOTS components to 
Sub-Recipients able to bypass, whilst nominally working with and within, the broken 
health system.  By bypassing the PNG state the policy reinforced these institutional 
failings.  The policy fails to articulate how policy “Objective 4. To contribute to the 
health system strengthening in 66 out of the 87 districts in PNG (which constitute 80% 
of the population) by Year 5” (PNG CCM 2006) was to be achieved. 
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 Relationship between the NDOH (Principal Recipient) and Sub-Recipients 10.5
A senior World Vision worker stated in her interview that the staff of NDOH, and 
especially the National TB Control Program, resented the role taken by the SRs in 
implementing the key components of the 2006 PNG TB DOTS policy.  “It was like the 
pride was hurt of the government, it was a bit humiliating to know you don’t have the 
capacity to acquit those funds.  Our mere presence is telling these workers that they 
are incompetent, basically if they were competent why would we be there?” (Adepoybi 
- Interview 12th April 2008) 
 
This had an impact on the way the NDOH related to and worked with the SRs.  
The NDOH staff attitude was “You are employed to do this so you do it.  It’s a problem 
calling someone to come in to do someone else’s job, because that person is going to 
feel disempowered and they get paid less, the constant refrain is you guys are here for 
5 years, then what? it’s true.” (Adepoybi - Interview 12th April 2008) 
 
Further, the implementation of the 2006 PNG TB DOTS policy required the recruitment 
of a large number of new staff employed under contract by the Sub-Recipients.  Many 
of these SR positions required prior health experience and paid higher salaries than the 
NDOH.  “We wanted to avoid taking people from the Department of Health and putting 
them into these sub recipient positions, leaving a skeleton staff in the National 
Department of Health. … (However), for the last one, which was for district TB 
coordinators, I would say all of the staff working in (National Department of Health) TB 
sections around the county applied because the money is more” (Adepoybi - Interview 
12th April 2008).  The Sub-Recipients had to fill these positions as this was a GFATM 
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requirement to be met before the next round of money would be released (Adepoybi - 
Interview 12th April 2008).  
 
 Differences between Global Fund and AusAID 10.6
A further major problem in the early stages of the implementation of the Round 6 
grant was the difference encountered between the management and reporting 
requirements of the Global Fund Grant compared to AusAID.  AusAID had been the 
largest donor to the Health Sector for many years, and managers in PNG had become 
used to its requirements.  “AusAID is notorious for not demanding a high level of 
performance, they can’t be classed as performance based.  Funding pretty much 
comes” (Adepoybi - Interview 12th April 2008). 
 
By contrast, the Global Fund set very high and stringent requirements for reporting.  
The Fund required quarterly reports on all the 2006 PNG TB DOTS activities – on 
workshops, trainings, field visits, supplies purchased etc.  Many of these data 
requirements were to enable comparison between Global Fund grant implementation 
in different parts of the world.  They were not framed around the Health Information 
needs of the recipient country programs.  A large part of Component 5 – Monitoring 
and evaluation, and impact measurement, activities were directed at collecting data to 
meet Global Fund needs.  There was also a strict audit of management of Global Fund 
moneys.  If agreed timelines and indicators were not met then the next tranche of 
funds was not released.  This was a new experience for both the NDOH as PR and also 
for the SRs used to the AusAID approach (Adepoybi - Interview 12th April 2008). 
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 Global Fund Implementation Performance Grading of the Round 6 Grant  10.7
The Global Fund grades the performance of its Grants using a scale which indicates the 
quarterly performance of the Grant against the agreed, and required, GFATM 
performance indicators.  These performance indicators are the Grant implementation 
deliverables – drugs supplied, trainings completed, new TB cases detected, cured TB 
cases etc.  The performance grades are: 
A1 – Exceeds expectations 
A2 – Meets expectations 
B1 – Adequate 
B2 - Inadequate but potential demonstrated 
C – Unacceptable 
If the Grant performance is “C” – unacceptable, then the Global Fund does not 
authorized the release of the funding for the next quarter.     
 
Based on this Global Funds own quarterly implementation performance grading 
system the Round 6 TB DOTS Grant, from the commencement of implementation in 
the fourth quarter 2007 up to 2011, the quarterly implementation performance was 
consistently in the range between B1 and A1(GFATM 2012).  So according to the Global 
Funds own assessment the Round 6 TB DOTS Grant was meeting the Funds minimal 
requirements for implementation during this time period.   
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 Global Fund Office of Inspector General (OIG) Review of 6 PNG GFATM Grant 10.8
However, the performance grade of the Global Fund Round 3 Malaria Grant (GFATM 
2004) and Round 4 HIV/AIDS Grant (GFATM 2004) both had several quarters which 
were recorded as “C” – unacceptable, was recorded(OIG GFATM 2014).   
 
As a result in October and November 2010, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) 
conducted a detailed audit on six Global Fund grants in PNG from Rounds 3, 6 and 8, 
including the 2006 Round 6 PNG TB DOTS Grant(OIG GFATM 2014).  The audit made 
several major findings with regard to the Round 6 Grant implementation which by the 
time of the OIG audit had completed 3 years, and the first phase, of the 5 years of the 
Round 6 implementation: 
 
Firstly, it noted a lack of capacity within the National Department of Health which 
resulted in dependence on foreign technical assistance to ensure the TB DOTS policy 
was being implemented.  “The success of the three Global Fund supported-programs 
was driven by the use of technical assistance and support from the sub-recipients for 
major parts of the program.  However, the National Department of Health as PR did 
not have a clear action plan on how to transfer knowledge from the technical 
assistance support in order to build in-country capacity” (OIG GFATM 5 July 2012).  The 
use of foreign technical expertise and sub-recipients outside the government health 
system “gave the appearance that the Global Fund had facilitated a parallel system in 
the country, whereas in fact this was due principally to an absence of capacity in the 
National Department of Health.  The reliance on technical assistance, however, should 
be complemented with capacity building of national and local staff for long term 
sustainability”.(OIG GFATM 5 July 2012). 
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Secondly, despite the Round 6 Grant implementation being in its third year, with 
health system strengthening as a central focus, the OIG audit noted that the health 
system was still very weak.  “For the three diseases (HIV, TB, malaria), patient access to 
the provision of good quality care was hindered by the fact that: staff were often 
inadequately trained; frequent stock-outs occurred; there was a lack of treatment 
compliance.” (OIG GFATM 5 July 2012)  As a result “there were risks of increasing 
resistance to malaria drugs; an increasing incidence of multi-drug resistance to TB; and 
co-infections of TB and HIV”(OIG GFATM 5 July 2012). 
 
Thirdly, the quality of health data was very poor.  “The National Department of Health 
faced issues with the quality and accuracy of data collection and reporting; data 
analysed and collected were not accurate”(OIG GFATM 5 July 2012).  The OIG audit 
emphasized that “supervisory visits should be strengthened at provincial level, and 
there is a need for on-site training in the use of management tools and the accuracy of 
data reporting. For the TB program, new monitoring tools should be made available 
and distributed as soon as possible”(OIG GFATM 5 July 2012).  Data collected by the 
National HIS was not adequate to track progress against Global Fund program 
indicators and extra staff needed to be hired to collect these data to meet the Global 
Funds reporting needs(OIG GFATM 5 July 2012). 
 
Fourthly, there were inadequate human resources to deliver the TB DOTS policy.  
There was “a lack of medical and paramedical staff at national and provincial level”.  
This resulted in “the use of community health workers to assist nurses and doctors (due 
to limited numbers available) which has contributed significantly to TB program 
outcomes in Papua New Guinea” (OIG GFATM 5 July 2012).  However, as doctors and 
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nurses received all TB DOTS training (Adepoybi - Interview 12th April 2008) the “CHWs 
were not all trained in TB DOTS. This lack of training was critical, as CHWs that are self-
taught use the Stop TB Guidelines (blue book) as a reference source, and this guideline 
had not been updated.”(OIG GFATM 5 July 2012)  
 
Finally, the OIG found within the NDOH that there had been fraudulent use of Global 
Fund Grant moneys which took various forms: 
• “Non-compliance with grant agreements and approved work plans, such as the 
purchase of health products based on an unapproved procurement and supply 
management plan.  
• Lack of supporting documentation for expenditure on goods and services, and 
to support Progress Update and Disbursement Requests, resulting in delayed 
and incorrect reporting.  
• Unreconciled differences between the expenses reported to the Global Fund and 
those in local financial records.  
• Inadequate control over bank and cash operations and weak monitoring of 
advances.  
• Instances of non-compliance with grant requirements and guidelines on 
procurement, including records maintenance and procurement planning.  
• Weak monitoring controls over third party activities and sub-recipients.”(OIG 
GFATM 5 July 2012)  
 
The OIG audit identified $US2.7m of “unsupported and ineligible” expenditure of which 
$US2.3m was not sufficiently accounted for by the NDOH as PR, and smaller sums by 
SRs (OIG GFATM 5 July 2012). 
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As a result in November 2010 the Global Fund invoked its “Additional Safeguard 
Policy” over the PNG portfolio developing an action plan of safeguards which included 
the suspension of the Global Fund Round 6 TB DOTS Grant except for life saving 
activities such as drug supplies …”the OIG concludes that the internal control 
environment requires significant improvement due to non-compliance with applicable 
policies, operating standards, sound commercial practices, the terms of the grant 
agreements and weak financial controls. …. the OIG could not provide reasonable 
assurance that oversight arrangements ensured that grant funds had been used for the 
purpose intended and that value for money had been secured.”(OIG GFATM 5 July 
2012)  
 
The findings in the OIG audit of the Global Fund Grants were a further indication of the 
low level or absence of the institutional commitment component of political 
commitment to address the governance reforms needed to “establish bureaucracies, 
laws and regulations” in the Fox et al framework on political commitment to actually 
deliver the national implementation of the TB DOTS policy. 
 
 NDOH Resigns as Round 6 Grant Principal Recipient 10.9
As a result of the OIG audit the NDOH, in a letter to the Global Fund dated 15 April 
2011, resigned from its role as the PR for Global Fund supported programs in PNG, 
including for the Round 6 TB DOTS Grant (OIG GFATM 5 July 2012, Ahmadova, Heldal 
et al. 2012, GovPNG 2014).  The PNG Global Fund Country Coordination Mechanisms 
(CCM) oversaw the selection process for a new PR for the Round 6 Grant.  This resulted 
in the selection of World Vision International as the new PR in June 2011(GFATM 17th 
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February 2012, World Vision 2013).  From June 2011 World Vision International took 
primary responsibility for the implementation of the TB DOTS policy receiving the 
balance of the Round 6 Grant funding of $US7.4m (World Vision 2013)..  As a result 
World Vision now provided human resources to the central and provincial level 
required to oversee and coordinate the implementation of the Round 6 activities.  It 
also reported directly to the Global Fund the required Round 6 Grant quarterly 
performance indicators.   
 
The NDOH and NTP no longer had any direct responsibility for the implementation of 
the TB DOTS policy.  The revised role and responsibilities of NTP was to monitor and 
report on NTP activities, only provide “oversight” of the Global Fund grant and 
coordinate sub-technical working groups represented by major development partners 
such as World Health Organisation (WHO), AusAID, JTA International, World Vision and 
Hope Worldwide and provincial TB coordinators and physicians from TB burden 
provinces (Adepoybi - Interview 28th January 2010, Ahmadova, Heldal et al. 2012, 
GovPNG 2014).   
 
In the 2006 Round 6 Grant agreement the Round 6 Grant had been meant to finish on 
October 1st 2012.  In agreeing to WV as the new PR the Global Fund, taking into 
consideration delays which occurred during the transition of PR-ship from NDOH to 
World Vision, approved an extension of the Grant from October 1, 2012 to June 30, 
2013 (GovPNG 2014). 
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 Round 6 TB DOTS Implementation Outcomes 10.10
The Round 6 Grant concluded on 30th June 20135.  The central question is by June 2013 
had the Round 6 Stop TB Grant achieved its four objectives?  We draw on independent 
external reviews of the NTP to provide an independent assessment of the four Round 6 
Grant Objectives by 2013-2014:  
2006 DOTS Policy Objective 1 - To achieve high quality expansion and implementation of 
DOTS in order to increase the DOTS coverage rate to at least 80%, case detection rate to at 
least 70% and treatment success rate to at least 85% - in 66 out of the 87 districts by Year 5. 
 
Firstly, DOTS Component 5 - Monitoring and evaluation system, and impact 
measurement provided the data for the evaluation of the other TB DOTS Round 6 
Grant indicators.  The 2014 Joint External Review found that the quality of the DOTS 
data was “still extremely poor”(GovPNG 2014).  In 2013 only 212 of 294 Centres 
providing DOTS returned reports.  Data collection was being driven by Sub-Recipient 
employed M&E staff who had no long term contracts or indication of being absorbed 
into the government health system.   With caveats about the quality of data the 2014 
Review relied on 2011 and 2012 data as the only available data in 2014 to undertake 
its evaluation of the performance of the NTP(GovPNG 2014), confirming the findings of 
the OIG in 2009(OIG GFATM 2014) and the 2012 WHO External Review of 
Programmatic Management of Drug-Resistant TB with regard to poor quality and lack 
of timeliness of health data (Ahmadova, Heldal et al. 2012). 
 
With regards to DOTS Component 2 - Case detection through quality assured 
bacteriology, the 2014 Joint External Review of the NTP stated that sputum smear 
                                                          
5 As the end of the Round 6 Stop TB Grant came to an end a further Grant was being prepared.  An 
application for bridging funds beyond June 2013 was being prepared for the Global Fund to continue 
funding.  This is dealt with later in this Chapter under Postscript. 
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performed is “the bedrock for monitoring and evaluation activities, providing 
diagnostic certainty and the ability to confirm cure.  A well-functioning DOTS program 
is dependent on high rates of quality assured sputum smear microscopy and well-
functioning microscopy centres” (GovPNG 2014).  By 2012 despite the Round 6 grant 
roll out, sputum smears were performed on <50% of adult pulmonary TB cases with 
high rates of “sputum not done” cases (GovPNG 2014).  This was due to the 
inadequate and poorly performing sputum microscopy services.  Whilst smear 
microscopy using the Zeihl-Neelsen method had been established for many years only 
112 of the established 139 microscopy centres were functioning in 2014(GovPNG 
2014) despite the Round 6 inputs.  The reasons for the 27 non-functioning microscopy 
units were either because of “a lack of a trained microscopist, or poor infrastructure, 
e.g. no space for the microscope or reagents.  So sputum samples from these centres 
were sent to other functioning microscopy centres in the province thus overburdening 
the workload of these centres, delaying patient diagnosis and leading to a high rate of 
“smear-not-done” among enrolled cases”(GovPNG 2014).  Again this 2014 outcome 
was despite the extensive inputs to improving sputum microscopy services during the 
Round 6 Grant.   
 
With regard to DOTS Component 3 - Standardized treatment, with supervision and 
patient support TB DOTS was now present in all 20 provinces as a result of the Round 6 
Grant.  However, the 2014 Review found that “case holding was poor with treatment 
success reported in 69% of new smear positive cases, and 52% of retreatments cases 
(based on the 2011 cohort), owing mainly to high rates of “loss to follow up/default” 
(19% for new smear positive and 22% for retreatment cases)”(GovPNG 2014).  This was 
less than the 85% treatment success Round 6 target.  Verification of treatment success 
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proved difficult because inadequate sputum microscopy and reporting and poor data 
management so that the reliability of reported outcomes were questionable so “actual 
loss to follow up” rates had been even higher than reported figures(GovPNG 2014).  
This was a serious concern, “since these patients are more likely to have poor 
treatment outcomes, acquire drug resistance and contribute to on-going TB and MDR-
TB transmission within the community”(GovPNG 2014).  The Review found anecdotal 
evidence that common causes of default “were a lack of knowledge on importance to 
adhere to TB treatment, reliance on traditional healers, religious beliefs, belief that the 
disease is the result of sorcery, patients moving to other locations after working in 
plantations or after opting for a reputed health facility situated far from their residence 
area” (GovPNG 2014) confirming other findings on why TB patients do not comply with 
Treatment (Ongugo, Hall et al. 2011).  This was despite Round 6 grant funding to 
specifically address these issues.  
 
With regard to DOTS Component 4 - An effective drug supply and management system 
the 2014 Review found that “stock management practices were universally poor” 
(GovPNG 2014).  “Stock inventory records were rarely maintained and no stock cards 
were in use.  For those who have, very few records are updated” (GovPNG 2014).  Poor 
storage practices observed by the 2014 Review were “boxes of medicines placed on the 
floor, without any temperature monitoring and control, no prevention of rodent 
damages or water exposure” (GovPNG 2014).  Again it was Round 6 Sub-Recipient 
employed staff that had no long term indication of integration into the government 
health system that drove drug procurement and distribution.  These findings 
confirmed the findings of the Global Fund OIG in 2009 (OIG GFATM 2014)and the 2012 
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WHO External Review of Programmatic Management of Drug-Resistant TB with regard 
to TB drug procurement and supply (Ahmadova, Heldal et al. 2012). 
 
2006 DOTS Policy Objective 2 - To address the challenge of TB/HIV co-infection in 16 of the 
87 districts by Year 5 
The focus of the Round 6 Grant was the scaling up of TB DOTS to the 20 Provinces.  
Joint TB/HIV activities were not in the unsuccessful 2005 Round 5 PNG Stop TB 
application.  However, they were included in the Round 6 Grant application with the 
release of the 2006 Global Plan to Stop TB 2006–2015 (Stop TB Partnership and World 
Health Organization 2006) which emphasised the need to address TB and HIV jointly 
given their close association which then resulted in the Global Fund (Feachem and 
Sabot 2007) from 2006 onwards giving favourable consideration to joint TB/HIV 
activities in grant applications.  As a result the Round 6 grant target was to establish 
joint TB/HIV services in 87 districts by the end of the Round 6 Grant. 
 
The 2014 Joint External Review does not make any mention of joint TB/HIV programs 
having been established.  It found that HIV screening in TB patients was low and that 
documentation of HIV test results in the TB register poor(GovPNG 2014).  The 2012 
WHO External Review of Programmatic Management of Drug-Resistant TB found HIV 
testing rates of 24% in TB patients.  The 2014 Review found that for TB and HIV co-
infected patients that “ARV treatment was often initiated only after completion of TB 
treatment” (GovPNG 2014).  The 2013 Mid Term Review of the PNG HIV Strategy 
(2011-2015) found that only 17% of TB patients had a record of one or more HIV 
counselling/testing episodes (Godwin 28 May 2013).   
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2006 DOTS Policy Objective 3 - To assess the Multi-Drug Resistant TB (MDR-TB) situation in 2 
of the 20 provinces in Years 3-4 
In 2014, after the completion of the Round 6 Grant, the first Drug Resistance Survey 
(DRS) took place in 4 selected provinces (National Capital District, Western Province, 
Madang and Morobe)(GovPNG 2014).  The results of that survey were not available at 
the time of writing this thesis.  However, there was increasing evidence of MDR-TB and 
documented XDR-TB in PNG.  Drug Resistance testing was given a boost with the first 
GenXpert machines to test for MDR-TB being installed in Daru and Port Moresby 
Hospitals in 2012 as part of an Australian Government funded TB control project for 
Western Province which was initiated in 20116 which was not part of the Round 6 
Grant (Ahmadova, Heldal et al. 2012, McBryde 2012, GovPNG 2014).  National PMDT 
Guidelines were finalized in 2011 and NDOH commenced procuring second line drugs 
for MDR-TB (GovPNG 2014).  By 2014, 8 provinces had access to GenXpert testing.  
These MDR-TB developments were outside the scope of the Round 6 Grant.   
 
2006 DOTS Policy Objective 4 - To contribute to the health system strengthening in 66 of the 
87 districts by Year 5. 
With regard to political commitment to “establish bureaucracies, adopt laws and 
regulations”(Fox, Goldberg et al. 2011) to ensure health system governance structures 
capable of implementing a TB DOTS policy, major challenges remained. 
 
Firstly, in 2014, there was still the ongoing major problem of a lack of lines of 
responsibility from the district to provincial, to national levels, impacting significantly 
on health service provision.  The overall system was functioning significantly below its 
potential with health systems management poorly developed, with little or no 
                                                          
6 See Postscript at end of this Chapter for further details 
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accountability, or encouragement or reward for improved performance.  The quality 
and frequency of supervisory visits were minimal and staff motivation generally low.  
Systems to encourage professional behaviour were ineffective, with high rates of 
absenteeism and poor performance outcomes whilst in general.  Program activities, for 
the most part, fell short of TB control requirements in NTP guidelines for both DOTS 
and PMDT (Godwin 28 May 2013, Adepoybi - Interview 28th January 2010, Ahmadova, 
Heldal et al. 2012, GovPNG 2014).  Despite this “high-functioning facilities were 
identified in all provinces, despite formidable local challenges, which demonstrates that 
it is possible to deliver care according to international standards. However, these 
examples were the exception and improved efforts are required to support these 
facilities/individuals and learn from them.” (GovPNG 2014) 
Secondly, low human resource capacity, both quantity and quality, was a major 
concern in all areas of the TB Programme.  There were insufficient  TB designated 
positions, vacancies not filled, absenteeism, travel and leave without ensuring the 
continuity of routine programme functions and technical capacity of staff.  The result 
was markedly reduced effectiveness of service provision and decreased momentum in 
implementation, planning, monitoring and supervision (Adepoybi - Interview 28th 
January 2010, Ahmadova, Heldal et al. 2012, GovPNG 2014). 
 
Thirdly, there was a lack of local ownership especially at the provincial and district 
level, with little engagement from the provincial and district managers in TB control 
activities.  In most provinces support and supervision of TB control activities were seen 
to be the responsibility of World Vision staff without active support or supervision by 
local officials (Adepoybi - Interview 28th January 2010, Ahmadova, Heldal et al. 2012, 
GovPNG 2014). 
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Fourthly, there was huge dependence on project supported partners for critical 
functions with no plans to mainstream these into the NTP with a view to sustainability 
(Ahmadova, Heldal et al. 2012, GovPNG 2014).  “World Vision, being the Principal 
Recipient of the GF Grant, efficiently provides the administrative function.  It has 
successfully facilitated the expansion of DOTS to a nationwide scale expanding from 
nine provinces to 20 provinces trained and implementing DOTS.  Together with other 
partners like WHO, etc., it ably facilitates meetings and trainings to ensure that targets 
are met.  Technical assistance is being provided continuously by the WHO Country 
Office, putting in place the PMDT (Programmatic Management of Drug-resistant TB) 
Guidelines, PMDT Training Modules, making possible the Training of Trainers in 2011, 
updating the TB protocol, collecting data and mediating technical assistance. The focal 
point for major projects like the DRS (Drug Resistance Surveillance) is the WHO Medical 
Officer who provides both technical and administrative support including coordinating 
and organizing meetings and trainings together with the PR.” (Ahmadova, Heldal et al. 
2012)  The 2014 Joint External Review of the National TB Programme of PNG found 
“this creates a perception that World Vision is running a parallel implementation 
structure that would become unsustainable after the end of the Global Fund Grant”. 
(GovPNG 2014).  By 2012, despite government commitment to do so, only five out of 
the 20 provinces have established TB/Leprosy Officer positions.  The remaining 75% of 
provinces have no focal person for TB.  At the national level, despite a commitment to 
do so and Round 6 grant funding for the positions, the crucial Central M&E Officer and 
Central PSM (Procurement & Supply Management) Officer, had not been appointment 
(Ahmadova, Heldal et al. 2012). 
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Finally, as the implementation of the Round 6 Grant came to an end it was found that 
the poor Health System and NTP performance may well be contributing to a worsening 
of the TB and MDR-TB.  The 2012 WHO PMDT Review TB concluded that “the overall 
frail DOTS implementation is likely to generate more MDR-/XDR-TB” (GovPNG 2014).  
The 2014 Joint External Review of the PNG NTP concluded that “these poor practices 
are replicated in many provinces, posing a grave risk of drug resistance multiplication” 
(GovPNG 2014). 
In summary, the impact of the Round 6 Grant in terms of strengthening the Health 
System of PNG was poor.  By the end of the Grant there was no documented 
improvement in the capacity of the PNG Health System to implement a TB Control 
Program.  Taking each of the six WHO building blocks of a Health System – Human 
Resources, Health System Financing, Health Information Systems, Service Provision, 
Leadership and Management, Pharmaceuticals and Medical Technologies (WHO 2007) 
there was no measureable improvement in capacity in any of these components of the 
PNG Health System despite this being an objective of the 2006 Policy.  Parallel 
structures, beside and separate from, although notionally working with the PNG 
government health system were the only means by which the Round 6 grant could be 
implemented.  
 
 Positive Outcomes from the Round 6 TB DOTS Grant 10.11
There were positive outcomes from the development of the 2006 TB DOTS policy and 
the Round 6 Global Fund Grant to implement the policy.  The first was that TB was 
recognized to be a disease of policy importance.  As a result of the process which had 
taken place in 2006 TB had become a policy priority so that it was receiving political 
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attention both in PNG and internationally (Ahmadova, Heldal et al. 2012, GovPNG 
2014).  Drug Resistant TB was also now recognized as a major health policy problem 
which needed to be addressed (Ahmadova, Heldal et al. 2012, GovPNG 2014).   
 
Secondly, by 20113 all 20 Provinces had a TB DOTS program in place where there was 
no national TB control policy previously (Ahmadova, Heldal et al. 2012, GovPNG 2014).   
 
Thirdly, by 2011 the PNG Government was funding 80% of first line TB drug purchases 
(Ahmadova, Heldal et al. 2012) and by 2013 the government was funding the full 
procurement cost of all TB medicines (first- and second-line, adult and paediatric), as 
well as ancillary medicines and TB laboratory supplies(GovPNG 2014).  This PNG 
government funding was consistent with TB DOTS Component 1 – Political 
Commitment, with increased and sustained financing (Stop TB Partnership and World 
Health Organization 2006).  It was also a demonstration of the third component of the 
Fox et al political commitment framework “disbursement and allocation of funds”(Fox, 
Goldberg et al. 2011).  There was a decision taken to stop the use of single drug 
formulations, except in rare cases of drug toxicity.  All new TB patients now receive 
quality-assured fixed-dose combination tablets (FDCs)(GovPNG 2014).  
 
Fourthly, GenXpert machines for the rapid testing of Drug Resistant TB had been 
installed and were operating in Port Moresby, Daru, Lae and Madang Hospitals 
(Ahmadova, Heldal et al. 2012, GovPNG 2014). 
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 Burden of TB in PNG 2013-2014 10.12
The ultimate indicator of the success of the implementation of an intervention such as 
the Round 6 TB DOTS Grant is a measured reduction in morbidity and mortality in the 
target disease.  The reality was that by the end of the Round 6 Grant, the HIS and data 
collection was still so poor it was not possible to measure any change.  It was also too 
short a time frame in which to realistically expect a measureable change. 
 
However it is important to note that TB continues to be a disease of major public 
health importance in PNG based on independent studies using methods and data 
which are completely separate to the HIS. 
 
A review of Western Province HC TB case records in 2012 found a TB incidence of 500 
cases per 100,000 people per year, similar to that in Mozambique and Cambodia 
(McBryde 2012).  These data were collected as part of an external review of the 
AusAID inputs into TB control in the Western Province of PNG.  This review used data 
taken directly from HCs and did not rely on data from the PNG NDOH.   
 
In a further study in the Kikori district of the remote Gulf province, 274 TB patients 
were followed from March to June 2012 to examine the incidence and characteristics 
of TB in a remote rural population with the aim of understanding TB in remote PNG 
communities (Cross, Coles et al. 2014).  The estimated incidence of TB in Kikori was 
1290 per 100,000 people (95% CI 1140 to 1460) in 2012.  The proportion of TB patients 
co-infected with HIV was 1.9%.  Three of 32 TB cases tested were rifampicin resistant.  
This is one of the highest recorded TB incidences in the world(Cross, Coles et al. 2014).  
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The TB incidence in the Western and Gulf Province studies are significantly higher than 
the official PNG National TB incidence, and also the WHO reported TB incidence for the 
whole of PNG.  The official TB incidence is 347 cases per 100,000 per year(WHO 2014, 
UNDP 2015).  This was for the final MDG report and is based on 2013 data (UNDP 
2015).  
 
Drug resistant TB is an increasing problem and a real challenge given the health system 
constraints (Gilpin, Simpson et al. 2008, Ahmadova, Heldal et al. 2012, McBryde 2012, 
Cross, Coles et al. 2014).  Country Guidelines for Management of MDR-TB were 
introduced in 2011 (Dakulala 2010, NDOH NTP 2011).  The 2014 Joint External Review 
of the NTP found that MDR-TB was present.  Some 337 MDT-TB patients had been 
started on second line drugs (SLDs) since 2009 with more than 50% of all MDR cases in 
Western Province, 8 with XDR-TB and 6 with TB/HIV coinfection(GovPNG 2014).  The 
number of cases is likely to increase as greater drug resistance testing is carried out 
now there are 8 centres with GenXpert machines. 
 
With regard to TB in PNG the 2014 Joint External Review found “Tuberculosis is 
rampant throughout PNG, and the National Capital District (NCD) reports the highest 
TB rates (over three times higher than any other province). Port Moresby is likely to act 
as an epidemic amplifier, also feeding the emergence and spread of drug-resistant TB.  
Multi-drug resistant (MDR-TB) strains are becoming more common, with high case 
numbers reported from NCD and the Western Province, where extremely drug-resistant 
(XDR) TB exists as well. TB/HIV co-infection remains a concern, but seems less common 
than previously feared and is concentrated within the Highlands and Southern 
regions”(GovPNG 2014). 
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Finally with regard to the MDGs, PNG has not achieved its MDG for reductions in TB as 
can be seen in Table 10.  PNG has not achieved any of its targets for the 8 MDGs. 
 
 
Papua New Guinea 
MDG Goal 6 – Combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria, and TB 
Target 6C – Halve by 2015 & reverse the incidence of TB 
 
 
Year 
 
1990 2006 2013 
 
Indicator 6.9  Incidence rate per year per 
100,000 popn (mid-point) 
 
309 353 347 
 
Indicator 6.9  Prevalence of TB 
per 100,000 popn (mid-point) 
 
694 548 437 
 
Indicator 6.9   TB death rate per year per 
100,00 popn (mid-point) 
 
105 62 33 
 
Indicator 6.10  TB detection rate  under DOTS 
(percent) (mid-point) 
 
19 57 89 
 
Indicator 6.10  TB cure rate under DOTS 
(percent) (mid-point) 
 
60 71 68 (2012 data) 
Table 10 Papua New Guinea Millennium Development Goal TB Targets and Indicators 
 (Note – 2013 data was latest data available, all data are estimates) 
Source: (UNDP 2015) 
 
 Postscript 10.13
All policy evolves and changes over time due to a range of factors to do with policy 
actors, policy context and the policy process(Buse, Mays et al. 2006).  This happened 
with the 2006 PNG Stop TB Policy before the completion of the Round 6 Grant in 2013.  
Even though these policy developments are not the subject of this research it is 
important to briefly touch on these policy developments so as to see how dynamic the 
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policy process is and subject to various factors.  The Global Fund OIG findings with 
regard to fraudulent use of Round 6 Grant funds and a lack of capacity to implement 
the Round 6 Grant was a crucial point in the 2006 policy process. 
 
 Australia and the “Stop TB in Western Province” Project  10.13.1
Despite having funded the majority of the 2006 Global Fund Round 6 TB DOTS Grant, 
TB  in PNG continued to receive attention at the political level in Australia.  There was 
ongoing documentation of TB and MDR-TB in Papua New Guinean patients crossing 
the border to seek treatment in Australian Torres Strait clinics (Gilpin, Simpson et al. 
2008) and continuing Australian press coverage of this issue (Parnell 1st March 2008, 
Parnell 11th June 2007).    
 
In 2010 this resulted in an Australian Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade 
References Committee established an inquiry to examine broad cross border issues in 
the Torres Strait including health, trade, climate change, law and order, and 
biosecurity, and presented its detailed report entitled The Torres Strait: Bridge and 
Border in November 2010 (Senate of Australia November 2010).  The Senate inquiry 
found that “Tuberculosis presents a particular problem for the Torres Strait.  In March 
2009, the rate of tuberculosis in Western Province, the PNG region closest to the Torres 
Strait, was 552 cases per 100,000 people.  Indeed, the most common reasons for health 
visits by PNG nationals to the Saibai health clinic were tuberculosis and malaria.  
Limited surveys estimate that between 10 and 20 per cent of tuberculosis in PNG could 
be MDR TB”(Senate of Australia November 2010).  The Committee’s report in 
November 2010 characterized TB in Western Province as both a biosecurity and border 
protection risk, as well as a major health threat for Australia (Senate of Australia 
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November 2010) and charged the Department of Foreign Affairs with responsibility for 
addressing these issues.  The Australian Senate Report was released within a few 
weeks of the Global Fund OIG audit report on the fraudulent use of Round 6 Grant 
funds, and the lack of capacity of the NDOH to deliver the Round 6 Grant national roll 
out of TB DOTS, and the suspension of the Round 6 Grant until a new Principal 
Recipient could be appointed (OIG GFATM 5 July 2012). 
 
In February 2011, within a matter of 2 months of the Senate Committee Report, 
Australia and the PNG Government announced an $Aus11m Australian funded four 
year “Stop TB in Western Province” Project to support the Government of PNG to 
strengthen TB control in Western Province, bordering the Torres Strait of Australia 
(World Vision 23rd February 2012, AusAID 2012).  This was a bilateral (Australia – PNG) 
project, completely separate from the Global Fund Round 6 Grant (World Vision 23rd 
February 2012, AusAID 2012).   
 
The AusAID press release announcing the Western Province project states that 
AusAID’s long term strategic objective was “to support the Government of PNG to 
significantly reduce morbidity and mortality from TB and MDR-TB in South Fly/Western 
Province and Torres Strait, through sustained quality TB control and strong cross border 
coordination, in line with National PNG TB targets” (AusAID 2012).  There was 
significant emphasis on “Strong cross border governance arrangements to ensure 
coordination, oversight and accountability. This involves development of strong 
partnerships and agreed cross border protocols” (AusAID 2012).  
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The Stop TB in Western Province Project was to be implemented by World Vision 
which had just taken over the Principal Recipient roll from the NDOH in the 
implementation of the Global Fund Round 6 Grant.  The AusAID announcement states 
that the “approach is based on the WHO’s established global standards for an effective 
TB and MDR-TB response. The WHO treatment guidelines have been proven to work 
internationally, including in PNG where it has been implemented already in nine 
provinces, with success” (AusAID 2012).  The Project included the construction of a 
new TB isolation ward, as well as the installation of X-ray equipment and a GenXpert 
machine, to rapidly test for MDR-TB, at Daru Hospital.  The Project also employed “TB 
specialist staff, and provided training for as well as managing a network of health 
workers to deliver best practice treatment to people in their own communities” (AusAID 
2012).  There was also the purchase of a purpose built “sea ambulance” to conduct 
monthly TB outreach clinics throughout the South Fly region of the Western Province, 
as well as transport TB patients to Daru Hospital when needed, rather than those 
patients crossing the border for treatment in Australian clinics.  The Project narrative 
was that “This approach will enable TB treatment to be provided to Papua New 
Guineans in their communities, which has been proven to be the most effective way to 
treat TB and prevent the development of drug resistance”(AusAID 2012). 
 
A major difference between the AusAID Western Province Stop TB Project and the 
Round 6 Grant was the inclusion of MDR-TB treatment which had not been present in 
the Round 6 Grant.  This involved AusAID funding the supply and training of health 
workers in the use of second line TB drugs (AusAID 2012).  This was a new policy 
response to the documentation of drug resistant TB in patients crossing the Torres 
Strait border (Brolan, Upham et al. 2011, Simpson, Coulter et al. 2011, Vincent 2011) 
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and in Western Province itself (McBryde 2012).  Official WHO policy was that 
treatment of MDR-TB only should commence once DOTS for drug sensitive TB was fully 
implemented and functioning successfully throughout a country(Stop TB Partnership 
and World Health Organization 2006).  This is an example of how health policy can and 
does evolve according to the needs within a context and of the actors in the policy.   
 
The Western Province Project narrative makes statements about “supporting 
leadership by the PNG government” and “support to strengthen primary health care 
services (such as improving the supply of essential drugs and training health workers) is 
essential to underpin and complement specific support to manage TB” (AusAID 2012).  
This is the same narrative as in the formulation and implementation of the 2006 Stop 
TB Policy.  As with the 2006 Policy there was still no clear strategy to address the major 
health system governance constraints in the PNG health system and resulting low 
levels of service provision, which had been a major contributor to the high TB 
prevalence and the emergence of MDR-TB.  
 
As the Stop TB in Western Province Project was announced, TB treatment services for 
Papua New Guinean patients through Australian Clinics in the Torres Strait were 
withdrawn.  This received criticism and opposition from doctors (Konstantinos, 
Simpson et al. 2011) as well as media attention in Australia (McCutcheon 18 Jul 2011, 
ABC Television - The 7.30 Report 19 April 2011). 
 
The Western Province Stop TB Project was “the start of a long term, ten year 
commitment by the Australian Government to working with the PNG Government to 
control TB in Western Province” which “is expected to result in increased TB detection 
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and treatment in the short term and reduce the TB incidence in the medium and long 
term”(AusAID 2012).   
 
The Western Province Stop TB Project was a further evolution of the 2006 Policy in 
response to Australian domestic political level attention combined with the adverse 
findings of the Global Fund OIG putting the Round 6 Grant in jeopardy.  Given the 
political priority TB in the Torres Strait was receiving domestically in Australia, the 
2006 Policy was by 2010 not sufficient for that Australian domestic policy problem. 
 2013 - Interim Extension of Stop TB Activities 2013-2014 10.13.2
As the end Round 6 Grant approached in June 2013 no planning or provision had been 
made for funding of the NTP beyond the life of the Grant(Aia 2012, Lokuge, Salee et al. 
2012).  Nor were there any concrete plan to integrate the round 6 Grant into routine 
into the NDOH disease control activities (Ahmadova, Heldal et al. 2012).  There was a 
period from June 2013 to October 2013 where there was no funding for the NTP(WHO 
2013).  In mid-2013 the NTP Technical Working Group, made up of the NDOH and all 
Sub-Recipients of the Round 6 Grant, prepared a concept note which made a 
successful interim application to GF which was approved in late 2013 for US$ 9.5 
million for a year from November 2013 to December 2014(GovPNG 2014).  This 
extension was predicated on World Vision being the Principal Recipient.  In February 
2015 the Gates Foundation announced an $Aus18m donation to be administered by 
the Global Fund and managed by World Vision for TB control in PNG along with an 
$Aus4m donation by World Vision itself (Flitton 16th February 2015). 
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 Conclusion  10.14
At the conclusion of its implementation on June 30th 2013, the Round 6 Global Fund 
Stop TB in PNG Grant (PNG CCM 2006) had not achieved any of the 4 Grant targets.  
Based on the limited HIS data the TB DOTS Target 1 – to achieve DOTS coverage of 80% 
of the population, a case detection rate of at least 70%, and treatment success rate of 
at least 85%, was not achieved.  Target 4 - to strengthen the PNG health system in 66 
out of the 87 districts was also not achieved.  The health system was no stronger as a 
result of the implementation of the Round 6 Grant.   
 
Rather than addressing the long standing and ongoing major dysfunction in the health 
system, the Grant was implemented by setting up a parallel structure using Sub-
Recipients from the private, faith based and non-government sectors to deliver 
interventions.  The role of the NDOH as the Round 6 Grant Principal-Recipient, 
providing oversight of the implementation of the Grant, including the management 
and distribution of the funds to Sub-Recipients, was terminated by the Global Fund 
due to fraudulent use of funds and a lack of capacity to perform the PR role.  World 
Vision was appointed to take on this role causing resentment in and lack of 
cooperation from the NDOH.  In so doing the fundamental health system governance 
constraints were bypassed and not addressed.  Underlying this failure to achieve the 
Round 6 Grant Targets was a lack of political commitment to establishing health 
governance structures in which accountability and responsibility for health service 
delivery took precedence over wantokism, clientelism and corruption.  The Provincial 
Health Authorities Act 2007 provided the provinces with an opportunity to address 
lines of responsibility and accountability.  This opportunity was largely ignored by the 
provinces, continuing the entrenched nepotism and lack of accountability which 
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underpinned the inability to implement this national health policy.  True political 
commitment meets all three areas of the Fox framework – expressed, bureaucratic 
and financial.  From both the political and bureaucratic level it involves a 
determination to build structures and governance arrangements which deliver services 
and outcomes with inbuilt accountability which in turn drive policy formulation and 
implementation.  These were lacking in the 2006 Stop TB policy, both with the 
international and PNG policy actors. 
 
Further, the failure to achieve the Round 6 Grant Targets was related to a policy which 
was formulated by global policy actors (Australia, Global Fund and WHO) from outside 
of PNG.  The PNG TB DOTS Policy was based on the needs of these global policy actors 
and their international and domestic policy agendas rather than starting with the PNG 
policy needs.  The result was a policy which in its formulation did not address or take 
into account the complex policy context in PNG.  By virtue of their funding power these 
global policy actors were able to influence and determine the PNG policy agenda, with 
little engagement within and by PNG in the policy process at either the political or 
health system level.  Health policy formulation and implementation in resource poor 
settings which do not take into consideration the major policy contextual issues and 
constraints may meet the short term needs of aid donors, but do not result in 
sustainable outcomes in disease burden nor stronger health systems. 
 
Finally, the comments of a long term, experienced employee of World Vision 
summarized why the Round 6 Grant Targets were not met: 
“I think the policies that have been developed have not taken into consideration 
the context that is here in PNG … its CHWs at the APs, a weak government 
health system, Sangooma (traditional PNG belief about illness causality), there 
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is MDR and XDR TB etc.  I haven’t really seen any of those being considered 
when drafting the DOTS policy for this country. … DOTS it’s not really working. 
Maybe there has not been enough time taken, but we need to look at exactly 
why, and we need to be flexible to modify things, I found that policy makers are 
not flexible to inputs.  This is how it is; this is how it’s going to be. You have to 
forget about flexibility when you have timelines to meet.” (Adepoybi - Interview 
28th January 2010) 
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Part 6 –Discussion and Conclusion 
 
 
 
Chapter 11- Discussion & Conclusion brings the key points of the thesis together and 
offers suggestions for future research, as well as offering suggestions arising from this 
research as to how to address the health policy process in low and middle income 
countries such as PNG
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11 Discussion & Conclusion 
 
 Introduction 11.1
The aim of this chapter is to bring the key findings of this research together and to 
discuss the implications of these findings with regard to political commitment and 
agenda setting in health policy in resource limited settings.   
 
The objectives of this research are, firstly, to describe and critique TB in PNG as a 
health problem (objective 1).  Secondly, to describe and critique what TB DOTS 
Component 1 – Political Commitment, meant and how it was exercised in the 
formulation and implementation of the 2006 policy (objectives 2 and 4).  Thirdly, to 
describe and critique the agenda setting process which lead to TB becoming a so called 
tier 1 policy priority disease (objective 3). 
 
This thesis sets out to critically understand the policy process by which TB came onto 
the policy agenda in PNG in 2006.  With a focus on political commitment this research 
has examined the policy context, and how and if this was taken into consideration in 
the formulation of the 2006 policy. 
 
The thesis particularly investigates power relationships in policy agenda setting in a 
resource limited setting.  It finds that international policy groups and funding agencies, 
through the provision of aid funds and the mechanisms by which those funds were 
provided, exert significant influence, and can and do alter policy priorities, shape policy 
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formulation and determine policy implementation.  Policy transfer from abroad and 
the involvement of foreign technical advisers and consultants removed national policy 
makers from the policy content development process.  The increased resources had 
the unintended consequence of weakening the national governments policy capacity 
even further.  Policy responses to TB can only be effective if both local political 
commitment and sustained funding are realised.  The intricacies of the 2006 TB DOTS 
policy process in PNG provides lessons for a broader understanding of the policy 
process in resource limited settings and how policy is formulated and transferred to 
resource limited settings.   
 
PNG with a population of 7 million people, most of who live in underserved rural areas, 
has some of the worse health indicators in the WPRO of WHO.  It remains 156 on the 
Human Development Index.  It will not achieve any of the 8 MDG targets, including the 
MDG 6 targets for TB, by the end of 2015.  The limited TB data from the HIS along with 
small well conducted incidence studies in Western and Gulf provinces shows that PNG 
has one of the highest burdens of TB in WPRO, and possibly the world.  
 
This research makes an original contribution to knowledge about political commitment 
and agenda setting in health policy in resource limited settings.  There is a very limited 
literature on political commitment and agenda setting in the policy process in resource 
poor settings.  There is a complete absence of research on these in Papua New Guinea.  
This is the original contribution of this research.  
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 TB as a Health Policy Problem in PNG 11.2
Firstly, with regard to Objective 1 - To describe TB as a health problem in PNG the reality 
is that the actual prevalence and incidence of TB was and still is not known.  Despite 
significant aid donor inputs over several decades, HIS data was and is still poor and too 
unreliable to provide an accurate measure of TB burden, or control program 
outcomes.  The reality is that what has been represented as strengthening the HIS 
during the Round 6 Grant implementation was in fact a focus on the collection of data 
to meet Global Fund reporting requirements.  As a result after the 5 years of Round 6 
Grant implementation there is still insufficient reliable data to provide accurate 
measures of TB burden.   
 
PNG has a fundamental structural governance problem which underpins the poor data 
collection, analysis and reporting.  These structural problems are beyond the control of 
the health system itself, starting soon after Independence due to the need to keep the 
new country intact and placate the needs of secessionist groups in a rugged, 
inaccessible, and culturally and linguistically diverse country.  The 1977 Organic Law on 
Provincial Government, and then the 1995 New Organic Law on Provincial Government 
and Local Level Government, decentralized responsibility for all government services, 
including health, to the lowest level of government which did not have the capacity to 
manage or deliver health services.  If health information, the health system, and health 
outcomes for all Papua New Guineans are to improve, then these fundamental 
structural governance problems need to be addressed, especially now with the 
emergence of MDR-TB and XDR-TB.  Attempts to do so have, thus far, not been 
successful. 
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Despite these overwhelming constraints, donors such as the Global Fund, DFAT 
(Australia) and ADB, have expended large sums of donor assistance on improving HIS 
in PNG and continue to do so.  Donors to disease control programmes such as TB, 
come to PNG with a particular paradigm of how a health system functions, e.g. how 
health data are collected, analysed and reported, as well as how TB control must be 
carried out i.e. TB DOTS.  These paradigms assume the existence of a centralized HIS 
with adequate communication between peripheral HCs and the central health 
information unit, and then the capacity to undertake analysis and reporting against a 
range of programme indicators.  However, the current PNG HIS is not capable of 
achieving data outputs based on such assumptions, given the embedded structural 
governance constraints.  This illustrates a divide between donors’ own need for data 
and the limited capacity to provide these data.  Donors’ own governance structures, 
including those regarding data requirements, are not flexible, and not able to be 
adapted to the major structural limitations of HISs in low income countries such as 
PNG.  There is an assumption that a recipient government should restructure itself in 
order to meet the data needs of donors; however, this is unrealistic.  Attempts to 
reform or set up parallel HISs have been demonstrated to be unsustainable.  Donors 
need to look at how the institutions of government work, especially with regard to 
information gathering.  Donors are not going to fix the HIS on their own.  A broader 
PNG driven reform of the health sector governance structures must be the starting 
point.   
 
Finally, the 2006 TB DOTS policy did not come about as a result an outcry from within 
PNG at the political, NDOH, NGO, TB advocacy or community levels over the 
documentation of a marked change or increase in TB prevalence and incidence.  The 
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PNG National Health Plan 2000-2010 had not made TB control a policy priority.  
Malaria and HIV were the two PNG Government and NDOH priority diseases up until 
2006.  There was no documentation or reporting of a dramatic change in TB incidence 
which created within PNG a policy problem of sufficient importance for the political 
level to demand a policy solution such as a TB DOTS policy.  The HIS was not reliable 
enough to document such a change.  The momentum for the 2006 TB policy came 
from and was driven from outside PNG. 
 
 Political Commitment 11.3
The key to an effective TB control policy is political commitment (also referred to as 
political will or political leadership).  Long term responsibility for TB policy can only rest 
with Papua New Guineans.  Political commitment is not an arbitrary variable and 
cannot be exhibited by or driven by anyone other than the national government.  For 
this reason political commitment is the first of the five TB DOTS policy 
components(Stop TB Partnership and World Health Organization 2006, WHO 2014).  
Political commitment is not an element which can be “bought” through donor funding, 
nor can it be transferred as part of a policy transfer and adaption process.   However, a 
major counter-pressure to the need for national political commitment is the influence 
of international policy makers. 
 
This research confirms the findings of Fox et al. (Fox, Goldberg et al. 2011) that political 
commitment cannot be said to have been exhibited until the elected and appointed 
representatives of the country demonstrate:   
1) Expressed commitment – giving verbal and written endorsement to the policy;  
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2) Bureaucratic commitment – establishing or reforming bureaucratic structures to 
facilitate implementation, adoption of laws and regulations to facilitate the policy, 
establishing monitoring and evaluation systems to measure change the policy has 
brought about; and  
3) Financial commitment - ensuring sustained and ongoing funding for the 
implementation of the policy.   
 
This research demonstrates two very different understandings of political 
commitment.   
There is a PNG construct of political commitment and a global construct of political 
commitment.  This significant difference posed major challenges in the formulation 
and implementation of the 2006 policy.  
 
The global actors in this process conceptualize political commitment in terms used by 
the health system strengthening movement’s (WHO 2007, Atun, de Jongh et al. 2010, 
Atun 2012) construct of leadership and governance which is framed in terms such as – 
“Policy environment, regulatory environment, stewardship function, and structural 
arrangements for purchasers, providers, and market regulators.  WHO judges that 
good governance means strategic policy frameworks exist and are combined with 
effective oversight, coalition building, the provision of appropriate regulations and 
incentives, attention to system design, and accountability” (Atun, Weil et al. 2010). 
 
The PNG construct of political commitment is very different.  Political commitment and 
leadership is shaped by the deeply rooted cultural imperative of loyalty to wantok 
whatever the circumstance (Okole 2003, Kurer 2007, Dix and Pok 2009).  This even 
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transcends the concept of the PNG nation and the national good.  At the political level 
wantokism has evolved to the point where the political process of Parliamentary 
elections, political party alliances and voting decisions are driven by clientelism.  
Decisions at the political level are driven by maximizing benefit for electors.  Political 
commitment is measured in terms of material returns to supporters in a clientelist 
political system.  Governance structures have evolved to serve these fundamental 
cultural imperatives of wantokism in appointments and in its structure.  Health system 
governance is a product of these cultural institutions.  The result is corruption and 
nepotism in appointments with institutionalized low capacity, poor performance, and 
lack of accountability throughout the health system.  The health system is not 
structured so as to be accountable and responsible for the provision of services 
(Research Field Visit Notes May 2007, Research Field Notes November 2005, Research 
Field Notes November 2006).  Essentially the impact of the governance reforms 
brought about by the 1977 Organic Law on Provincial Government and the 1995 New 
Organic Law on Provincial and Local Level Government created a disconnection 
between the three levels of the PNG health system, which has become entrenched in 
health service provision down to the HC level.  The result was a lack of accountability 
between the three levels of the health system – national, provincial and district, and a 
lack of supervision from, and accountability to, higher levels in the health system with 
absenteeism, poor staff attitudes and behaviour towards clients and low morale.  
There was a significant decline in all health infrastructure.    Most importantly there 
was a lack of trust by the communities in the health service, and a lack of engagement 
with the communities by the health service. 
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This is why the health system was and is not able to deliver global health initiatives and 
achieve targets set by global actors and programs.  Global policy actors do not have 
the capacity to change this.  This change must come from within PNG.  It requires a 
new form of political commitment at all political levels in PNG.  
 
It is this PNG construct of political commitment and the consequent dysfunction within 
the PNG health system which formed the policy context for the development of the 
2006 TB DOTS policy.  The difficulties and challenges were well documented and well 
known by all policy actors in the 2006 policy process.  It was well known that the ability 
of the PNG health system to deliver even basic primary care services had been in 
decline since Independence and the rate of decline had increased since the 1995 New 
Organic Law on Provincial and Local Level Government completely devolved 
responsibility for service provision, including health to the lowest level of government 
which had no capacity to implement policy or provide basic services.  As a result, by 
2006 up to 50% of Aid Posts (the obvious place to undertake DOT) were closed in parts 
of PNG with people having to walk for hours, even days, to attend an Aid Post or HC for 
health care.  Health Patrols, which were meant to fill health system gaps in remote 
villages were not happening in most parts of PNG due to lack of funding, lack of 
transport, lack of supervision and low staff morale.  This policy context was a direct 
result of an absence of political commitment to the provision of basic health services.  
Aid donors knew this.  Technical consultants funded by the donors, along with multiple 
reports, also funded by donors, had repeatedly documented this fact. 
 
Applying the Fox et al. framework to the 2006 TB policy there was definite expressed 
commitment to a TB control policy.  This took the form of the Minister for Health 
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moving TB to a tier 1 policy disease with the adoption of the 2006 TB policy.  There was 
even increased funding from the PNG recurrent budget such that by 2011 all TB 
medications were being purchased by the PNG government.  This was a demonstration 
of financial commitment. 
The 2007 Provincial Health Authority Act was an attempt to redress the fragmentation 
of the health system brought about by the 1995 New Organic Law on Provincial 
Government and Local Level Government by bringing rural health services and hospital 
services back under one authority with clear central reporting and accounting 
responsibilities.  This was an example of bureaucratic commitment - establishing 
bureaucracies and enacting legislation to facilitate the implementation of the policy 
(Fox, Goldberg et al. 2011).  However, only three provinces or the then 20 provinces 
have taken the opportunity to accept this voluntary legislation.  The loss of control 
over resources which would have resulted from endorsing the 2007 Provincial Health 
Authority Act, meant it was not acceptable to the majority of the provinces in PNG.  
The second, and most important component, of political commitment, bureaucratic 
commitment, was absent.  There was no commitment to establishing bureaucracies, 
laws and regulations which facilitated the implementation of the policy. 
 
Political commitment to TB is hard to exhibit in PNG because it requires addressing and 
discussing overwhelming cultural institutions in a deeply traditional country.  In PNG 
there is often consensus, a sense of the “common good”, about the need for effective 
health policy.  However, this is superseded by the cultural, political and institutional 
imperatives we have identified and examined in the PNG setting, so that the 
governance structures and institutional behaviours ensure there are no structures 
capable of delivering those very policies.  This is the crux of the policy development 
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and implementation dilemma in PNG.  “How can national policies, on which there is 
little substantive disagreement, be translated into effective programmes and 
implemented in a context characterised by differing institutional, political and group 
based priorities and interests, and where 'the state' is seen by many as a distant actor, 
at best?”(Bolger, Mandie-Filer et al. 2005) 
 
Political instability has undermined the capacity of the PNG state to take advantage of 
considerable funding levels for health policies in general, and TB control in particular. 
“It also raises questions about the role and functioning of modern state institutions 
(including efforts to strengthen their capacity) in societies which are guided 
substantially by traditional cultural beliefs, relationships, leadership styles, and 
knowledge systems.  Other traditional, nonunitary states with diverse and dispersed 
populations struggle with similar tensions.  The question for PNG is how central or 
marginal these factors are to success in the health sector.”(Bolger, Mandie-Filer et al. 
2005)  
 
It is only political commitment from the policy actors at all levels of government in 
PNG who can ultimately answer this question.  What do Papua New Guineans see as 
the function of the state and do they value the services delivered by the state as 
worthwhile enough to bring about radical changes in the style of political commitment 
being currently exercised?    
 
 Agenda setting in the 2006 TB policy 11.4
This research shows that donors can and do influence policy formulation and agenda 
setting and in so doing may and do neglect local conditions and provide funding which 
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both diminishes the role of the state and detracts from the opportunity of the national 
government to be politically committed. 
 
TB was not a policy priority disease in PNG before 2006.  The National Health Plan 
2000-2010 (GovPNG 2000, Mann 2006) identified HIV and Malaria as the PNG 
government and NDOH so called tier 1 policy priority diseases.  TB was a tier 2 disease. 
The 2006 policy was not a policy which was driven from within PNG by groups at the 
political, NDOH, NGO or community levels as a result of a documented significant 
change in the burden of TB.  
 
The agenda setting process took place largely outside of PNG and was driven by global 
actors and their agendas.  The press coverage which raised awareness of TB in PNG 
was driven by the Australian press, and was framed in terms of a “threat from the 
north” to Australia resulting from the documentation of increased TB and MDR-TB in 
Western Province Papua New Guineans crossing the Torres Strait border for treatment 
in Australian HCs.  TB in PNG came onto the Australian policy agenda before it came 
onto the PNG policy agenda.  The newly established Global Fund was successful in 
mobilizing significant levels of funding for the control of HIV, TB and Malaria.  It 
received funding from Australia which had to be directed to funding HIV, TB and 
Malaria in the Pacific region.  This increased availability of funds for TB and the 
increased influence of international players on policy paradoxically undermined the 
opportunity for local adaption of policy and political commitment.  WHO was actively 
advocating for TB DOTS as the “evidence based” policy solution for the global TB 
emergency. The policy priorities agenda of these three key donors came together or 
converged in 2006. 
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The power to influence the policy agenda setting process in PNG was exerted by these 
external actors in two ways. 
 
Firstly, this influence and power was exerted through the significant levels of donor 
aid, making up a major portion of the health budget for the provision of even basic 
health services across every area of the health system.  In the period leading up to 
2006 Australia was the largest donor to the health sector(Asian Development Bank 
2003, Foster, Condon et al. 2009).  By 2006 the Global Fund with the Round 3 Malaria 
Grant(GFATM 2004) and the Round 4 HIV/AIDS(GFATM 2004) was also a major donor.  
The dependence on aid is such that donor funds determine if, and when, a disease 
control program will commence.  When donor funds are no longer available disease 
control programs simply cease, even if this will result in higher mortality and morbidity 
and contribute to the emergence of drug resistant strains of TB.  This was the case 
when the Round 6 Grant was suspended due to fraudulent use of funds(OIG GFATM 
2014) and when there was a six month time period with no funds from June 2013, 
when the Round 6 Grant finished, until interim funding was secured (Aia 2012).  
 
The second was through the provision of technical experts or advisers in key roles of 
influence with NDOH.  Whilst nominally not in “line positions” for disease control 
policy formulation or implementation these advisers did, de facto, take on line 
responsibility due to the low capacity within the NDOH.  They become policy 
entrepreneurs for the particular policy of the organization for which they work.  The 
2004 appointment of Dr Yadav as the WHO Technical Adviser with extensive 
experience in TB DOTS in India was a key point in the policy process leading to the 
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2006 TB policy.  This policy actor came with one policy approach.  There is no 
indication in this research of a policy debate about which policy approach was best for 
TB control in PNG.  His appointment, and the managerial skills and knowledge he 
brought, meant the concerns of international donors about the NTP were overcome 
and resulted in the 2006 TB policy.  The 2006 policy had goals and targets determined 
by, and taken directly from, the 2006 Stop TB Strategy 2006-2015(Stop TB Partnership 
and World Health Organization 2006) of achieving a DOTS population coverage of 80%, 
a case detection rate of 70%, and treatment success rate of 85%.  Given the PNG 
context with limited capacity at the NDOH and fragmentation of the health system 
down to the provincial and district level, with every indication that in fact the health 
service was declining in coverage and quality, these targets were unrealistic in a five 
year grant time frame.  These were targets to achieve a global policy, not targets which 
had been developed taking into consideration the PNG context and which could be 
realistically achieved in such a period. 
 
The result was a TB DOTS policy which did not deal with the major governance 
constraints and which in order to meet the donors’ objectives, reporting requirements 
and time frame by-passed the PNG government health system whilst at the same time 
using the health system strengthening terminology as a principal justification and 
objective for the policy. 
 
Global Fund Guiding Principle C states that the Global Fund grants need to “reflect 
national ownership and respect country-led formulation and implementation 
processes”(GFATM 2001).  Global Fund Guiding Principle F states that Global Fund 
grants need to “take into account local realities and priorities”.   Global Fund Guiding 
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Principle H3 states that GFATM funded Grants would “support the substantial scaling 
up and increased coverage of proven and effective interventions, which strengthen 
systems for working within the health sector, across government departments, and 
with communities”.   
 
The WHO Global Plan to Stop TB 2006-2015 – Actions for Life - Towards a World Free of 
Tuberculosis (Stop TB Partnership and World Health Organization 2006), on which the 
2006 policy is directly based, emphasized the importance of health systems 
strengthening.  It stated that TB control policy is to “Contribute to Health System 
Strengthening (by) actively participating in efforts to improve system-wide policy, 
human resources, financing, management, service delivery, and information systems.” 
(Raviglione and Uplekar 2006). 
 
Further the AusAID consultant Dr Konstantinos’ recommendation to AusAID was that 
the TB DOTS provided an opportunity to establish a strong PHC system in PNG.  He saw 
that TB DOTS Program, if done well, could help deliver this strong PHC system.  “I really 
tried to push hard the message of the importance of TB control in PNG, both from the 
effect on disease, but also as a mechanism of introducing a primary health care 
structure in the country, if you do it well” (Konstantinos - Interview 7th May 2008). 
 
The international influence brought to bear by these key actors, while integral to the 
TB formulation and policy agenda has arguably undermined the long-term success of 
the policy for two reasons.  Firstly, the international community influenced the policy 
process with both funding and expertise during the initial policy development phase.  
PNG response was confined to acceptance and response to advice and funding offers.  
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Such a role undermined PNG ownership of TB as a policy problem.   Walt (Walt and 
Gilson 1994) has pointed to the strong fears of developing countries that policy driven 
by external donors with scant regard for local conditions and sensibilities may prove 
irrelevant and impossible to implement.  Just as importantly, external donors can 
develop the policy free from accountability pressures.  Second, the structures set up in 
parallel to the health system to implement the policy meant the policy failed to 
address the fundamental health system governance constraints arguably further 
undermining the health system it purported to strengthen. 
 
 The Way Forward 11.5
There are several important implications for how policy is formulated and 
implemented in resource poor settings which this research brings out. 
 
The first is that there are parts of the PNG health system which do work.  During field 
visits and interviews it was apparent that there are individuals and groups at the 
national, provincial and district level who are competent, perform well and achieve 
well in terms of coverage of interventions and outcomes in their areas of responsibility 
despite the major health system constraints.  Anecdotally  these individuals and groups 
demonstrate strong leadership and a commitment to their local communities along 
with a lack of willingness to accept the status quo in addressing local health problems 
and delivering health interventions.  There needs to be greater research focused on 
these successes to provide evidence for what works and why it works.    It is this local 
evidence which should be informing policy formulation and implementation.  The 
successful provinces, districts and HCs where commitment and leadership has been 
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exercised, with a track record of achieving outcomes, is where health policies need to 
be trialled, and introduced initially on a small scale with achievable targets and an 
emphasis on health system strengthening as the starting point.  Time-frames for the 
roll-out of national programs need to be based on this research which shows what is 
achievable within the local context rather than timeframes which suit the funding 
cycles of international donors.  A smaller financial commitment and one that actually 
contributed to the rebuilding of the health system would have had the added benefit 
of synergising TB funding with funding for other health issues like restoring the health 
system.  This was stated in the policy but the implementation actually set up parallel 
systems undermining what already existed. 
 
Donors need to make decisions about their policy priorities.  Is the donor’s priority to 
meet targets for the donor’s programs so as to document success according to donors’ 
indicators?  Or is it about achieving what is stated in the donor’s own charters with 
regard to stronger and more sustainable health systems using indicators which are 
true measures of outcomes within PNG?  If it is the later then a new approach which 
does truly take into account the policy context using local evidence must be adopted.  
There was every indication in 2006 that the health system was not able to implement a 
national DOTS policy.  The more realistic target would be to take those “successes” in 
the PNG system as the starting point and use local evidence about what does work or 
not work.  Policy formulation and implementation lead times of years, and possibly 
decades, instead of a hurried short 5 year time frame for the national roll out of 
interventions which are not achievable, even before policy implementation starts.  
Future approaches need to initially limit programs to those districts and provinces 
which seriously address governance reforms and have high levels of accountability and 
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reporting.  Future research needs to focus on what works rather than continuing as per 
the current approach. 
 
There has been significant research on global health policies, such as TB DOTS and Stop 
TB, and the success or otherwise of why these policies do or do not make it onto the 
global policy agenda (Quissell and Walt 2015, Shiffman, Quissell et al. 2015).  There is 
less research on how these policies are transferred to resource limited settings with 
limited capacity to adapt and implement the policies.  This research is a contribution to 
addressing that knowledge gap.  It is in the interests of global donors and also recipient 
countries to understand what actually takes place in the policy transfer and adaption 
process and especially the role of various actors and power relationships when policy 
transfer takes place. 
 
As this thesis is being finalized there is the first draft of the new WHO End TB Strategy 
(WHO 2015) which will take up from the 2006-2015 Stop TB Strategy(Stop TB 
Partnership and World Health Organization 2006).  The End TB Strategy sets the goal of 
eliminating TB by 2035.  The first of four principle of the End TB Strategy is 
Government stewardship and accountability with monitoring and evaluation(WHO 
2015).  In the new Strategy DOTS is not the only approach to drug sensitive TB and 
DOTS-Plus as the approach to MDR-TB.  There is openness to the promise of new 
diagnostics and treatments (Dooley, Nuermberger et al. 2013, Zumla, Schito et al. 
2014) now in the pipeline for TB control.  The programmatic issues around TB/HIV 
coinfection and dealing with drug resistant strains of TB (Maeurer, Schito et al. 2014) 
are also not confined to specific policy approaches i.e. only using the DOTS-Plus 
approach.  Important areas of TB control not addressed in the previous strategies such 
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as childhood TB (Marais and Graham 2014, Graham, Grzemska et al. 2015) are now 
identified as an important component of the TB policy problem (WHO 2014).   
 
The political level in PNG must also make hard decisions about what political 
commitment and leadership is and how it is exercised.  This research confirms that 
political commitment and leadership are the foundations of health policy.  The current 
approach to policy and the manner in which the political process plays out does not 
serve the people of PNG.  The short term materialistic gains of wantokism and 
clientelism do not result in governance structures which serve the greater good of 
PNG.  Only Papua New Guineans can address these fundamental issues and make 
changes.  This will require the exercise of political commitment and leadership in a way 
that focuses on the common good rather than clientelism.  PNG is a resource rich 
country and generates large revenues each year.  Those revenues are not currently 
translated into improved health services, education etc.  They disappear into the 
pockets of elites.  It is only by true political commitment and leadership from the 
political level that long term change will come about.  This change must come from 
within and be driven by PNG.   
 
Donors who become part of, and unquestioningly fund, a clientelist system do no 
service to the very people they aim to help.  Whilst ultimate power to bring about 
change rests at the political level in PNG, donors bring significant power to the policy 
process as we have seen.  The current donor approach of bypassing a weak and 
dysfunctional health system by creating parallel structures to meet the donor’s goals 
and targets, reporting requirements and accounting needs, in fact undermines and 
further weakens the PNG health system.  This is not health system strengthening.  
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Finally, researchers must develop and include in health policy research on agenda 
setting and policy transfer an analysis of local context particularly with regard to 
political commitment and governance as the starting point so as to inform the policy 
formulation, agenda setting and policy implementation process.  The three streams 
framework (Kingdon 2011) as adapted and refined to undertake global health policy 
analysis by Walt et. al. (Walt and Gilson 1994, Buse, Mays et al. 2006, Walt, Shiffman et 
al. 2008) provides a robust and tested framework for such analyses and especially for 
understanding critical power relationships in the policy process, as this research 
demonstrates.  However, recent refinements of these methods by Shiffman and the 
applications of those refinements to  agenda setting (Shiffman and Smith 2007) have 
focused largely on the influence of global networks in the uptake of global health 
policies e.g. maternal health(Shiffman 2007, Smith and Rodriguez 2015), TB (Quissell 
and Walt 2015) and tobacco control policy (Gneiting 2015).  The methodologies 
analyse the agenda setting and policy transfer process from the global health policy 
perspective with the assumption that the global policy is the most appropriate policy 
for the resource poor context.  Global health partnerships and global policy context are 
the main variables for analysis and whether global policies come onto the policy 
agenda.  There is little or no consideration of local context as the key variable for 
analysis in the transfer and adaptation of the global policy by the resource poor.  There 
is the unquestioned assumption that the global policy is what is best for the resource 
poor to which the policy is being transferred, with little critique or understanding of 
this process.  This overemphasis and focus on the global policy downplays, and even 
excludes, the local context in determining if the policy is formulated and transferred in 
such a way as to be implemented and have an actual impact on health outcomes.  
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Political commitment and governance are not included as variables in these methods.  
It is the least researched and understood, yet the first and central component of TB 
control, whether as part of TB DOTS or the new End TB Strategy as this research has 
demonstrated.  The research undertaken for this thesis, and other recent research 
critically examining PNG social and cultural institutions and their impact on health 
policy and service provision in PNG (Street 2012, Street 2014), needs to be the starting 
point in understanding if global policies are appropriate and implementable in PNG. 
 
Analysis of health policy in low-income countries must evaluate the local governance 
structures and cultural context in determining policy outcomes.  As I have argued in 
this thesis, the local context and governance structures play a vital role in policy 
success or otherwise.  Models for health policy analysis must incorporate analysis of 
local context and governance structures in order to understand the effect these 
variables play in determining policy outcomes. 
 
 Conclusion  11.6
Analysis of the policy drivers for the development of a TB control policy in PNG must 
start from the country’s unique social, historical and political context.  A failure to 
undertake this contextual analysis resulted in the 2006 TB policy not taking into 
consideration and failing to understand the complex local context.  The result was a 
policy with no local political commitment or ownership in its implementation, which 
required parallel structures to be implemented, which had little or no impact on 
building a sustainable and stronger health system, and which probably had no impact 
on the burden of TB.  The governments competing agendas and priorities within this 
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context illustrates the complexity of the policy dilemma in PNG.  Understanding the 
resulting tension contributes to understanding the barriers to political commitment of 
key actors in this process. 
 
If they are to effectively address TB donors and recipient governments need to include 
an analysis of local context and governance structures as a central component of the 
policy formulation and implementation process if implementation is to achieve the 
policy goals and targets.  The support offered by donors in policy transfer needs to be 
cognisant of the long time frame required to develop local capacity in low income 
settings.  The danger of not doing so is not simply a failure to reduce the burden of TB, 
but the development of policies which contribute to the emergence of drug restraint 
strains of TB, posing an even greater global public health threat. 
 
Finally, sustainable delivery of health policy requires that all aspects of political 
commitment (expressed commitment, institutional commitment, and budgetary 
commitment) need to be exercised at the political level in order to ensure governance 
structures which enable the delivery of context specific health policy.  In the end this is 
a matter only Papua New Guineans can address. 
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Appendices 
1. Profile of Interviewees 
There were a total of 18 interviewees for this research.  All interviewees signed the 
Consent Form after having read the Participant Information Sheet.  If the section of the 
consent form was not completed then it was assumed that consent had not been given 
and the interviewee is not identified.  Where the interview volunteered the reason for 
not being identified the usual reason was that their employment could have been 
affected by having their views expressed publically.  The interviewees who gave 
permission to be identified were: 
 
• Ms Tope Adepoybi, National Advocacy and Social Mobilization Coordinator, 
World Vision, Papua New Guinea.  12th April 2008 & 28th January 2010. 
• Dr Tom Konstantinos, Director of Queensland Health TB Services, AusAID 
consultant to PNG National TB Control Program Jan & Feb 2006.  7th May 2008 
• Professor Ron May, Emeritus Professor, Department of Political and Social 
Change, Australian National University; former Director, National Research 
Institute (NRI), Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea.  17th June 2008 
• Professor Hank Nelson, Professor of Political Science, Australian National 
University, Former Professor of Political Science, University of Papua New 
Guinea.  17th June 2008 
• Professor Ian Riley retired Professor of Community Medicine, School of 
Medicine & Health Sciences, University of Papua New Guinea; and former 
District Medical Officer, Mt Hagen, PNG.  10th February 2010 
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• Dr Kindin Ongugo, Specialist Physician, East New Britain Province, Papua New 
Guinea.  14th April 2008 
The backgrounds and organizations of all 18 interviews are set out in the Table below: 
 
Background of Interviewees 
 
 
PNG Health Sector 
 
7 
 
International NGO in PNG 
 
5 
 
Bilateral Funder 
 
2 
 
Academic / Researcher of PNG Politics / 
Policy Process 
 
3 
 
International TB Consultant 
 
1 
Table 11 – Background of Interviewees 
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2. Ethics Consent form 
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3. Participant Information Sheet 
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4. Monograph - Asante, A and Hall, J 2011, A review of health leadership and 
management capacity in Papua New Guinea, Human Resources for Health 
Knowledge Hub, University of New South Wales, Sydney 
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1 
5. Journal Article:  Ongugo, K., Hall, JJ, Attia, J (2011). "Implementing 
Tuberculosis Control in Papua New Guinea: A Clash of Culture and Science?" 
Journal of Community Health 36(3): 423-430 
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6.  Journal article:  Hall J, Gillespie J, Rosewell A, Mapria P.  The Papua New 
Guinea Cholera Outbreak: Implications for PNG, Australia and the Torres 
Strait.  Medical Journal of Australia. 2013. 199(9): 576-577 
 
 
10 
 
 
 
  
